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
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FINAL REPORT

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ISSUES OF CIVIL DEFENSE:
VINTAGE 1978

--SUMMARY RESULTS OF THE 1978 NATIONAL SURVEY--

BY


JIRI NEHNEVAJSA

PREPARED IN COLLABORATION WITH
GEORGE ROGERS AND STEVEN MANNERS

CONTRACT: DCPA01-77-C-0218
WORK UNIT: 4815B

FOR

DEFENSE CIVIL PREPAREDNESS AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301



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UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH
UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR SOCIAL AND URBAN RESEARCH

FEBRUARY, 1979

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FINAL REPORT

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VINTAGE 1978

--Summary Results of the 1978 National Survey--

by

Jiri Nehnevajsa

Prepared in collaboration with
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This report has been reviewed in the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency and approved for publication. Approval does not signify that the contents necessarily reflect the views and policies of the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency.

University of Pittsburgh
University Center for Social and Urban Research

February, 1979

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Issues of Civil Defense: 1978 National Survey		
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<p>△ This report deals with the aggregate results of a late 1978 survey of a probability sample of 1620 Americans (18 years of age and older in the 48 contiguous states) on issues central to the problem of civil defense. Many questions from previous national studies (1972, 1968, 1966, 1964, 1963) were repeated in the inquiry. The 1978 data show essentially the same results as did the previous inquiries: strong support for measures of civil defense that would</p>		

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20. Stand a chance to enhance the survivability of our people in face of a nuclear attack (as well as selected other nuclear hazards). There exists strong support for appropriate in-place shelter systems (both public fallout shelters and home basement sharing). The nation reflects a high level of support for programs to develop protection against primary effects of nuclear weapons as well (blast sheltering).

The 1978 survey included a major focus on issues having to do with crisis relocation. Since this has been a relatively new emphasis in DCPA, the questions raised in the inquiry are "new." But some of the items were used on a study of the 4th Congressional District of Missouri (Congressman Ike Skelton).

The national results, whenever comparable, parallel the 4th Congressional Missouri District's findings. The data show that considerable spontaneous evacuation might take place in face of an acute international crisis, though an important portion of such population flow might be maladaptive (movement from safe to safe areas, safe to high risk areas, high risk to other high risk areas--using TR-82 as the referent for defining "higher" risk and "safer" areas). Compliance with a Presidential directive to relocate can be expected to be high and by far most Americans also believe that there may well exist circumstances under which the President might actually opt for population relocation. Helpfulness of host communities is expected, and willingness to accommodate relocatees in private homes is high (higher, indeed, for the respondents themselves than in terms of their attribution of such willingness to others).

There exists low information level about civil defense, but high interest in emergency-related training and education, and high willingness to serve as a civil defense volunteer should the need arise.

Along with supportive assessments of civil defense in general and both in-place and relocation options more specifically, our people also support most key measures of arms control and disarmament thus seeing no contradiction at all between prudent measures of civil defense and advances in arms control agreements with the Soviets. The favorable climate of opinion makes it possible for the (Federal) Government to make almost whatever decisions might promote the enhancement of survival on the part of our people should the nation encounter an acute threat of nuclear confrontation.

PREFACE

We are quite indebted to the fine staff of the University Center for Social and Urban Research of the University of Pittsburgh for their support. This is particularly true about the unswerving help of the Center's Director, Professor Vijai Singh, and the outstanding work of the secretarial staff under the direction of Toni Guzik. We recognize the help of Marge Hazuka who managed the coding of the data, and the contributions of those staff members who aided in the data processing aspect of the study.

Indeed, we are gratified by the high quality and timeliness of effort on the part of the Marketing Information Services of Atlanta, Georgia to whom the field work of the study was entrusted. Our appreciation to John Massey and Michael Hardin is in special need of recognition.

But, of course, no one is responsible for the data analysis or interpretation except the senior author of this report who, however, could not have accomplished the task without the first rate contributions, as collaborators, of Steven Manners and George Rogers.

Jiri Nehnevajsa

February 15, 1979

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I. INTRODUCTION

This report highlights the main aggregate findings from the 1978 survey bearing on issues of civil defense.

By "aggregate findings" we mean simply the results as they characterize the national sample as a whole. The data thus pertain to distributions of responses, and relevant indices, without refinements as to who responds how, or how the various issues under inquiry relate to each other.

The sample (N=1620) is a national probability sample from the 48 contiguous states of the Union. It is stratified by region, city size, racial and socio-economic composition of the respective sampling areas. It includes those residents of the nation who are 18 years of age or older (and save for a very few respondents) they are American citizens (one respondent was not a citizen; in 22 cases, the citizenship status was not determined).

The field work, carried out on behalf of the University Center for Social and Urban Research of the University of Pittsburgh by Marketing Information Service of Atlanta, Georgia, was completed between September 16 and December 15, 1978.

The average interview lasted 71 minutes and this, then, represents the "burden" placed upon the respondent. But, of course, all responses were voluntary and it was made clear to the respondents that they need not participate in the study or, for that matter, they can refrain from answering any questions which they might prefer not to answer.

Complete confidentiality was assured. In fact, upon coding of the results, all information (front and back pages of the questionnaire) which might ever lead to the identification of the respondents were removed and destroyed. This means that such "identifier" data, the nature of which could lead to violations of the privacy provisions, no longer exist and can no longer be recovered in any manner.

The Sample Composition table gives a summary of the characteristics of the national sample. There are three omissions here which we, as researchers, consider significant: the religious preferences of the respondents and their own sense of religiosity; and political (party) preference.

These items were not included at the specific demand of the Office of Management and Budget.

Sample Composition

MAJOR SOCIO CULTURAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC TRAITS OF THE SAMPLE (N = 1620)

	Percent
A. <u>REGION</u>	
East	23.1
North Central	24.6
South	32.1
West	20.2
B. <u>CITY SIZE</u>	
Largest metropolitan areas (1,000,000 and over)	42.7
Other cities and metropolitan area	31.5
Rural areas	25.8
C. <u>SEX*</u>	
Men	43.8
Women	55.8

*In 5 cases, the interviewers failed to identify the sex of the respondent.

D. RACE*

White	83.6
Black	12.6
Oriental	6.4
Other	2.3

*1.0 percent refused to answer or visibly unidentifiable.

E. AGE*

18 - 21	9.4
22 - 29	21.8
30 - 44	28.7
45 - 64	26.3
65 and over	13.8

*Actual age data for each respondent exist. Here only a simple reclassification is given.

F. MARITAL STATUS *

Single, never married	18.5
Married	62.6
Divorced	6.8
Separated	2.5
Widowed	9.6

*Not answered by one respondent.

G. HOUSEHOLD SIZE*

One person	17.0
Two persons	28.3
Three persons	20.1
Four persons	18.8
Five persons	9.4
Six or more persons**	7.2

*An additional 0.4 percent (7 respondents) did not report the total size of the household.

**Data on actual numbers, six or over, are available in detail but here summarized over the established range (of up to 11 persons in the household, reported by one respondent only).

H. CHILDREN UNDER 5 YEARS OF AGE*

No child	63.0
One child	14.4
Two children	4.7
Three or more children	0.5

*The question was inapplicable to 16.1 percent of the respondents, and an additional 1.3 percent failed to answer it.

I. CHILDREN 5-13 YEARS OF AGE*

No child	56.2
One child	15.4
Two children	8.2
Three or more children	2.8

*Apart from inapplicability (16.1 percent), 1.2 percent did not answer.

J. CHILDREN 13-18 YEARS OF AGE

No child	61.4
One child	13.4
Two children	5.9
Three or more children	1.8

K. HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS 65 YEARS OF AGE AND OLDER*

None	71.9
One	12.2
Two	4.1
Three or four	0.3

*Inapplicable to 10.4 percent and not answered by 1.1 percent.

L. EMPLOYMENT STATUS (MAIN WAGE EARNER)*

Full time employment	69.6
Part time employment	5.6
Unemployed (by self-assessment)	6.8
Retired	17.0

*1.0 percent refusals to answer.

M. OTHER HOUSEHOLD MEMBER EMPLOYMENT

Yes	41.7
No	41.0
Inapplicable	17.2

N. FAMILY INCOME IN 1977*

Up to \$3,000	4.6
\$3,000 to \$4,999	8.0
\$5,000 to \$7,499	9.1
\$7,500 to \$9,999	8.0
\$10,000 to \$14,999	17.8
\$15,000 to \$24,999	26.6
\$25,000 and over	18.9

*Income information missing from 12.9 percent of the respondents.

O. LEVEL OF EDUCATION*

	<u>Respondent</u>	<u>Spouse</u>
No schooling	0.2	0.2
1 - 8 Years	8.2	5.6
9 - 11 Years	13.8	8.2
12 years (High school graduate)	38.5	23.2
Some college	19.1	9.1
College graduate	12.3	7.7
Advanced degrees or study	7.6	3.5

*0.3 percent didn't answer about their own formal schooling.
18.5 percent inapplicable regarding the education of spouse.
23.9 percent unable or unwilling to answer.

P. MEMBERSHIP IN LABOR UNION*

Yes	25.2
No	74.4

*Not answered by 0.3 percent (5 respondents).

Q. SELF-EVALUATED "SOCIAL CLASS"*

Upper	4.2
Middle	47.0
Working	37.8
Lower	5.7
"There are no classes"	2.1

*Question not answered by 3.1 percent.

R. OWNERSHIP OF RESIDENCE

Own	67.1
Rent	30.7
Other (group quarters, living with parents, relatives)	1.8

S. NUMBER OF RESIDENCES SINCE AGE 18*

One	7.9
Two	11.0
Three	15.7
Four	14.4
Five	11.3
Six to ten	23.7
Eleven or more	11.5

*No answer 6.5 percent.

T. MILITARY SERVICE*

Respondent or spouse	43.4
No military service	55.5

*1.1 percent missing data.

U. COMBAT EXPERIENCE

Yes, of total sample	18.1
No, of total sample	24.7
Yes, those with military service	42.3
No, those with military service	37.7

Now, the respondents in this 1978 survey (with an average of some 71 minutes of their time investment) were both cooperative and interested. The interviewer ratings in the post-interview assessment indicate that 80.3 percent were "very cooperative" and only 2.1 percent rather "uncooperative." In turn 56.1 percent of the respondents appeared "very interested" and 37.1 percent "interested" (with some 6.4 percent reported rather uninterested) in the subject matter of the inquiry.

This summary report is organized in terms of major themes:

Perceptions of Threat (Chapter II)

Survival Perceptions (Chapter III)

Opinions Regarding Warning (Chapter IV)

Perspectives on In-Place Protection (Chapter V)

Perspectives on Crisis Relocation (Chapter VI)

Civil Defense Costs (Chapter VII)

Training and Education (Chapter VIII)

Volunteering for Civil Defense (Chapter IX)

Information Level (Chapter X)

Assessments of Soviet and American Military Might (Chapter XI)

Arms Control and Disarmament Perspectives (Chapter XII)

The "No Civil Defense" Situation (Chapter XIII)

and a concluding section.

Since many of the 1978 questions were also included in previous surveys, and most were incorporated in an identical form in 1972, aggregate comparisons of the results are made whenever possible.

Furthermore, some of the questions of the national survey were also incorporated into a (telephone) survey among voters of the 4th Congressional District of Missouri, a study carried out at the request of Congressman Ike Skelton. Thus, some comparisons with the Missouri data are also cited whenever appropriate.

The tabulations of the summary data are provided, in detail, as Appendix A. These summary data are sectioned according to their relevant chapter for easier reference. In the body of the report, no detailed references to the tabulations are made but the textual and tabular material represents a further summarization of the more detailed data.

Some of the main lines of further analysis are specifically mentioned in each chapter of the report. All such references have to do with analyses which can, and will be carried out on the basis of the existing information so that there are no allusions here to analytic postures in the absence of relevant data.

The main thrust of the findings will, of course, not be affected by any subsequent analytic refinements. But it is precisely such refinements which will allow us a better understanding of the findings and which will permit us to draw even firmer policy-relevant conclusions than those which we feel compelled to draw already.

Last, but not least: we do not assume in any way at all that matters of difficult national choice can be decided by sentiments and views reflected in public opinions surveys, no matter how well decided or how well carried out or how well analyzed and interpreted.

The views of our respondents are not votes. They do not carry the mandate of legally constituted national will as do formal elections of the nation's leaders or appropriate referenda.

This means, of course, that the results--robust as they are--establish one of the inputs, though we believe one of the significant inputs, into the relevant policy deliberations as they bear on problems of civil defense. The policy makers must peruse other information--technological, legal, more narrowly "political," economic and otherwise.

Be it as it may, the data are a powerful--and consistent--voice of our people at this time. They are a riverbed which facilitates the smooth flow of some policy while constraining others. They are a body of information which, in simple terms, it would be totally imprudent to disregard or to treat with less seriousness than the seriousness with which these 1620 Americans responded to our probing inquiries.

II. THE THREAT

In the 1978 national study, we sought to assess perceptions of risk along several dimensions: for one, the feeling of an ambient sense of danger; second, the threat of nuclear war; third, the risk to the geographic area of each respondent's residence should nuclear war occur; and fourth, the dangers of nuclear events other than those predicated on a war scenario.

The ambient threat was measured by probing into the perceptions of international tensions. As in other studies, we sought to determine (relative to a scale from 0 to 10) how tense the current world situation seemed to be, how it appeared, on recall, some two years ago, and how it might, by expectation, evolve over the coming next two years, to about 1980.

The threat of nuclear war was assessed by seeking estimates of war likelihood which is an index of threat intensity, and by asking about the timing of such a war (when might it occur, if at all) which helps to assess the acuteness of the danger, such as it may be.

The area-specific risks (themselves contingent on the actualization of a war) were measured by probing whether Americans thought that the country's area in which they live would be a likely target. In turn, should the area not be a focus of a direct attack (a target), what might be the level of danger that secondary weapons effects (fallout) would present.

Finally, our current conceptualization of "other-than-war" nuclear hazards included a concern over a nuclear power plant accident, a terrorist take-over of a nuclear power facility, and the possibility of a nuclear weapon (regardless of the means by which it may be acquired) in the hands of some terrorist group or organization.

The likelihood of such hazards was measured over a time horizon stretching up to 1985.

Of the three non-war nuclear threats, two are area-specific and one is more diffuse or, if you wish, also ambient. A nuclear power plant accident or a terrorist take-over of a power plant (with the attendant

potential threat to "blow it up" unless whatever demands were met) refer to dangers which are geographically circumscribed with a particular nuclear facility at the hub of the plausible problem. The (blackmail) use of a nuclear device on the part of some terrorist group or organization, in turn, is not geographically definable in that the danger might, possibly, arise anywhere and its blackmail "effectiveness" might well be the greatest in, or around, the most densely populated areas of the nation, the major cities.

The 1978 survey incorporated these threat perception themes for a simple reason: in a world without risk, emergency preparedness systems would presumably not be needed at all; in a threatening world, we can expect higher receptivities to all that goes into measures to prevent the risk from actualizing, readiness to cope with it should it materialize anyway, and a capacity to minimize its effects and aftermaths.

We assume, of course, no simple relationship between risk perceptions and receptivities to emergency systems which are supposed to address the particular risks (in preventive, coping or ameliorative manner).

Thus it may well be that some level of risk (with non-zero probabilities) can be "absorbed" by our people without any strong feeling that the nation needs, or should have, ways to deal with it. Hence, non-acceptance of emergency preparedness systems does not have to go strictly with zero threat probabilities, but might characterize the likelihood of danger up to some threshold value beyond which, however, the need for appropriate measures begins to become manifest.

It may well be that some emergency preparedness systems themselves could be construed as contributing to the accentuation of the danger, itself considered real, so that their overall effect yields higher costs (not merely fiscal) than potential benefits.

It could be the case that some risks are real, intense and even acute, but there exists a feeling that nothing can work to mitigate them so that efforts at emergency preparedness measures are futile and wasteful.

We use these possibilities (or, if you wish, hypotheses) as illustrative of the complexities rather than because the examples exhaust the gamut of interpretable results. The point is, of course, that our analysis must focus on such, and other, "meanings" of the data, as it will, and that it is this class of considerations which gave rise to the

rationale for the inclusion of the variety of threat perception issues which the survey incorporated in its 1978 design.

Furthermore, the objective (or objectifiable) risk levels might be similar, or very different, from the risk perceptions on the part of our people.

To exemplify: the assessment of international tensions (ambient threat) may be different among the Government's experts (representing not objective, but "objectified" danger) than among our people, or it may be quite similar.

The risk of war (itself also not "objectively" measurable but again "objectifiable" by the prevailing sense of the experts in the intelligence community--regardless of whether their judgments would prove right or mistaken) may be also similar, or different, for the salient actors (Government; the nation's public).

The primary or secondary weapons effects danger to particular areas of the nation ("objective," as in TR-82, if certain assumptions about the strategic war plans of the adversary are accurate, "objectifiable" if alternative attack-scenaria were considered) also may display similar patterns of agreements and disagreements between the more objective and the perceptual environments. Thus our people may well live in an area which is viewed as highly threatened in the event of a war, but be unaware of this (or suppress the feeling that they live, indeed, in a threatened area), while others, in as "objectively" less threatened environment might perceive high levels of threat--and so on.

Thus apart from the importance of the threat perception issues in their implications for acceptabilities of various emergency preparedness systems, the interactions between "objective" (or "objectified") imageries of threat and the "perceptions" of threat suggest somewhat different policy sweeps.

A simplified schematization is provided in Table 1. That cost-effectiveness and cost-benefits (as much as these can, in fact, be determined) of the various relevant action courses require an additional assessment, and that the outcomes of such evaluations are affected by the more calibrated levels of threat assessment (rather than in terms of the primitive dichotomization included in the Table) goes without saying.

Table 1
OBJECTIVE AND PERCEIVED THREAT: SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Objective or Objectified Level of Threat	Perceptions of Threat Level	Plausible Action	Objectives of Action
Low	Low	No action; but reassurance of the public that its career assessment is, and remains, accurate	To insure that public perceptions do not change toward higher threat perceptions
Low	High	Public education as to reason for which the "actual" threat level is low 1. Public education, followed by 2. Emergency preparedness system development	To convince the public that the perceived threat is not real, or not as real as might be thought To first enlighten the public that the threat is real; to insure acceptability of system needed to cope with the threat; to maximize, as last step, the nation's capacity to deal with the threat
High	Low	OR Actual development of an emergency preparedness system	To change public perception of threat by Government action; to implement a system because it is "needed" even though our people might not feel that it is, in fact, needed
High	High	Development of an emergency preparedness system	To maximize national capability to deal with the risk, should it actualize; to respond to public sentiment

The cutting edge of decision, of course, is one which straddles some threat probability which is sufficiently low (if not actually zero--in which case the decision problem is greatly simplified) so that the "utility calculus" (threat probability intersect with threat impact if it should materialize despite its low probability) suggests that the risk can, for all practical purposes, be ignored.

The cutting edge of decision is also one in which the development of an emergency system, and its existence, does not alter the probabilities of threat in a negative way (from tolerably low to high), a matter of particular concern with regard to the "effect" of emergency preparedness systems upon the likelihood of war itself (that is, upon the perceptions, objectifications, intentions or plans of an adversary), and with respect to tactical considerations (that is, upon the adversary's plans bearing on the choice of targets, patterns of weapons deployment, attack timings and the like).

In mentioning some of the issues that link threat perceptions to the more objective assessments, and that relate threat perceptions to sentiments regarding measures of emergency preparedness, we have merely explored some of the underlying logic for the inclusion of such issues in our study instruments. In this report, we do not propose to undertake the analyses which are called for to shed light on some of the problems we have pointed to.

Rather, we shall only indicate how our people, in the latter part of 1978, perceive the respective threats. Subsequently, we will have an opportunity to evaluate the results in terms of the more complex, if not overwhelming, relations both to views regarding emergency preparedness systems and the more objectified assessments of the global and national environment.

A. International Ambience

In Table 2, we present the long-range trends as they reveal the manner in which Americans view the international context. In our national studies of 1963, 1964, 1966, 1972 and 1978 we asked about the level of international tensions.

In all these surveys, except in 1978 (due to the need for economy in light of other issues that had to be raised and seemed more important), we sought to determine not only how our people assessed the then-current

Table 2
PERCEPTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS

Level of Tensions In	1963	1964	Year of Survey 1966	1972	1978
1961	6.51				
1962	↑	6.57			
1963	6.95				
1964	↓	6.92	5.61		
1965	7.03	↓	↑		
1966	↓	6.90	7.59		
1967	↓		↓		
1968	6.51		7.42		
1969		6.22	↓		
1970			↓	6.91	
1971			6.35	↑	
1972				7.02	
1973				↓	
1974				6.54	
1975				↓	
1976				6.15	
1977					6.23
1978					6.70
1979					↓
1980					7.12

level of tensions (on a scale from 0 to 10, from zero to "maximum"), but also how they evaluated, by recall, the tensions two years prior to the survey date, and, by anticipation, the tensions two and five years in the future. In the 1978 survey, the five year time horizon, somewhat regrettably, was omitted.

The basic "story" is straightforward enough:

1. International tensions have been seen as moderately high throughout the period—in the 6 and 7 point range of the 0-10 point scale.

2. The middle sixties and early seventies were characterized by higher current tension perceptions than either the early sixties or the late seventies.
3. In every case, the past (2 years ago) seemed better than the present (as of the year of the survey) though not substantially so.
4. In general, the future seemed somewhat better than the present, especially over the five year horizon, but there are two crucial exceptions with respect to the two year perspective:
 - (a) The 1963 survey revealed a pattern of tensions increasing, if only somewhat, from the past to the then-present to the future.
 - (b) The 1978, the current, survey, displays a similar pattern in which lower past (1976) tensions have increased into 1978, and are further expected to increase toward the end of the decade.
5. The major tone of the data, of course, shows that the world is anything but risk-free, and that a sense of danger has been felt by our people whether they assess the recent past (2 years ago), the present (as of the date of the surveys) or the future (2 or 5 year perspectives respectively).

The pattern of tensions of the 1960's may well be, in good measure, explainable by the context of the war in Viet Nam. This, of course, makes the 1978 data particularly important: the world environment is seen as deteriorating (though not dramatically so) even though there is no current conflict in which the United States would be engrossed in a major political, not to speak military, manner.

B. The Threat of War

If questions concerning international tensions (useful as they are also to open up an interview situation with the generality involved and the impossibility of the respondent to be, or to feel, "wrong" regardless of answer) have to do with a more diffuse sense of concern, the issue regarding the possibilities of nuclear war is quite specific.

Table 3
LIKELIHOOD OF NUCLEAR WAR

Study Year	Percent Evaluating Likelihood as 50-50 or Higher	Likelihood Index*
1963	53.2	.456
1964	49.9	.423
1966	51.8	.432
1972	49.2	.415
1978	58.6	.469

*In the 1963, 1964 and 1966 surveys, a likelihood scale from 0 to 10 was used.

In the 1972 and 1978 studies, the 5 point scale is converted to a 0 - 1.00 scale. Those who said that a nuclear war was "very likely" were assigned a value of 1.00; the respondents who thought that war was "likely" were given a value of .75; those in the 50-50 bracket were given a value of .5; the Americans who considered a nuclear war "unlikely" or "very unlikely" were given values of .25 and .00 respectively.

The key conclusions are of the following kind:

1. The anticipations regarding nuclear war were higher in the 1950's (without providing the actual evidence here, but based on numerous surveys of the period) than in the 1960's or in the 1970's.
2. The late 1960's and the early 1970's were characterized by a lowered perception of a nuclear war threat (and, as we have seen, not necessarily by lowered perception of overall international tensions, largely attributable to the Viet Nam conflict which, by implication, did not seem likely to escalate into a major nuclear confrontation), whereas the dangers seemed greater in the early 1960's--and again in late 1978.
3. The 1978 data reveal the highest expectations of nuclear war over the 15 year interval which the particular national studies cover. This, in turn, is in keeping with the heightened sense of international tensions in terms of the pattern of changes from past to present to future.
4. The trend between 1972 and 1978 is particularly crucial in this regard--and it manifests itself as a change from 49.2 percent

to 58.6 percent of those who consider another world war as having 50-50 or higher probabilities, and as a shift by .054 points on the likelihood scale itself.

Furthermore, the aggregate result may mask some important regional differences. In our analysis of Congressman Skelton's data from the 4th Congressional District of Missouri (based on telephone interviews of a sample of 300 from the 16 county area, but using an instrument which we designed for the purpose, and thus involving many identical items to the 1978 national survey), we might suspect that the pattern of threat might be different for those areas of the country which are somewhat more like the Missouri District.

Though the percentage of respondents who thought that a nuclear war had 50-50 or higher probabilities is not dissimilar (61.0 percent in the Missouri district and 58.6 percent nationwide), the likelihood index is .621 in the 4th District (and .469 nationally) thus suggesting a different distribution which gives rise to the overall measure.

As far as the underlying tendency is concerned, the results support the conclusion that the threat of war is seen as having increased by the late 1970's when compared with the early part of the decade, or the latter years of the preceding decade as well.

The 1972 study indicated that the median number of years within which a nuclear war was expected was about 7 1/4 years (thus about late 1979), and 34.0 percent of the respondents placed the possible conflict into the interval of 10 years and beyond.

In 1978, we find the median war expectation to lie within 9 1/4 years --thus in the middle half of the late 1980's with 66.4 percent of the respondents (of the total sample: while the median is estimated only on the basis of those who were willing to provide a time assessment) placing it into the 10 year plus bracket (but, indeed, 10 years being the modal response characteristic of 26.2 percent of the total sample).

Hence, we conclude:

1. The threat of nuclear war is perceived to be both real and serious.
2. The threat is, however, not "acute" in the sense that war would seem to be, from the perspective our people, imminent or relatively imminent.

If we assume that our people do not want war, an assumption which is so eminently reasonable as to be just about beyond challenge (though we do not have recent empirical evidence to substantiate it precisely because we have felt that it does not call for such evidence), the data--with analytic refinements to follow in subsequent reports--suggest the following obvious policy implications:

1. The reality and the severity of the perceived threat facilitates a national climate of opinion in which Government actions are oriented toward reducing, minimizing or doing away with the threat (deterrence, negotiations, arms control agreements, disarmament measures).
2. The reality and severity of the threat also suggests a national ambience in which actions to minimize the impact of war, should it occur and should it not become avoidable by measures previously mentioned, would also prove welcome (active as well as passive defense systems).
3. In principle, the data would indicate that both measures of war probability reduction and war coping should prove appreciated by the nation's body politic in the absence of certainty whether threat reduction is possible or likely or whether effective coping measures might not only help to deal with the war insult, should it occur, but also to reduce the threat (as an aspect of deterrence).

The basic non-acuteness of the otherwise real and serious threat, furthermore, has still another implication for policy:

- * There is a sense of "reasonable" leadtime over which measures to reduce the war probabilities or to deal with the consequences of war can be taken. On the whole, the nation is seen as having 10 or more years to "tool up" for a potential war, or to decrease its risks (and thus "tool up" for not having to face the prospects of such a conflagration).
- * The non-immediacy of the danger is a factor in its low saliency, and low saliency is a factor in low levels of actual demands for war likelihood reduction or for emergency preparedness systems so that Government cannot expect to be "pressured," by the nation's body politic, to do anything but can, in an optimal world, provide the leadership and thereby respond to the uneasiness which permeates the country.

To repeat: further analyses of the data as well as analyses of comparable information from prior studies will permit us to interpret the policy implications more precisely.

For some Americans, of course, no risk of war seems to exist. In 1978, 2.3 percent of the respondents, asked about the likelihood of war, refrained from answering the question in terms of the probability scale and emphasized that a nuclear war would simply never happen. When asked about the possible timing of a nuclear war, 7.8 percent volunteered the view that such a conflict would never come about.

This indicates, of course, that some proportion of those who really thought that a war had zero probabilities initially said that a conflict was "very unlikely," and only when forced to consider the timing of such a war, chose to make clear that this "very unlikely" response actually meant "zero" likelihood.

Given the sample size, we may conclude that the national percentage of those, 18 years of age and older, who discount the threat of nuclear war altogether lies, with confidence of .95, between about 5.8 and 9.8 percent.

This is a somewhat lower percentage than the 1972 national study revealed. In this early 1970's inquiry, 13.1 percent were convinced that a nuclear war simply would never occur--and with the respective sample size (N=1302) this yields an estimate (at the .95 level of confidence) of between 11.1 and 15.1 percent at that time.

Thus if the overall likelihood of a war has increased (though its probable timing shifted further into the future), the expectation that war would never come declined at the same time.

There was also an increase in anticipating a Soviet-Chinese war. In 1972, the likelihood index was .373 (with 38.5 percent falling into the 50-50 and higher likelihood categories), while it was .473 (with 56.9 percent in the corresponding likelihood groupings) in the current, 1978, study.

Since a Soviet-Chinese war might, under some circumstances, lead to an American involvement, we asked about the likelihood of such involvement among those Americans who thought that a conflagration in the Far East was at least as likely as not.

Among these (38.5 percent) 1972 respondents, an American involvement yielded a likelihood of .542; among the 1978 interviewees (56.9 percent), the likelihood turned out to be .608.

The relative priorities which we attached to various items in the 1978 study and the obvious time constraint on the length of interviews made it necessary not to include questions about smaller, brushfire wars and the possible American entanglement, with its escalating potential, in such limited wars. The 1972 estimate is thus the best we have, indicating a likelihood of .389 that such conflicts would take place and that American military presence would be involved.

C. Area Risk

By using TR-82 assessments, and "locating" each respondent (in terms of the Primary Sampling Unit) relative to residing or not residing in one of the high risk areas of the nation, we find that 74.8 percent of the 1620 interviewees of the 1978 survey live in designated high risk areas.

This information, indeed, will permit us to make comparisons between the perspectives on emergency preparedness measures of those who live in riskier parts of the nation and those who, by the attack premises of the TR-82 analysis, reside in safer areas.

Be it as it may, 53.4 percent of the 1978 respondents believe that there exists a "certain" or "very great" danger that their residential area, somewhat broadly conceived, would be a likely target. The likelihood which the data imply is about .642--and this compares with the .619 index (and 48.7 percent in the "certain" or "very great" danger categories) in the 4th Congressional District of Missouri.

Both the national 1978 data and the Summer 1978 Missouri results suggest that many people in high risk areas may be simply unaware of the dangers--indeed, though just about all of the counties in the 4th Congressional District of Missouri are located in a high risk region, the target danger index, .619, is lower than it would be were the residents actually attuned to the risks they might have to face.

Similarly, since some 75 percent of the national respondents actually live in high risk areas, the overall index (of likelihood of being in a target area) of .642 also suggests a greater feeling of safety than analyses of the TR-82 variety would support.

In 1972, we found that 43.4 percent of the 1302 respondents thought that they were residing in likely target areas--and the likelihood index of .621 along with the percentage of respondents under perceived severe threat indicate an upward shift between 1972 and 1978.

If a particular area were not to prove to be a target, 48.3 percent in 1978, and 49.2 percent in 1972, expected that their general residential area would be exposed to significant fallout. The likelihood (of fallout) indices yield .637 in 1978 and .672 in 1972.

But only 1.5 percent (1978) and the same percentage in 1972 were convinced that there would be "no danger" of fallout at all, and 4.4 percent (1978) or 3.1 percent (1972) felt rather sure that their area was also in "no danger" of being a likely target.

The 1978 respondents who thought that their area was in "certain," "very great" or "some" danger of being a target were also asked to explain what it might be about the area that would make it a likely target.

In all, 1242 of the 1620 respondents were probed in this manner.

- * 37.3 percent referred to INDUSTRY
- * 32.1 percent cited specific MILITARY INSTALLATIONS, and another 2.2 percent mentioned MISSILE installations.
- * 19.0 percent simply referred to the fact that they live in, or near, a CITY.
- * 17.5 percent cited UTILITIES or POWER PLANTS as the most likely target objective of the adversary in their particular area.
- * 16.0 percent viewed the fact that their area was a TRANSPORTATION HUB as a critical factor.
- * 8.5 percent mentioned POPULATION itself as the main reason for a probable targetting of the area, and
- * 5.7 percent were convinced that their area was to be subjected to an attack because it is a GOVERNMENT CENTER.
- * AMMUNITION DEPOTS were cited by 2.9 percent of the relevant respondents, and
- * 8.5 percent mentioned other than any of the above factors (such as natural resource deposits, agricultural and the like), and
- * Only 3.8 percent of these 1242 threatened respondents were unable, or unwilling, to state a reason why their area might be subject to an adversary's direct attack, while 42.4 percent gave two main reasons, and 10.2 percent three reasons for feeling that their area would, in fact, be a target.

The data then support the conclusion that Americans, in the late 1970's, consider the risk of war to be both real and severe, though not imminent, but

also that many are quite convinced that their own residential area would be impacted by such a war, either being an actual target or being subjected to significant fallout effects. In this regard, the study indicates that the epidemiology of the target risk may actually somewhat underestimate those dangers which more objectified analyses, such as those on which TR-82 was predicated, might point to.

Furthermore, most of those who believe themselves in the pathway of an adversary attack have also a fairly clear idea--accurate or not--why their particular areas would be included in a targetting plan.

The feeling that the world is rather safe from a risk of nuclear confrontation, or that their areas are rather safe should a conflict come about, characterizes only few of our citizens.

Under these circumstances, it is difficult to imagine that our people would want to do nothing, or only little, in the way of emergency preparedness. But then, of course, what they might be willing to do or what might be more objectionable is precisely a central theme of this inquiry.

D. Other Nuclear Hazards

In the 1970's many nuclear power plants have become operational. Others are under construction. Still others are in various planning stages.

Without doubt, the development of nuclear energy has been a subject of heated controversy. The risks of accidents have received wide publicity.

But other dangers, too, have been suggested. For one, the possibility that a nuclear facility might be taken over by terrorists and that they might threaten nearby communities as "hostages." Second, the possibility that terrorists might acquire a nuclear device, if only a small one, has also emerged especially in face of wide publicity received by two undergraduates (one at Princeton and one at M.I.T.) who were able to design and construct a potentially effective small nuclear weapon.

Since diversion of weapon grade uranium or of plutonium is not an impossibility, the problem of nuclear power facilities has come to be compounded not only by problems of waste storage but also by the risks of theft, and terroristic misuse, of nuclear materials.

No questions of this type were raised in the 1972 survey--and the issues were simply not salient at all in the 1960's. But in 1978, we included

several probes into nuclear dangers of the non-war variety because the concerns have become real and because the underlying issues have come to be placed on the nation's agenda.

In Table 4, we provide the likelihood indices associated with the three major hazards about which specific questions were asked in the course of the 1978 study.

Table 4
LIKELIHOOD OF SELECTED NUCLEAR HAZARDS
(1978)

	Likelihood Index (By 1985)
Nuclear power plant accident*	.479
Terrorist takeover of a nuclear facility	.470
Acquisition of a nuclear device by terrorists** and threat to an American city or community	.512

*An accident which would release significant fallout.

**The item implies an actual threat to a city or other community in the United States based on terrorist claims that they have a nuclear device.

In a more objectified sense, the probability of a power plant accident may be so low as to be, for practical purposes, negligible. The Rassumsen report comes up with a probability of about 5×10^{-9} when it considers a serious accident (core meltdown, release of fallout, "favorable" wind conditions, and a sizeable population downwind).

Even were the most severe critics of such estimates more accurate than WASH-2000 and the probabilities were 1,000 times higher than those presented, the objective likelihood is clearly very low (even given several hundred of nuclear power plants).

If our people may underestimate the target risk to their area in the event of a war, they appear to overestimate the well-publicized hazards of a power plant accident of major proportions. But the concern is quite clearly real, and the data on possible terrorist actions (facility takeover or nuclear blackmail of an American community) further underscore the nation's not

insignificant worry. At the same time, the favorableness index regarding power plant installations is .581 (with 61.2 percent being either "strongly in favor" or "in favor" of plant construction) so that our people, in effect, tend to say that the risks are, on the whole, worth taking.

Nonetheless, when it comes to having a nuclear facility within a 50 mile radius, the picture changes in important ways: 45.1 percent of the respondents fall into the favorable categories, while 48.5 percent tend to be inclined to oppose, and the favorableness index falls to .460. Thus nuclear power plants "somewhere else" rather than in one's (50-mile) vicinity are significantly more acceptable.

Further interpretation of the results will, of course, become possible because we also know that 32.5 percent of the respondents claim that there already exists a nuclear power plant within a 50-mile radius of their residence, and among those who make no such assertion, 20.1 percent (and thus 6.8 percent of the total sample) stated that a power plant was either being built in, or planned for, this wider geographic area of the respondents' residence.

The data base will thus permit us to ascertain not only the relative accuracy of knowledge about nuclear power plants (by comparing the assertions regarding facilities in the respondent's area with actual distribution of power plants), or the degree to which threat perception vary as a function of nearness to such facilities, but also the extent to which the perspectives on needed emergency preparedness systems vary dependent on the relevant nuclear threat perceptions and/or the actual nearness of nuclear facilities.

E. Conclusions

It does not seem necessary to restate the more specific conclusions which we have already reported. To be sure, the findings hold, in the manner in which they have been presented, only in the aggregate--for the national sample as a whole. No analytic refinement has been incorporated into the current report although we have, on a number of occasions, indicated some of the directions in which the analysis must proceed and the kinds of questions which it needs to address.

At this overall level, the data clearly show that our people do not believe that they live in a risk-free world. Thus emergency management systems would certainly not be dismissed as "unneeded" were it not even for

the further fact that we refrained from exploring the perceived dangers of various major natural disasters or other non-nuclear man-made catastrophies. To be sure, we did ask about exposure to various hazards (floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes and "other" disasters) but not about their likelihood. We shall, of course, return to the issue of exposure to mass emergencies and its bearing upon perspectives on preparedness and mitigation systems later in the report.

Not only is the world not free of (nuclear) risk, the data lead us to conclude that the sense of danger has increased throughout the 1970's, although not dramatically so. But the world is a more threatening place in 1978 than it had been in 1972 or, for that matter, in the waning years of the 1960's.

At the same time, the relatively long lead times which the results mirror would not instill a sense of urgency in the nation's body politic so that articulated public demands for systems deemed adequate cannot be expected under the prevailing conditions of the national mood in the late 1970's.

However, the lead times permit both prudent thinking and prudent planning, and the general perceptions of the reality, and relative severity, of the dangers provide a climate of opinion which can only facilitate such efforts as might be undertaken.

III. SURVIVABILITY

To evaluate how our people, in their intuitive ways, size up their survival prospects should a nuclear war come about, the 1978 study included four major questions. One, we wanted to know what the survival odds might look like if a war were to start "next week." The purpose of such phrasing (used also in previous surveys) is not to suggest that a nuclear war would, in fact, be a "next week's war." Rather, the item implies that the nation would have to cope with the conflict as best it could with whatever system is in existence at the time.

Two, we sought to determine what the expected outcome would be if people were in fallout shelters. This, of course, avoids the issue of how many people could get to fallout shelters in time (in an out-of-the-blue war scenario in which only tactical warning might be available), and what their distribution would be relative to the quality of protection, in turn, relative to the likely fallout magnitudes. The issue (also used in previous surveys) is deliberately worded so as to assume a (fallout) sheltered posture in order to determine whether, and how much, shelters are believed to affect survivability.

Three, the 1978 survey (but not previous studies) also inquires into survivability of our population should it be provided with blast shelter protection. The probe was included after we determined whether, and how many, respondents felt that it would be desirable to construct blast shelters rather than merely rely on protection against fallout (and thus, on fallout sheltering).

Fourth, following a detailed probe (also not used in prior surveys) of crisis relocation, we sought to ascertain the survivability perceptions if relocation would take place. Thus, the question assumes a posture in which the high risk areas are evacuated (regardless of the numbers of stayputs which may characterize the actual situation).

The perceived survival likelihood under these varied circumstances is summarized in Table 5.

Table 5
SURVIVAL LIKELIHOOD UNDER DIFFERENT
BASIC POSTURES

Survivability in:	Nationwide 1978	Missouri 1978*	Nationwide 1972
"Next week's war"***	.315	.296	.344
Fallout shelters	.584	.585	.602
Blast shelters	.642	data not available	
Relocated posture	.558	data not available	

*4th Congressional District of Missouri, N = 300. Summer, 1978 data.

**Implicitly, making the best of whatever the present system can offer.

The results, of course, are quite important. Above all, they show that any of the three major alternatives to the "current state" of the system is seen as sharply enhancing national survivability.

The data also show that blast protection facilities are seen as insuring higher survival rates than do fallout shelters or than crisis relocation might induce. Finally, the data indicate that there is some belief that a fallout sheltered population might survive somewhat better than a relocated one.

Our subsequent analysis will, of course, seek to assess the reasons for these survival evaluations with special emphasis on the greater attributed effectiveness of fallout sheltering than of crisis relocation.

If we confront the data with the March 1978 System Planning Corporation study of Candidate U.S. Civil Defense Programs, we may be able to interpret even these aggregate results somewhat better.

The "next week's war" situation basically parallels Program B (p. 25ff) of the SPC report. It assumes "current funding" and no crisis relocation planning. The estimated survivability is 30 percent--thus just about what our people intuitively suggest by their response to the survival

question in the late survey. The "best use of present shelter but no CRP" alternative, Program C of the referenced document, comes somewhat close to our notion of a fallout sheltered population. The survey results yield higher survivability (.584) than does the SPC inquiry (which gives an estimate of about 38 percent). Even a significantly up-graded fallout shelter program (thereby going well beyond the "present system's best use") is unlikely to produce objectified survival rates of 58.4 percent under the attack scenario postulated. The data suggest that the many years of emphasis on fallout shelter systems may have yielded a somewhat inflated belief in their effectiveness--or, at least in their effectiveness against the types and magnitudes of attacks which the future (say, mid-1980's) seems to indicate.

The "blast sheltering" alternative approximates well Program F. Here, we find that our respondents underestimate survivability. The study of Candidate Civil Defense Programs yields an estimate of about 90 percent of survivors, while the survey implies a rate of only about 64.2 percent.

Finally the relocation option in our study straddles Programs D and E (but is more like the former alternative than the latter one) for which the estimates of survivors range between 71 percent (if the relocatees were targetted, Program D with its relocation to farms and hamlets) and 91 percent (if the relocatees were not targetted--Program E with somewhat less extensive relocation but some blast protection available).

The 1978 national survey leads to an estimate of 55.8 percent survivability and, as is the case with blast shelters, the national mood is more pessimistic about the effectiveness of such a program than war gaming analysis of the particular class of attacks would suggest.

In sum, our people have an intuitively rather accurate feeling about survival chance with the "present" civil defense system, they overestimate the effectiveness of fallout shelters (especially when the standard of a "typical" mid-1980 attack is used), and they underestimate the payoff which might result from blast protection and from (successful) crisis relocation.

IV. WARNING

In previous surveys, the issue of warning was generally viewed along three lines: one, the way in which our people expect to be warned should an attack be imminent; two, their assessment of the time which would be available to act between the receipt of a warning and the actual insult; three, general evaluations of the adequacy of the nation's warning system.

If these were for the most part, the typical patterns of questions raised in earlier studies, the fabric of responses, too, is rather typical and fairly simple:

1. People expect to be warned by television, radio and sirens-- in that relative order of importance, though radio is often seen playing, in this regard, even more of a role than television.
2. About one half of our people felt (for instance in the 1964 national survey) that there would be 15 minutes less time available between the issuance of a warning and the attack itself and just about 10 percent of Americans believe that there might be more than 2 hours of time.
3. The nation's warning system tended to be rated as fair-to-good (with a typical rating of 47.6 on a 100 point scale) implying a not too unrealistic probability, as of the mid-1960's, of .476 of being effectively warned against the danger of an impending attack.

In "out-of-the-blue" conflicts, of course, there would exist at best limited tactical warning. For conflict scenarios grounded in patterns of sudden attacks, the data from previous surveys are appropriate, and there is little reason to believe that the nation's reactions would have changed in important ways by the late 1970's. But as some forms of strategic warning become more plausible, and as most contemporary scenarios are predicated on an onset of hostilities following a period of escalating tensions (and thus, are based on crises conceptualizations), we need

to ascertain the public's views regarding actionable warning time in a more strategic, or crisis-nested, environment.

The matter becomes even more pressing in light of efforts to develop crisis relocation plans since all measures of evacuation (disregarding the instances of last minute flight) require significantly more than what would be considered tactical warning time.

The availability of at least some strategic warning—even were it simply in the form of clues derived by the public from media reports and Government statements in the course of a deteriorating international crisis—would also tend to enhance the effectiveness of in-place systems.

If some movement to shelter began prior to the issuance of an attack warning itself, or if perhaps some Americans were to spend their non-working hours in shelters during a deepening crisis, the chances that the population might be sheltered in the event of an actual attack would certainly be increased.

Furthermore, the construction of expedient shelter might be possible, as would be opportunities to upgrade existing facilities (by such measures as earth piling and the like).

In the 1978 national survey we chose not to include questions about warning time with respect to an imminent attack. Rather, we asked about the time our people think they would have from the moment they would, by whatever means, conclude that a war is about to break out and the actual onset of hostilities.

Furthermore, we wanted to know how people might use this time: what would they actually do, or what do they, at a minimum, claim now that they would do in this time period.

Since crisis relocation has become a major, if not the, civil defense thrust of the recent, and coming, years we also sought to ascertain whether the nation's public believes that there would, in effect, be enough time available to relocate. In some significant measure, the very credibility of crisis relocation planning may rest on the actual time-feasibility of relocation and, in the same sense, on the nation's view, correct or mistaken, whether relocation is practicable.

A. Actionable Time

To differentiate the perspective from "strategic warning", we use the term actionable time to describe the period between the nation's near certainty that a war will happen and the outbreak of such a war.

This does not imply, of course, that convictions regarding an impending war make such a war objectively somehow inevitable. The risk may well be defused even at the very last moment before the "point of no return." To be sure, we have no comparable data from previous studies because the issue simply was not posed in this way before.

It turns out that 19.6 percent of our people believe that there would be no effective warning time at all, and another 11.7 percent refer to the more traditional tactical warning period of some 15 - 30 minutes or, as another 15.2 percent say, of perhaps a few hours.

In all then, 46.5 percent of the respondents tend to define the problem as one of essentially tactical warning. Basically then, these are Americans who continue thinking--and perhaps rightly so--in terms of a sudden war.

Perhaps, however, the question itself does not tap a valid response if it aims at determining the nation's thinking about a more extended, strategic, warning situation. Be it as it may, this itself would suggest that the issue seems to be, to our people a confusing one. We probed into the factors which might induce the conviction that war is almost certain to come. Responses to open-ended questions, such as this one was, are always somewhat problematic because, in matters of high complexity, there is a built-in premium on articulateness, speed of (verbal) reaction, and on sort of "having thought through" the subject at one time or another. Yet the responses are quite revealing:

- * 36.3 percent of the responses alluded to, or made explicit, some form of international political crisis.
- * 15.0 percent mentioned military action in various parts of the world, and an additional 8.3 percent mentioned specific Soviet military actions (invasion of America's allied country, attack against China--whether initiated by the Soviets or China).
- * Economic factors (energy crisis, food crisis, major recessions and the like) were referred to by 6.9 percent of the respondents.

* 4.1 percent of the sampled Americans remained convinced that war would never happen anyway, and the question was irrelevant to them for this very reason.

* 23.1 percent of the total sample were unable, or unwilling, to articulate circumstances under which they might conclude that a major war was just about certain to come.

The key tone of the data is, however, quite obvious: political, military or economic crises would provide the major evidence that war is about to come.

We did not probe further as might be, for other purposes, quite desirable. Thus, what remains unclear from the data is the particular state of a crisis, or its dynamics, which would trigger the reaction we sought to determine.

What would our people do during this "actionable" period? We asked another open-ended question, and we were especially interested in responses which might give entirely off-the-cuff clues to the magnitude of spontaneous evacuation flows.

As a matter of fact, two types of outflows were mentioned in responses: statements about leaving one's place and area of residence with a more specific destination in mind; we may consider this to be an instance of spontaneous relocation. There were, however, also statements about simply leaving with no clue offered the interviewer whether or not a specific place might have been on the respondent's mind. This is, in our terminology, instances of spontaneous evacuation.

* 10.1 percent of the respondents, in this open-ended probe, claimed that they would spontaneously evacuate their place of residence.

* 6.2 percent referred to spontaneous relocation.

Thus even though at this respective stage of interview the issue of crisis relocation was not broached in any manner whatsoever, some 16.3 percent of our respondents considered it prudent to leave their place of residence and go somewhere else once they would conclude that war was imminent.

Our analysis, of course, must show whether this out-flow characterizes high risk areas in particular, and we must consider whether such population movement would be "adaptive" or not since there may well be some instances of moving from one risk area to another risk area or even from a "safer"

area to a risk area because of a "miscalculation" grounded in misinformation or absence of reliable information about safer areas of the nation.

Other responses, too, are quite illuminating:

- * 20.9 percent of the respondents said that they would seek shelter.
- * 18.4 percent stated that they would try to stock necessary supplies.
- * 6.4 percent asserted that they would try to "modify their house" to be better prepared (though we have no way of telling whether, otherwise unaided, these residents would know what to do, how and when).

Futhermore, 6.6 percent of the respondents reported that they would actively seek information--from friends (0.4 percent only!) or from public sources (6.2 percent).

Finally, two additional answers are salient with respect to the issue:

- * 19.6 percent stated that they would do nothing at all.
- * 9.9 percent told us that they would simply "pray."

B. Evacuation Time

Some 16.3 percent of the respondents stated that they would be inclined to (spontaneously) relocate or evacuate once it became clear to them that a nuclear war would come about.

It turns out that 18.4 percent believe that there would probably, or definitely, be enough time to evacuate. But it is of the utmost importance for national policy to recognize that of this total percentage, only 1.7 percent thought that there would "definitely" be enough time for evacuation.

The question about evacuatibility in terms of time availabilities was raised at a late stage in the interview and after several questions about crisis relocation had already been asked. Thus, the responses refine the meaning of "actionable time" especially as regards a particular civil defense program with its resulting posture of a relocated population.

By contrast with the 18.4 percent who believe that there just might be enough time to relocate (and another 16.5 percent who are in the general

50-50 category), 60.8 percent of the 1978 respondents thought that there would "probably" (42.2 percent) or even "definitely" (18.6 percent) not be time enough. Overall, the time-feasibility index is .345, reflecting the likelihood that evacuation might be possible in the time seen as available.

Thus a central problem of CRP credibility might revolve precisely around the question of available time, and this is, of course, a question of warning cues and actual (strategic) warning messages and signals.

Since many Americans seem to be, or remain, attuned to a "sudden war" scenario, the result of the study is not suprising though it does pose serious problems for national civil defense policy especially with regard to public information about "likely" war scenaria, patterns of warning cues, messages and signals, the intricate fabric of actions that can, or should, be taken under the variety of circumstances possible, and the like.

Our subsequent analysis will, of course, shed some additional light on these issues but it will not resolve the pestering policy dilemmas: how much information should be actively imparted to the public (as contrasted with information which is being made available anyway) as to the contours and locations of high risk areas; how much information to be disseminated regarding alternative "war scenaria" and how much, within this context, the balance ought to swing in support of crisis-borne versus sudden conflicts; how much information, by what means and when, might be needed to enlighten our people as to the measures which would be most appropriate under the various circumstances; how much information is required, and when, regarding the time constraints which operate on the various limited choices of action.

In an important manner, these are not merely questions regarding a "public information strategy." They are, above all, questions regarding policy determinations themselves, and the issues are unlikely to go away. The temporal dimension of the relocation problem may well prove to be the key credibility question regarding such programs, a statement which, in being repeated here, does not loose its unfortunate "horn-of-the-dilemma" sting.

C. DIDS

In the 1978 survey, we also included two questions about the DIDS approach to warning. For one, whether such a device would be acceptable; second how much our people might be willing to pay for it should it be marketed.

The questions were not incorporated in this study because we feel that DIDS "is the way to go" or because it is, in fact, going to be used. Rather, it establishes some worthwhile limits.

Indeed, we considered the inclusion of items about a concept like CHAT--a much more likely candidate for future (crisis) warning situations, but we decided against this simply because CHAT is, in effect, a non-problem. It may require a simple action on the part of our people (turning down the noise level of a radio or TV according to simple real-time instructions and leaving the set on during sleeping hours). It would entail no cost except that which would amount to electricity charges for the periods during which the radio or television are left on.

We simply could not imagine that any but a few scattered Americans would say that they would be unwilling to reduce the noise level of their receivers prior to retiring for the night and leaving the receivers on during an intense crisis (or, for instance, in a period in which a slow-evolving natural hazards, such as a hurricane, might come to threaten the area).

By contrast, DIDS would cost money to purchase (unless, as would be very unlikely, it were "Government issue"), and an actual decision to acquire one.

Compared with the NEAR system, DIDS is obviously simpler. The NEAR warning signal would have required the resident to turn on the radio or TV to receive more specific information. DIDS would, in effect, do that job.

We asked questions about a DIDS like approach, not because we expect it to be used but because it gives us a benchmark feeling regarding warning technologies when warning systems are brought right into American homes.

The results can be compared with the 1972 data. In the early 1970's, we also asked about the worthwhileness of a "device" which, when acquired, might turn on the TV or radio and issue whatever warning might be appropriate.

- * In 1972, 69.0 percent of the respondents were on the positive end of the acceptability (of DIDS) spectrum: in 1978, 71.3 percent were favorable.
- * The likelihood of acquiring a device of the DIDS variety was .741 in 1972 and .738 in 1978.
- * The 1963 - 1964 (Winter) study of the NEAR system reveals acquisition probabilities of .700.

A clear conclusion, indeed, can be drawn even without further analytic refinements: our people are very receptive to improvements in warning technology. They have, in fact, remained so for the past 15 years over which the evidence stretches.

- * In 1972, people were willing to pay for a DIDS somewhere between \$16.30 (if all those who were unwilling to give a dollar value were counted as willing to spend nothing) and \$35.00.
- * In 1978, the "same" system yields a lower margin of \$50.00 and the higher margin of \$86.40.
- * But these results, apart from the obvious impact of inflation, are affected by the few respondents who were willing to spend a great deal of money on a warning system both in 1972 and in 1978.
- * The median values obviate the major difficulty (of some extreme values which affect the average quite a bit). In 1972, the median was \$18.00 (so that about half of the people were willing to pay less than that, and half more than that); in 1978, it was \$29.90--not unrealistic in that the data imply an inflation of about 66 percent over the period (around 10 percent per year).

Thus: the acceptability of a system like DIDS is about the same in 1978 as it was in 1972; and furthermore, the acceptability is high.

Thus: the willingness to pay for a device of the DIDS variety is similar in 1972 and 1978 if inflation is taken into account and the inflationary implications of the survey data are not widely off the mark of the national experience over the year.

The results mean a fairly strong, and articulate, desire throughout the nation for a better disaster warning technology and certainly for a better way to warn our people against the more ultimate disaster, a nuclear war is evident.

D. Conclusions

The major findings of the 1978 study as they bear on warning problems are about as follows:

1. Many Americans imply an expectation of a sudden war at the outset of which tactical warning would be available at best--and almost 20 percent anticipate no warning time at all.

2. Political, military and economic crises are the main circumstances under which many Americans would decide that a war is really about to come.
3. Significant numbers of Americans (some 20 percent) would, however, take no protective actions at all though the effects of visible actions by others are not taken into account, and the percentage almost certainly overestimates the amount of passivity with which an acute danger of war would be dealt with.
4. Some 16 percent might relocate (evacuate to specific places) or evacuate (move away but not to specified alternative locations) once our people felt that war became almost certain.
5. Many Americans, almost half of the sample, believe that there would not be enough time to evacuate so that the time factor may be an important ingredient in credibility of crisis relocation programs of any kind.
6. The desire for an improved warning technology (exemplified in the study by questions about DIDS) is strong and many people would be quite prepared to pay a fair amount of money to acquire improved assurance of an emergency warning.

V. IN-PLACE PROTECTION

Following a relatively brief period, in the 1950's, of strategic evacuation planning, the nation's civil defense systems focussed on in-place sheltering. Efforts to induce American homeowners to construct family shelters gave way, in the early 1960's, to the surveying, marking and stocking program. Emphasis has been placed on techniques to enhance the protection factor in existing buildings as well as to encourage the inclusion of (fallout) shelters in new buildings. Surveys, with the aid of the Bureau of the Census, were carried out to determine how much protection, and for how many Americans, existing home basements might offer, and how marginal basements, too, could be improved in the way of last minute actions.

Some consideration has been given to the feasibility of home basement sharing in order to establish how many Americans might find shelter with the help of their neighbors and other community members.

Studies have been carried out to ascertain whether the construction of expedient shelters would be possible, how much time and what kind of manpower would be required, along with the material factors and their national distribution involved.

Throughout the period, serious attention has been paid to blast shelter technologies but no actual proposal to "go the blast shelter way" has been made, as yet, for policy adoption.

The recent emphasis on crisis relocation represents, on the one hand, an up-dated version of "strategic evacuation" thinking of the early 1950's. On the other hand, it implies a particular way of conceptualizing the most probable ways in which a war would come about. But there can be no certainty that a nuclear war, should it occur at all, would not begin "suddenly" or, at least, within a time-span which would make massive population relocation extremely difficult or even impossible. Thus in-place protection systems of some sort would be needed if only as a back-up against alternatives which may be quite unlikely in their own right.

Nor can we assume that crisis relocation would be, in fact, carried out or that the decision to relocate would occur on a timely enough basis. Hence, in-place postures represent also a fallback system against the all too natural reticence of the national leadership to order, or urge, evacuation or to arrive at the decision too late to make it implementable.

Third, even in a relocated posture, however, some essential facilities in the relocated areas would have to continue operating throughout the crisis period, and this means that some personnel, defined as "essential workers," would have to commute to the evacuated areas or remain there (with or without families) until the very last moment. Since not all would be likely to get out of the risk areas in time, or all such essential workers could be in the risk area in a tactical warning environment, in-place protection for the relevant portion of the work force would also be required.

Finally, we cannot assume that all Americans in risk areas would relocate or would be, for technical reasons, relocatable (some portion of hospitalized people may, for essential medical reasons, not be relocatable and similar problems might be faced with proportions of other institutionalized populations). Thus some form of in-place protection might be necessary to help the survival chances of the non-relocatees and of the non-relocatables.

We make these points mainly to underscore that sound crisis relocation planning does not obviate the necessity for some, if far from ideal, "in-place" protection systems.

In the 1978 study, we have repeated a number of probes regarding in-place sheltering for these very reasons, but also to be able to determine, upon further analysis, what kind of posture, or mix of postures, our people may find most acceptable and credible.

A. Public Shelters

Three of the items in the 1978 inquiry pertain to public fallout shelters specifically. One measures general favorableness toward public shelters. The second item seeks to assess the desirability of a program to use available spaces in public buildings, and mark and stock such areas. This is, of course, a continuation of the earlier surveying, marking and stocking program. The third item postulates Federal fiscal incentives for the inclusion of fallout shelters in buildings constructed by "non-profit organizations," such as hospitals, schools or churches.

1. Overall favorableness toward public fallout shelters is very high: 82.4 percent of the 1978 sample, with a favorableness index of .756, are supportive, while 11.6 percent disfavor the idea of public fallout shelters.
2. The favorableness, if anything, has increased somewhat over the years of the 1970's. In 1972, the favorable responses characterized 75.3 percent of the interviews, and unfavorable ones marked 13.4 percent of the sample. The corresponding favorableness index was .730.
3. The 1978 national data yield results much like those obtained in the 4th Congressional District of Missouri during the summer of 1978: 82.0 percent of the respondents held favorable views regarding public fallout shelters. The results indicate very high acceptability of public shelters, and since they are, in the basic outcome and directionality of the data, rather invariant over time, it would seem very difficult to reach any other conclusion.

In Table 6, we summarize the data as they bear on the use of shelter spaces in (marked and, presumably, stocked) public buildings.

Table 6
DESIRABILITIES OF PROGRAMS TO USE
AVAILABLE SPACES IN PUBLIC BUILDINGS

	Favorable Responses*	Unfavorable Responses**	Desirability Index***
1978	84.8	7.6	+ 1.94
1972	87.2	4.9	+ 2.21
1966	90.5	3.5	+ 2.43
1964	88.9	7.1	+ 2.29
1963	90.0	5.4	+ 2.28

*Aggregation of (+1), (+2) and (+3) responses.

**A sum of the (-1), (-2) and (-3) desirability responses.

***The index could range between (-3.00) and (+3.00).

These results are a further indication of the strong support for public fallout protection systems. There is a slight shift, by 1978, toward a less unqualified support than in the earlier studies, but the level of favorableness remains very high indeed.

Whether the slight decline in supportive expressions reflects some preferences for alternative systems, or whether it mirrors the change in the media climate might be estimatable upon further analysis and from other data of the research. In the 1960's, of course, the marking and stocking program was the main operational effort of civil defense and the limited publicity about civil defense in general tended, in this period, to deal precisely with the then on-going major program.

As the data in Table 7 show, the support for efforts to include fallout shelters in new construction (with the Federal Government absorbing the additional construction costs involved) is also extremely high.

Table 7
DESIRABILITY OF INCLUSION OF FALLOUT SHELTER IN
NEW BUILDINGS OF NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS

	Favorable Responses	Unfavorable Responses	Desirability Index
1978	78.8	8.6	+ 1.81
1972	83.2	7.2	+ 1.97
1966	86.7	6.5	+ 2.15
1964	84.8	9.5	+ 2.05
1963*	91.9*	4.7*	+ 2.46*

*The 1963 question dealt with fallout shelters in the nation's schools only. It is not exactly comparable with the otherwise identically worded items of the subsequent surveys.

B. Home Basements

When it came to the possible use of home basements as shelters for the residents, our surveys quite accurately forecasted the acceptability of such a program to our people. In the 28 states in which the Basement Shelter Surveys were carried out, the mail returns with the required information were characterized by the high rates (around 80 percent) which were indicated by public responses to such a program.

In some detail, we have also explored the possible use of home basements to shelter non-residents. The 1978 survey once again considered this possibility. Questions were asked not only about the more general desirability of basement surveys and the possible assignment of others to those basements which provide reasonably good fallout protection or which, with relatively modest effort, might be upgradable.

As in 1972, we wanted to know how much our people would support the use of basements to shelter non-residents; how much they believe others in the nation would let other people use their basements; and how much would they support an actual program of assigning people to basements with sheltering potential.

Furthermore, as in 1972, we asked the respondents whose homes included basements whether they, themselves, were likely to allow others to use their basement; whether they would be inclined to permit their home to be marked as shelter; and whether they would permit others to be assigned to their basement by local civil defense officials.

In 1968, the parallel questions were somewhat different from those raised in either the 1972 or the most recent, 1978, inquiries. The 1968 data show:

- * 89 percent willingness to make their home available to others from the same general area or neighborhood;
- * 79 percent willingness to share one's home with people from outside of the residential area;
- * 84 percent willingness to stock emergency provisions (at no cost to the home owner);
- * 67 percent willingness to mark the outside of the house with a "large civil defense sign."

Compared with the 1968 answers, the 1972 and 1978 results may appear to suggest lower levels of acceptance. This does not turn out to be the case. The 1968 data were based on simple dichotomous "yes" or "no" answers, whereas the 1972 and 1978 responses referred to a five point favorability or likelihood scale. The dichotomy "forces" a clear "yes" or "no" (apart from unwillingness to answer at all).

Even if we were to assume that only those who were neither in favor nor in opposition would be inclined to support the program, the basement sharing option yields a favorable percentage of 80.8 percent

Table 8
ATTITUDES TOWARD HOME BASEMENT SHARING

	Favorable Responses*		Favorableness Index	
	1978	1972	1978	1972
Acceptability of home basement sharing	64.4	61.5	.673	.602
Acceptability to home owners as seen by the respondents	42.9	41.9	.532	.530
Acceptability of assign- ment of people to home basements	67.0	66.2	.684	.690
Residents with basements:	1978--51.5 percent		1972--49.4 percent	
Allowing others to use one's basement	72.5	75.8	.695	.720
Allowing others to be assigned into one's own basement	72.6	74.8	.684	.702
Allowing home to be marked with appropriate civil defense sign	49.6	59.3	.535	.583

*"Strongly in favor" or "in favor" in response to the general questions; willingness to "definitely" or "probably" permitting the referent action for questions pertaining to respondents with basements (bottom part of table).

(instead of the 64.4 percent as tabulated), the assignment alternative finds favor with 80.3 percent of the respondents, and 57.8 percent expect other home owners to be supportive.

If those residents with basements who gave a 50-50 likelihood of cooperating with a basement sharing program were included among the more positive respondents, the percentage of those willing to accept others becomes 81.8, those accepting shelterees by local civil defense assignment amount to 77.2 percent, and willingness to have a home marked with a civil defense (shelter) sign characterizes 56.1 percent of the respondents.

Since these results appear to come much closer to the 1968 data (and the pattern for the 1972 results is similar), we can conclude that the respondents who fell into the middle response categories of either the favorableness or the likelihood scales would, when a clear "yes" or "no" choice would have to be made, tend to make a positive choice.

There are, perhaps, two main approaches to basement sharing although a plausible operational program could well represent some viable mix.

One type of program might place reliance on the home-owners entirely. They would have information about the protection their basement affords, about the most protected part of the basement, about simple ways of upgrading the protection, and the like. The homeowners would be encouraged by Government to accommodate as many others as they could handle given the space limitations. Such a program would not, in effect, incorporate home basements into a national shelter plan even though at the aggregate level good estimates might be available as to numbers of families that could be protected in such private facilities.

In turn, another program might involve actual assignments of people to specific, and possible alternative, basements and would require an ex ante commitment on the part of homeowners not dissimilar to the commitment of building owners who permitted their structures to be included in the marking and stocking program of the 1960's.

It is almost clear that a program of this nature, to insure the best use of the best available shelter space, would necessitate some forms of survey (beyond the type of aggregate and anonymous survey which was carried out by the Bureau of the Census for the Office of Civil Defense in assessing the national reservoir of private home basements with sheltering potential) and a community planning strategy not unlike that which led to the Community Shelter Plans program.

If the more unplanned version of the basement sharing program depends mainly on information (apart from Governmental encouragement and, of course, the willingness of homeowners to share), then our 1978 data provide some relevant input into the broader, and difficult, mosaic out of which a program configuration would emerge:

- * 51.3 percent of the respondents heard about the possible use of basements as shelters, and
- * 27.3 percent reported to have heard how much protection home basements might provide.

We have already reported that 51.5 percent of the 1978 respondents had basements:

- * Among those with basements, 37.1 percent thought about the possibility of using their basement as shelter, and
- * 13.2 percent obtained, by their own claim, actual information about the protection their basement would provide.

If the more formal inclusion of basement sharing into community shelter systems depends, to some extent, on specific information about each available basement, and if such information may have to be acquired in the way of an appropriate survey, the 1978 study provides some insight into the problem:

- * 63.4 percent of the respondents were favorably disposed to the idea of a home basement survey with the understanding that this might lead to the assignment of non-resident families to the basement as shelterees.
- * With a possible range of values from (-3) to (+3), such a program rated +0.99 in 1978 and +1.16 in 1972.
- * Clearly, most Americans are receptive to the basement sharing idea (and, indeed, a survey of their homes which this program option entails), but there are also quite a few of them who would not welcome the concept: 17.7 percent in the 1972 study, and 19.1 percent in the 1978 inquiry fell into the negative response categories.

No one can underestimate the difficulties connected with any effort at organized home basement sharing. But the major tone of the data, both in 1978 and 1972 as well as, in somewhat different modality, in 1968, indicates that the nation's public would be quite supportive, and the results, furthermore, show that people with basements are as, if not a little more, positive toward the idea of providing shelter for others as are people who have no basements.

This is, of course, a crucial finding because it would not help a great deal if favorable dispositions existed among Americans without basements and not among those who would actually have to commit themselves to have their homes used as shelter for others, and generally for total strangers.

C. Blast Shelters

In the 1978 survey, we asked three main questions pertaining to blast shelters. For one, we wanted to know whether Americans thought that in their own general residential area, fallout shelters would do or actually shelters against primary weapons effects would be needed and ought to be constructed.

Second, we assessed the desirability of a national program to build blast shelters.

Third, we sought to ascertain the perceptions of survival chances if people were in blast shelters rather than only in fallout shelters.

In our brief discussion of survival prospects, we already noted that the survival likelihood in blast shelters seemed, to our people, higher than was the survivability in fallout shelters or upon evacuation--and higher by a factor of 2 were the nation faced with a war "next week" (given the present state of the civil defense system and no more than that).

- * 50.3 percent of the respondents thought that blast shelters ought to be constructed in the area in which they live; further analysis will, of course, pin-point the distribution of these people to determine whether they actually live in high risk areas.
- * 25.6 percent believed that their area would do with fallout shelters only, and 12.4 percent were unsure about the kind of shelter their area ought to have (they responded, "depends").
- * The desirability of a national program of blast shelter construction yielded an average of +1.39, with 14.8 percent of the respondents leaning toward the negative end of the response spectrum, and 70.3 percent falling into the positive response categories (40.0 percent actually in the strongest, +3, desirability bracket).
- * Further analysis will disclose, of course, how a national blast shelter program rates in high risk areas as compared with the safer parts of the country--in other words, the acceptability of blast shelter construction may well be higher (or lower?) in areas most likely to be subjected to a direct attack than in areas which are unlikely to be targetted.

D. Conclusions

Our inquiry into the acceptability of various in-place system leads to the following major conclusions:

1. The levels of public support for all major alternative in-place systems (public fallout shelters, home basement sharing, blast shelters) are very high.
2. The patterns of support in late 1970's are just about the same as those which we found in the early 1970's.
3. Beyond this floor value of high support, public fallout shelters (in existing buildings as well as in the way of shelter incorporation into new construction) are particularly well thought of, but there exists also a rather strong felt need for shelters against primary effects of nuclear weapons.

VI. CRISIS RELOCATION

To gain a more detailed understanding of the public's views on possible crisis relocation programs, the 1978 survey devoted a considerable portion of the interview time to various dimensions of population relocation. To begin with, "evacuation" or "relocation" responses were expected to occur, if occasionally, as spontaneous answers to the probe regarding actions people might take between becoming pretty certain that a war was coming and the actual start of the conflict. We noted that 16.1 percent of the respondents mentioned relocation-and-evacuation types of behavior in that entirely open-ended context.

To insure data continuities and permit comparability with prior surveys as well as to measure the overall acceptability of evacuating, the respondents were asked about the desirability of a national program to evacuate the major cities and places "near military installations." Here, we referred to the effort quite deliberately as one of "strategic evacuation" since this was the way in which the issue was worded in previous surveys.

As far as "crisis relocation" is concerned, that is the contemporary version of "strategic evacuation," we wanted to ascertain several different things.

One, we sought to establish how many people would be likely to evacuate spontaneously and where they would go. Two, we wanted to know whether information that the Soviets were evacuating their cities would trigger an outflow of Americans from those areas which our people consider unsafe. Three, we wanted to know whether our people believe that relocation plans are, in fact, in existence and whether Americans ought to develop relocation plans, or improve on plans it may be believed, by the respondents, to have already.

Four, we wanted to know how people would respond to a Presidential recommendation, or order, to evacuate--and, indeed, whether there were perceived circumstances under which the President might be prone to order relocation.

Three specific programmatic aspects were of further interest to us in as much as their ramification impact any national planning effort quite considerably.

We sought to determine whether, in response to a Presidential directive, people would tend to follow instructions regarding their relocation or whether they would prefer to choose where to go and thus, indeed, comply with the spirit of a Presidential decision but not necessarily in keeping with relocation plans.

We also wanted to know whether people, with the little knowledge of the issue which they currently have, prefer a relocation concept based in geographic terms (relocation by neighborhood areas) or whether some form of organizational relocation would seem more advantageous. In this context, we attempted to determine which kinds of organizations might be the best referent.

To establish the nation's thinking about the way in which the crisis relocation plans might deal with those workers who would be defined as "essential," and whose efforts would keep the evacuated areas "going" at least in terms of critical activities, we offered the respondents several alternatives and asked them to indicate the better, as well as the poorer, ones.

Further analysis, of course, will make it possible to identify, by current occupation and current locus in the occupational structure, many of the critical workers, we will be able to see whether those who are likely to be classified as being "essential" workers have a different view on this matter from those whom we might quite clearly not label as critical workers.

Still other probes in the 1978 survey dealt with resources. On the one hand, we wanted to determine what people had available immediately (food, medications, money, gasoline, possible sites to evacuate to, equipment). On the other hand, we asked about the kinds of items people would have to purchase just prior to relocating.

The study also focussed on helping behavior. We wanted to know whether our people expect to be well received in potential host areas as well as whether they, in the host role, would be helpful to others. Thus we have responses, from the total sample, both in the role of potential evacuee and in the role of host. It will, of course, be of critical

importance to compare the patterns of national reactions between those who actually do reside in high risk areas (and are thus the most likely evacuees) and those in safer areas (who are, therefore, the most likely hosts).

To see whether our people believe that, if necessary, they could essentially survive just "off the land" for a limited period of time, we asked about their self-assessed capability to do so.

Finally, to interpret the responses to the various crisis relocation issues and to the expectations of, or commitments to, helpfulness, we asked the respondents about their own prior evacuation experiences, if any at all. We wanted to know whether they ever had to evacuate their place of residence, and what the circumstances were. The other side of the coin, too, was of importance: whether the respondents ever accommodated people who had to evacuate their homes, and what kinds of experiences were involved.

A. Strategic Evacuation

We have already explained that a general question about "strategic evacuation" had been asked in previous national surveys and that it was, for the sake of comparability (as well as the meaningfulness of the question to begin with), asked in the 1978 inquiry as well. Table 9 provides a convenient summary of the results.

Table 9

DESIRABILITY OF STRATEGIC EVACUATION OF COMMUNITIES NEAR
MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND "SOME LARGE CITIES"

	Favorable Responses	Unfavorable Responses	Desirability Index
1978	65.1	16.4	+1.15
1972	57.6	21.2	+0.92
1966	73.8	11.3	+1.64
1964	85.7	9.8	+2.05
1963	82.3	10.2	+1.86

The acceptance levels are, and remain, very high. But the data from the 1970's yield somewhat lower desirabilities of a "strategic evacuation" program than do the findings from the 1960's series of studies. We think that this is explainable by the fact that the question, while comparable in principle, is not exactly the same--and the difference is one of potential significance.

In the 1960's, we asked about a program in which people would be evacuated to safer areas "where fallout shelters would be available."

In the 1970's, we asked simply about evacuation of communities near military installations (plus "some" large cities) without reference to fallout protection availability upon evacuation.

Since fallout shelters are seen as contributing to survival prospects quite considerably, the omission of the reference in the 1970's, may well be the key factor in the slightly lower favorableness toward strategic evacuation. But, to repeat, the level of support is very high even under these more constraining circumstances, and there has been a modest increase in favorableness since 1972.

B. Spontaneous Evacuation

The question about the likelihood of evacuating in the midst of an international crisis differs in its character from the item in which we asked about actions which people would take upon concluding that a war was imminent. In the latter probe, 16.1 percent opted for moving out of their residential areas in the way of an altogether unsolicited response. In the likelihood question, by raising it explicitly, we are tapping a dimension involving higher information level: as a minimum, information that evacuation or relocation might be an option to consider. It is, in other words, not an action that people somehow have to think up themselves, but in view of discussions about relocation and in light of possible relocation planning, the alternative becomes more visible.

Thus the likelihood question is more isomorphic to a situation in which there exists a national dialogue about relocation or in which, in fact, crisis relocation planning is proceeding.

Table 10 summarizes the 1978 nation-wide data along with comparable results from Missouri's 4th Congressional District.

Table 10
 LIKELIHOOD OF SPONTANEOUS EVACUATION IN A CRISIS

	National Study 1978	Missouri Study 1978
Inclined to evacuate*	43.3	50.0
50 - 50	16.6	9.0
Disinclined to evacuate**	35.4	36.0
Spontaneous evacuation like- lihood	.548	.552

*Includes those who stated that they would "definitely" or "probably" leave their residential area.

**Includes those who said that they would "definitely" or "probably" not evacuate.

Obviously, the actual flows of world events would have the central bearing upon the actual numbers of spontaneous evacuees. Obviously, the behavior of one's friends and neighbors, too, would either re-enforce dampen the consideration of spontaneous evacuation. Obviously, work-related responsibilities along with other structural opportunities, or obstacles, to evacuating (without a national mandate to do so) would also impact the implementation of such preferences.

But the estimates which the 1978 data yield are high by any standard. If only those who said that they would "definitely" evacuate are taken into account (21.2 percent) as providing a useful planning guideline, the pattern amounts to a massive movement of people and it is questionable whether even such "spontaneous" movement would not require a great deal of planning to insure its effectiveness.

Thus "spontaneous" evacuation could reach proportions which approximate formal directed crisis relocation, and might well "force" a significant planning effort even were the chances of Presidentially ordered relocation negligible.

Now the 60.0 percent of respondents who assigned a likelihood of 50-50 or higher to the possibility of their spontaneous evacuation in the course of a deep international crisis were also asked where they might go to, and how far.

Among these respondents, 32.9 percent stated that they would evacuate to a shelter. This represents some 15.4 percent of the total sample, and these are Americans who construe "evacuation" in a way different from what crisis relocation planning might look like. Thus they view moving to shelter as "evacuating," and this, in a narrower sense, is an altogether reasonable perspective.

If these respondents are discounted from the "spontaneous evacuation" total, the estimate changes from 60.0 percent to 40.3 percent--now characterizing those with 50-50 or higher evacuation probabilities and planning to leave their residential area altogether.

A few additional responses are, from the vantage point of crisis relocation, "maladaptive": of those with 50-50 or higher evacuation chances, 1.6 percent would move to an unsafe place, or, at least, a place not safer than that which they might abandon.

Discounting these respondents, the overall estimate comes down to 39.3 percent (of the total sample).

Further analysis, of course, will show where such potential evacuees are living, and how they are distributed over the likelihood-of-evacuation spectrum (which proportion of them, for instance, live in high risk areas and plan to evacuate "adaptively"--that is, out of the risk area).

The average mileage turns out to be 246 miles. But since some people planned to move hundreds of miles (and a few of them even thousands of miles, presumably by plane), the median provides a different, possibly better, estimate: the movement of 50 percent of the spontaneous evacuees would exceed 75.5 miles (this being the median) while the remaining half of the evacuees are thinking in terms of locations less than 75.5 miles away.

- * Among those planning to evacuate (with 50-50 or higher chances), 62.3 percent would do so in the belief that they were moving to a "safer" area.

- * 14.2 percent would move to be "with their family."

How unique, or different, do the respondents consider their own likely evacuation action to be? To determine how the respondents perceived the likely behavior of others, we asked about the percentage of people in the community who might be expected to evacuate spontaneously in "a major war and a big war seemed very likely."

- * The respondents estimate that 47.8 percent of community people would be inclined to evacuate spontaneously.
- * Thus not only do we have data to indicate that spontaneous evacuation could prove to be quite massive, but the study also supports the conclusion that Americans believe that their friends, neighbors, and other community people would be quite inclined to leave the area.

A Soviet evacuation, however, would not be seen invariably as a prelude to an inevitable conflict. This is indicated by the fact that spontaneous evacuation likelihood turns out to be .442, with 27.8 percent very likely or likely to leave, and another 24.4 percent estimating the chances as about 50-50.

Furthermore, some 40.4 percent of the community people are believed likely to evacuate in response to information that the Soviets are doing so.

The results suggest that there would have to be factors other than Soviet evacuation itself to lead to the conviction that war was extremely likely. We did not ask about evacuation likelihood if Soviet evacuation were to take place in the midst of a Soviet-American crisis. Rather, we postulated such a Soviet move and allowed the respondents to read "into it" whatever they may have thought. Since the likelihood of spontaneous movement, high though it remains, is lower than for a postulated crisis (in which a war seems rather certain), it seems that our people can conceive of a Soviet evacuation also, in part, as an aspect of other than Soviet-American war scenarios. A more detailed analysis of the data bearing on a Soviet-Chinese war might provide some evidence whether this is not one of the international environments which the respondents appear to have in mind.

We did not anticipate this response: we expected that spontaneous evacuation would increase in response to a Soviet move of this kind and that our people will consider it an important piece of evidence that war is about to come. Had we, in fact, thought that the respondent might construe a Soviet evacuation measure as potentially non-threatening (or not as threatening as we implicitly believed it to be in raising the question in this manner), a further probe might have given us more direct information as to the manner in which our people might interpret

Soviet evacuation under various key circumstances. Instead of having direct data, we will have to rely, in this regard, on interpretations of more proxy evidence (such as that which has to do with Soviet-Chinese conflict probabilities).

C. Crisis Relocation Plans

Not surprisingly, many people simply do not know whether the Soviets, or our own country, have actual evacuation or relocation plans.

- * 39.4 percent were unable to answer the question as to whether the Soviets do have evacuation plans, and another 19.1 percent were "unsure."
- * 22.0 percent were unable to say whether the United States has evacuation plans, and an additional 18.6 percent were unsure about this.
- * The percentage of those who believe that the Soviets have developed evacuation plans (26.5 percent) is very similar to the percent of those convinced that America has such plans (26.9 percent).

We know that survival chances, upon evacuation, were not seen quite as high as survival likelihood in blast, or even in, fallout shelters. We also know that many respondents considered the actionable warning time to be quite short, and many felt that there would not be time enough to evacuate even were they inclined to do so.

At the same time, we have found rather high propensities toward spontaneous evacuation.

Should then the nation be preoccupied with crisis relocation planning? The answer is both strong and obvious:

- * 78.2 percent of the national, and 83.0 percent of the Missouri, sample said that the nation should "definitely" or "probably" have such plans, and another 10.0 percent (national) and 4.3 percent (Missouri) were in the "undecided," or effectively 50-50, response category.
- * General favorableness toward crisis relocation planning yields an index of .794 for the national sample, and .793 for Missouri's 4th Congressional District.

Thus even though relocation might not seem implementable to many Americans because of time constraints, there exists strong consensus that relocation planning is desirable and needed. This, of course, indicates that many of those who feel that there might not be enough time to evacuate are also inclined to believe that there might well exist circumstances under which relocation would be possible and, therefore, the nation should be in a position to carry it out.

But would crisis relocation, even if planned, be ever activated? We asked the respondents whether it was likely that the President might, under any circumstances, actually order large scale population relocation:

- * 66.7 percent were convinced that, indeed, there existed situations under which the President might ask our people to evacuate,
- * and another 9.4 percent were unsure, but did not deny the possibility--as did 17.0 percent of the respondents.

Clearly, our people do not rule out the possibility that the President may order, or urge, massive population relocation, and they favor national plans to make such an action possible even though warning time is viewed as something of a constraint on the effectiveness of such measures.

D. Directed Relocation

Relocation planning is seen, quite obviously, very desirable. There are, furthermore, circumstances under which the President is believed likely to ask our people to relocate. The data of Table 11 show, for the national and the Missouri samples, the likely patterns of compliance should the President, in fact, order, or urge, relocation.

In fact, only 4.9 percent of all respondents in the national sample said that they would definitely not relocate even should the President urge the nation to do so.

But these are, in any event, aggregate data: some of the respondents live in "safer" areas of the country and they would not be expected to relocate anyway. Further analysis will show the pattern of compliance with a Presidential directive in those areas which would be at risk and from which, in fact, people might be asked to leave.

Table 11

LIKELIHOOD OF DIRECTED RELOCATION IN COMPLIANCE WITH
PRESIDENTIAL ACTION

	National Survey 1978	Missouri Survey 1978
Likely to relocate*	70.2	69.7
50 - 50	15.2	11.0
Unlikely to relocate**	12.4	12.3
Likelihood index	.717	.715

*Includes those who would "definitely" or "probably" relocate.

**Includes those who would "definitely" or "probably" not relocate.

Asked about the percentage of area people who would follow a Presidential recommendation to relocate, the respondents yield an average of 69.1 percent.

Thus if their own likelihood index is .717, the estimate of how others in their communities might act produces a similar value (.691).

* 61.5 percent of the respondents would follow instructions as to "where to go," while 27.5 percent would "want to evacuate to a place of their own choice" (and the remaining 11.0 percent didn't know whether they would prefer to follow instructions or not--a percentage which certainly includes most of those who were decided not to relocate at all).

Why might some people not relocate at all? We will be in a position to contrast the responses of those who are likely to relocate with those who are unlikely to do so. But the question was asked of all respondents in the way of an open-ended probe so that we can assess how our people "feel" about the main factors which would serve as a disincentive to relocation even if asked for by the President.

* 36.3 percent of all respondents suggested predominantly ideological reasons for noncompliance.

* 23.0 percent thought that the desire to protect one's property or area would be the main reason for unwillingness to relocate.

- * 9.1 percent believed themselves in a safe area.
- * 9.1 percent would feel that "age" is a key factor in non-compliance.
- * 6.5 percent were convinced that they would have "nowhere to go," while 3.9 percent cited health reasons.

It is important to emphasize that these attributed reasons for non-relocation amount to expressions about the underlying rationale for noncompliance on the part of all respondents, including the vast majority of those who would actually relocate. Further analysis will show how these reasons apply to those who are just about decided to stay put.

Now crisis relocation can, in principle, be planned primarily around geographical areas and thus amount to evacuation essentially "by neighborhoods." Alternatively, as many people as possible might be relocatable in the context of particular organizations--the employing organizations, church groups and the like.

Neighborhood-based relocation planning has much to recommend itself, especially its relative simplicity (within the overall complexity of the problem).

Organization-based relocation, in turn, would prove much more difficult to plan for but might have many advantages both from the vantage point of the national situation upon relocation, in greater ease of return to pre-crisis activities should the crisis be defused, and, perhaps, in facilitating the processes which would trigger the nation's reconstruction efforts should a war actualize despite all attempts to prevent it.

In terms of national preferences, and apart from all more technical merits and demerits of the major alternatives, the answer is fairly clear:

- * 64.9 percent would prefer to relocate on a neighborhood basis.
- * 15.1 percent assert that it would make no difference to them whether neighborhood-grounded or organization-based relocation were involved.
- * 8.5 percent would prefer to relocate along with their employing organization, and
- * 7.5 percent with some other organization (56.1 percent of them mentioned a church group).

We did not ask whether organizational relocation would be unacceptable. Thus the data do not mean that people would not relocate if organizational relocation were the key basis for planning. At the same time, the results point to a strong preference for neighborhood-based planning.

For most people then, the key referent is their home and the area in which they reside rather than their organizational affiliations and ties.

E. Critical Workers

To find out what might be the most acceptable way to deal with relocation problems of "critical workers," we provided the respondents with a brief explanation:

In the evacuated areas, some essential services may have to continue. For example, policing, or firefighting, some of the main utilities, some of the major industrial activities and the like. Some people then would have to be designated as critical workers because their occupations would be essential even if there were large scale relocation of our people.

The respondents were given a list of five major options, and asked to identify the best, second best, worst, and next worst ones. The results lead to a rather clear rank-ordering of the alternatives. The data are presented in Table 12.

How potential "critical workers" themselves might feel about the matter is, at this time, unclear. But we will be able to identify at least some of the major occupational pursuits which would clearly fall into the "critical" worker category and those which would, with somewhat similar clarity, not be so "classifiable." This will permit us to see how receptive or non-receptive the critical workers themselves would be to the various alternatives.

The idea of evacuating family members only, while urging designated essential workers to remain and providing protection against both blast and fallout for them emerges as, by far, the preferred modality. But all the options are quite controversial, even the three which more Americans favor than disfavor.

Table 12
RELOCATION PLANNING FOR CRITICAL WORKERS

	Best or Next Best Alternative	Worst or Next Worst Alternative
Evacuation of families of critical workers only; urging such workers to maintain essential services and providing full protection for them both against blast and against fallout.	54.0	23.4
Evacuating workers and families; having critical workers commute.	44.1	32.4
Evacuation of families only; urging workers to stay and maintain essential services and evacuating them at the very last moment before an attack.	42.8	31.0
Urging workers and families to stay and providing full protection for them and their families (in-place).	30.9	44.7
Urging workers and families to stay and evacuating them at the very last moment.	19.6	57.9

Thus what ought to be done about essential workers and their families is likely to result in a significant controversy with possible (negative) spillover effects on the overall concepts of crisis relocation planning. The point is, of course, that none of the postulated alternatives proves to be relatively non-problematic from the vantage point of the nation's body politic, and we could not think of any major option beyond the five which were explicitly considered.

Actually, if we focus only on the "best" and "worst" alternatives, the idea of relocating everyone and having the essential workers commute to maintain the required services in the depopulated risk areas has higher acceptance and lower opposition than any of the remaining options.

We asked about the percentage of workers who would be designated as "critical" could be expected to comply with the need to commute back and forth from an host area to the abandoned risk areas. The respondents estimate that about 51.6 percent of such workers would be willing to do so (and the median of 50.1 percent indicates the relative non-skewness of the total distribution).

- * 9.1 percent of the respondents are convinced that only 10 percent or fewer "critical" workers would put up with the required commuting regime (and the obvious risks connected with it).
- * 10.4 percent of the respondents assume that 90 percent or more "critical" workers would comply.
- * 11.6 percent failed to provide an estimate either because they were unable or unwilling to do so.

F. Resources

Apart from what people told us about spontaneous evacuation, or their preference of responding to a Presidential relocation directive by choosing where to go to, we wanted to ascertain some of the major options which seemed available.

Table 13
AVAILABILITIES OF PLACES AND EQUIPMENT WHICH
MIGHT FACILITATE RELOCATION

	Percent
A car, or cars	87.8
Friends or relatives to stay with within 100 miles	58.1
Friends or relatives to stay with within 200 miles	54.6
Camping equipment	33.0
Campsite or a similar place within 100 miles	20.6
A camper or similar equipment	20.1
A campsite or similar place within 200 miles	19.4
A boat	12.5
A cottage, summer home within 100 miles	6.2
A cottage, summer home within 200 miles	4.7

How these resources are distributed across the nation, and how their availabilities relate to residential locations (especially with regard to risk) must be determined in the course of subsequent analyses.

Thus, for instance, having a "boat" (12.5 percent of the respondents) would have a somewhat different possible value as a survival resource for people on the nation's seashores (or within easy access of the seashore) than for inlanders who may use their boat on a river or a lake.

The percentages of people with friends or relatives with whom they claim they could stay are quite impressive both when we consider the 100 mile and the 200 mile radius. The result is even more promising since it was made clear in the wording of the item that these ought to be "friends" or "relatives" within the specified radius but not living in another city area.

Some 88 percent of the respondents have at least one car. In fact, 47.3 percent of the sample have two or more cars.

At the time of the interview, the car which the respondents consider to be the "principal" family car was generally between half- and three-quarters full. Only 4.1 percent of the respondents (4.7 percent of those with cars) told us that the tank was either quite empty or almost empty, and 23.4 percent of the car-owners reported to have an essentially full tank.

- * On the average, the car-owners thought that they could drive for about 162 miles without having to refill their tank if they had to leave "right away."

- * The median, which splits the distribution into those with higher and lower mileage estimates, amounts to 150 miles without the need for refueling.

How about people without cars?

- * 69.5 percent of residents without cars were sure that they could rely on friends, neighbors or relatives to take them along in their cars should they have to evacuate, while

- * 30.5 percent of them would have to rely on public transportation of some kind.

Food supplies, too, do not appear to be an unsurmountable problem. Asked for how long people could make do with the food items on hand if

they had to leave their home right away, only 9.4 percent of all residents thought that they could not last out for 3 days or more.

- * On the average, the respondents claim that they could manage with food supplies on hand for about 22 days, but
- * The median turns out to be 13.5 days--just about a fortnight, so that about half of the respondents would have enough food-stuffs immediately available for more than about 14 days, and the other half for less than 14 days (but most of them for 3 days or more).

In a similar manner, we probed about the family need for drugs and medicines and how long the supply on hand would last:

- * 31.7 percent of the respondents said that they, or other family member(s), were in regular need of medication.
- * But the supplies on hand, without the need to acquire additional drugs, would last on the average about 37 days (with a median of about 30 days--thus just about one month).
- * Only 2.8 percent of those in need of regular medication did not have enough drugs or medicines on hand to last for 3 days or more.

How about money? We can imagine a whole array of relocation plans in which the requirement for cash (or the use of checks) might be minimal. But we did want to determine what financial resources were practically on hand.

The respondents were asked whether they would have enough funds "readily available" to stay somewhere for two weeks if they did not have to pay for their accommodations.

Originally, we thought of probing how much money might be on hand in cash around the house and whether there would be enough somewhere else (in a bank, presumably) to draw upon in need. But it did not seem prudent to have the interviewer-stranger asking questions about cash around the house even were we to expect to get a valid answer.

Thus we do not know whether people would have to go banking or not, and how many of them would have to do so. The notion of money "readily available" masks the situation to that extent.

- * 71.3 percent would have enough money easily available to manage for a two week stay if they did not have to finance their accommodations while.

- * 24.3 percent would be unable to do so for the postulated duration.

We have already established that many respondents feel that they have enough food items on hand to manage, and that, in principle, they might manage for about a two week period without great difficulties.

But 72.7 percent of the respondents would also want to buy some additional items:

- * 50.4 percent mentioned canned goods of various kinds.
- * 31.2 percent referred to dried goods.
- * 26.6 percent cited various perishables.
- * 8.9 percent mentioned bottled water, and
- * 8.0 percent cited unspecified nonperishables.

Thus even though there may be enough food around the house to last, significant--perhaps overwhelming--efforts at additional purchases can be anticipated.

We asked also what other significant items, apart from food or medicines, people might take along if they had to relocate and which of such items, if any at all, would have to be purchased before leaving.

- * Clothing items are mentioned by 72.6 percent of the respondents, and
- * 36.9 percent mentioned bedding or night clothing more specifically.
- * 19.1 percent would take along selected "family" items and valuables, while
- * 11.0 percent specifically mentioned portable TV or transistor radios.
- * 10.3 percent would take along their camping equipment, and 4.4 percent referred to kitchen utensils.
- * 8.3 percent would carry with them various medical and health aid accessories, and
- * 7.3 percent would take along guns and/or fishing equipment.

Such items as tools (2.4 percent), water (2.8 percent) or batteries (2.5 percent) are mentioned only infrequently in this general context.

For the most part, however, these are not items people would plan, or have, to buy. Only 8.5 percent said that the items they would

definitely want to take along would have to be purchased just prior to evacuating--and among these Americans, camping equipment (35.3 percent of the 8.5 percent) ranked by far highest along with a scattering of various small purchases among which only communications equipment and tools yielded relevant clustering of responses (7.5 and 5.3 percent respectively).

The result, in this regard, is in sharp contrast to the felt need to buy additional food items. Thus a relocation situation might present serious problems for the nation's food markets but much less so for other retailers. At the same time, of course, the dissemination of information about the actual character of crisis relocation plans might generate demands for other types of products so that we suspect that the need for additional purchases, in some respects, may be quite underestimated by the present data even though it reflects the conditions as of late 1978.

G. Pets

Some 50.7 percent of the respondents reported having pets around the house. Dogs were found in 29.1 percent of all households, dogs as well as cats in 9.0 percent, and cats in 8.9 percent of the homes. An additional 2.6 percent had pets other than cats or dogs or both.

- * 76.7 percent of Americans who have pets around the house would plan to take them along if they had to evacuate, and

- * 12.9 percent said that it "depended" on the circumstances.

Of the national sample, this implies that 37.8 percent would be very likely to relocate along with their pets, and another 6.4 percent might well be inclined to do so depending on the situation.

In all then, crisis relocation is not merely a massive movement of people but also a rather major movement of household pets and this alone cannot but have an impact on the nature of the host area preparedness needs, including the various housing options for the relocatees.

It is, of course, not an issue to overwhelm crisis relocation planners in any way nor is it one to present important obstacles to the consideration of various alternatives. At the same time, it is the kind of small pestering problem which simply cannot be disregarded altogether.

H. Helpfulness

The questions regarding the nation's probable response to the massive flows of relocatees tap several different, but complementary, dimensions.

One, we wanted to know how helpful the nation's communities are seen if they were to receive evacuees.

Two, we also wanted to know how helpful people might be more specifically in the rural hinterlands of the country should the crisis relocation program stress a movement into rural America--that is, how helpful might farmers prove to be.

Three, we sought to find out how helpful people would be in the respondent's community itself should it be a host, rather than relocation, site.

Four, we measured the extent to which it seemed likely that people in host communities around the nation would actually be willing to accommodate the relocatees in their own homes.

Five, we assessed the extent to which the respondent's own community might prove hospitable for relocatees should it serve as a host area.

Six, we also wanted to know whether the respondent himself/herself would be likely to provide housing for relocatees and if so, how many families might be hosted in this manner.

Finally, we wanted to determine what are the main reasons why some people may be unable, or unwilling, to house relocatees--a question asked only of those who said that they would "definitely" or "probably" not be in a position to accommodate any relocatees of their own place of residence.

The results, presented in summary fashion in Table 14, leave little doubt: there exist very high expectations of altruistic behavior throughout the nation, and the finding is further strengthened by the conviction that the respondent's own community might be even somewhat more willing to help than other communities across the face of America.

It is also of considerable importance to note that a possible relocation into rural America--either exclusively or predominantly so--is in no way seen jeopardized by perceived attitudes of the nation's farmers. If anything, they are considered to be even more supportive than are other possible host communities, and almost as supportive as are the municipalities in which the survey respondents themselves reside.

Table 14
HELPFULNESS OF HOST COMMUNITIES

	Positive Responses*	Negative Responses**	Helpfulness Index
Helpfulness of the nation's communities to receive and aid relocatees	75.3	11.6	.732
Helpfulness of the nation's farmers and other rural residents	79.1	7.7	.740
Helpfulness to evacuees of people in the respon- dent's own community should it be in a host area	81.9	9.2	.771

*"Very helpful" or "helpful."

**"Unhelpful" of "very unhelpful."

Nor do these feelings appear to be unfounded in actual experiences: 38.2 percent of the sampled respondents claim to have lived, for some time, on a farm or in a community with fewer than 2,500 people; and 43.1 percent lived in communities of 2,500 to 10,000 residents--both questions having been asked only of current residents of larger towns and of city dwellers.

Not only are the nation's host areas seen as quite receptive to the flows of eventual relocatees. The data presented in Table 15 also show rather high likelihood that the relocatees would be in private homes.

Now optimistic as the respondents are in general, they are personally even more inclined to say that they would house relocatees than they believe to be the case throughout their own communities or throughout other communities around the nation.

Table 15

LIKELIHOOD OF RELOCATEE ACCOMMODATIONS IN
PRIVATE HOMES

	Likely*	Unlikely**	Likelihood Index
Willingness in host areas to have relocatees stay in private homes	65.9	13.1	.668
Willingness of people in the respondent's community to house relocatees	64.0	14.5	.657
Willingness of the respon- dent to provide accommo- dations for relocatees	72.6	9.2	.751

*"Definitely yes" or "probably yes."

**"Probably no" or "definitely no."

Those who were either likely to accept relocatees in their own homes or who responded with a 50-50 likelihood were also asked about the numbers of families they might be willing to take in:

- * 50.0 percent of them (39.3 percent of the total sample) would be willing to accept one relocatee family.
- * 31.0 percent (or 24.4 percent of the total sample) might accommodate two families.
- * 7.6 percent would be willing to house three to five families, but
- * 11.4 percent mentioned six or more families they might be willing to have stay with them.

Even were we to assume that the notion of "family" may be quite unclear (at least to some of those who offered to provide for six or more families) and some respondents might be actually talking about numbers of individuals, the private housing potential is clearly quite enormous. How it is distributed between high risk and safer areas remains to be seen and only upon such further analysis will we be able to estimate the aggregate numbers of people who might find refuge in the homes of residents of designated host areas. But given the overall results, the numbers cannot but prove to be very large,

indeed, and they may directly affect the nature and magnitude of congregate care concerns which need to be built into national crisis relocation plans.

The respondents who were unlikely to house potential relocatees were asked, 9.2 percent of the total sample, about the factors which enter into their consideration.

The question was quite carefully worded to avoid any possible feeling, or implication, of guilt or any sense that somehow "everybody" was sort of expected to share their home with strangers.

- * 47.2 percent (and thus 4.2 percent of the total sample) cited shortages of space in their own residence as a key factor for their inability to house evacuees.
- * 38.9 percent (and thus 3.5 percent of the sample as a whole) mentioned ideological reasons which prompt them against being willing to accommodate potential relocatees.
- * 13.2 percent gave "other" reasons (1.2 percent of the total sample), and 0.7 percent explained their unwillingness to house relocatees by not knowing who it is that they might have to accommodate.

That the results do not represent inflated intentions to help seems further validated by parallel findings pertaining to home base-sharing, and these findings, in turn, are cross-validated, for 1978, by data from both 1972 and 1968.

Even if some proportion of the helpful intentions were not, in a crisis, actualized (though it is, in principle, more likely that actual cooperativeness would exceed the current, normalcy-based, intentions rather than the opposite), the findings are so strong as to suggest that much of the housing problem of the large numbers of relocatees would, indeed, be "solved" by willing, perhaps even eager, cooperation of people in the host areas.

I. Living "Off the Land"

We know already that our people expect farmers and other rural inhabitants of the nation to be extremely cooperative should the flow of relocatees be directed primarily into the nation's hinterlands.

But to determine whether our people believe that they, and their families, could survive for "a couple of weeks" in the countryside even

if they were unable to "stay at someone's farm or house," we asked about the manageability of such a situation.

- * 72.2 percent of the respondents thought that they could "definitely" or "probably" manage "for a couple of weeks" under such extreme circumstances, while

- * 15.6 percent "probably" or "definitely" could not manage the circumstances, and an additional 8.3 percent are unsure about their ability to deal with the postulated situation.

Whatever else may be said, more than seven out of ten Americans have an image of themselves and of their family as quite capable of "roughing it," if need be, even for "a couple of weeks" and thus, implicitly, do with the barest essentials.

J. Evacuation Experiences

In the 1978 sample, 12.2 percent of the respondents reported prior experiences with evacuation. Various storms (specifically mentioned or unspecified) were mentioned most often as the triggers for their evacuation (30.4 percent of all who did evacuate previously), while fires were the second most frequent single factor (18.5 percent).

- * On the average, such evacuations involved a move over some 9.2 miles, with a median at 3.0 miles.

- * On the average, the evacuation experience lasted 12.5 days, with a median of 2.6 days.

In turn, 11.4 percent of the respondents provided temporary housing for other evacuees. Again, major storms were the main reason for this need for temporary housing (32.9 percent of those who provided a temporary refuge mentioned such storms) as were fires (23.5 percent), floods (18.4 percent) or major power outages (6.7 percent).

The resulting experiences (69.8 percent of which have occurred since 1965--with almost half of those dated in 1975 and more recently) were mainly quite positive. In 64.3 percent of the instances, the experience was rated favorably by those who did help house evacuees in need--but, of course, this also means that some 35.7 percent of the reported experiences were less than positive. Some clearly mixed feelings, however, must be involved here since only 48 percent of those with hosting experience (which, to repeat, characterized 11.4 percent of the sample) were willing to say whether the experience was, for the most part, a positive or a negative one.

Further analysis, of course, will permit us to determine whether and how, prior experiences as either evacuee or host or both affect the views regarding crisis relocation.

K. Conclusions

The main themes which run through the data can be, perhaps, summarized as follows:

1. There is a strong felt need for crisis relocation planning, and an important conviction by many Americans that the President might, in fact, ask the nation to evacuate.
2. Intentions to evacuate spontaneously are quite high, characterizing so many people that the potential outflow comes really quite close to a massive directed relocation.
3. Anticipatable compliance with a Presidential relocation directive is high but, perhaps, not as high--being in the low 70's in percentage terms--as might be expected though we cannot tell how the pattern is distributed as a function of either objectifiable or perceived area risks, a matter to be addressed in further analyses of the data.
4. An actual Soviet evacuation would not be seen as a certain clue that an American-Soviet confrontation is imminent; implicitly, Americans are saying that the Soviets might evacuate under other circumstances as well.
5. Most people would be able to travel, using their own cars, for distances which seem quite sufficient from the stand point of relocation without having to refuel.
6. People without cars have little doubt that they would be taken along by friends, neighbors or relatives, though some risk area dwellers would obviously be dependent on public means of transportations.
7. By far most people have enough food items around the house to last for a significant period of time, but the vast majority of Americans would also want to buy some additional foodstuffs prior to evacuating.
8. Those, almost a third of the sample, who use drugs and medications regularly would generally not have to purchase

any in the last minute rush, and their on-hand supplies would seem to last, for the most part, for the duration of a relocation (or until its less favorable, warlike, resolution).

9. Only few purchases of other items people might want to take along would seem indicated.
10. Pets, themselves in about half of the households, would quite obviously be taken along.
11. The study strongly supports the conclusion that Americans are expecting that others would help relocatees if needed, and that they, themselves, would help as much as possible.
12. The helpfulness, indeed, implies not only that relocatees would find support in the host communities in general, but also, that they could expect, for the most part, to be housed in private dwellings of the host area residents. If anything, the nation's rural residents are seen even more cooperative than are others.
13. By far most people are convinced that they could live "off the land" for a couple of weeks if they had to.
14. Somewhat more than 10 percent of the respondents reported a prior experience as evacuees, and a similar percentage cited circumstances under which they provided a temporary refuge to evacuees who needed it.

VII. CIVIL DEFENSE COSTS

In 1972, we asked the national sample to estimate how much America has been spending on civil defense programs and to state how much ought to be spent. To be sure that the item is comparable, in its basic meaning, to other patterns of expenditures, we also asked the same questions about anti-poverty programs, ABM defenses, and foreign aid.

In fact, the questions about then-current expenditures were asked first and the probes into desirable levels of funding followed.

To be sure that numbers in hundreds of millions of dollars or, for that matter, billions of dollars do not confuse most of our people whose money arithmetic is limited by their own budget experiences, the respondents were given a simple card in which the aggregate amounts were also expressed in approximate expenditures, in dollars and cents, per person.

Since an ABM limitations treaty was signed between the United States and the Soviet Union shortly after the completion of the 1972 study and since it has remained, for all practical purposes, in effect, the 1978 survey repeated the cost questions concerning anti-poverty programs, foreign aid and civil defense but not the ABM defenses item. Table 16 contains a summary of both the 1972 and the 1978 data. The 1978 results, in terms of average expenditures, suggest:

- * Major cutbacks in foreign aid spending, a result paralleling that of the 1972 study.
- * Essentially holding the line on anti-poverty programs, the expenditures for which the 1972 sample sought to increase by a factor of about 1.4.
- * Increasing the expenditures on civil defense program by a factor of about 1.5 (and by a factor of about 1.6 in the 1972 study).

Table 16
AVERAGE AND MEDIAN CURRENT AND DESIRED
LEVELS OF EXPENDITURE

Programs	Averages			
	1978		1972	
	Current	Desired	Current	Desired
(In millions of dollars)				
Foreign aid	2,891.4	676.7	3,133.1	865.4
Anti-poverty programs	1,883.6	1,731.1	1,665.0	2,405.8
Civil defense	1,028.8	1,618.6	789.0	1,243.1
Programs	Medians			
	1978		1972	
	Current	Desired	Current	Desired
Foreign aid	1,041.8	79.7	1,177.0	119.0
Anti-poverty programs	358.5	249.6	331.3	450.1
Civil defense	117.8	252.5	51.2	177.1

Furthermore, the current average expenditures on civil defense efforts are overestimated by a factor of almost 10 (the overestimation in 1972 was by a factor of about 7) so that the more desirable level of spending, relative to the approximate budget of \$100 million, represents a 15-fold increase (14-fold in 1972) over "actual" 1978 spending.

The median is, in this regard, a much more conservative measure, unaffected as it is by extreme values in the overall distribution. For civil defense program, it amounts to an estimation of expenditures "roughly" similar to the actual ones, but a doubling of desirable investments (from about \$118 million to over \$242 million annually).

Many respondents, however, make no claim to know what the nation has been spending nor do they try to say how much money ought to be spent. But there are significantly fewer non-estimators in the 1978 than in the 1972 study:

- * In 1978, 25.5 percent were unable to estimate current, and 24.6 percent desirable, civil defense expenditures. The 1972 percentages were 39.4 and 36.2 respectively.
- * In 1978, 22.7 percent and 23.2 percent refrained of evaluating current and desirable funding levels for foreign aid programs; in the 1972 survey, the percentages were 31.7 and 32.8 percent respectively.

* Regarding poverty programs, 24.5 percent were unwilling to commit themselves to an assessment of 1978 expenditures, and 21.7 percent preferred not to answer how much the nation ought to be spending; 32.1 percent and 31.9 percent respectively gave no estimates in the 1972 national survey.

In all then, people continue being convinced that the country is spending more on civil defense systems than it has been spending, and they advocate substantially higher expenditures than those which they already believe to be involved.

In light of these data, so strongly paralleling also the 1972 results, it would be hard to imagine that the nation might somehow object to an increase in civil defense budgets since even the most likely budgetary increases would not even reach levels of funding which people already believe to be used.

Thus an argument that a sharp increase (say, doubling or even tripling the current budgets) in civil defense spending would somehow signal to our people to worry more about the chances of nuclear war, or else, would be seen as wasteful, is not really tenable.

The concern over the possibility of war is there. A national dialogue about civil defense expenditures would, if anything, make our people realize how low the spending level has been when compared with what they, themselves, believe it to be and, even more so, believe it ought to be.

In no way are we, of course, suggesting what civil defense budgets ought to look like. Rather, we are merely drawing direct inferences from what the nation's public seems to feel. Actual budgets involve many other considerations than those of public sentiment, and we do not, in any manner, address such important factors which influence the respective policy decisions.

VIII. TRAINING AND EDUCATION

To our knowledge, a systematic inventory of secondary skills and capabilities of the nation does not exist. Such "secondary" skills, of course, have to do with know-how different from specific occupational capabilities and it may come from various forms of self-learning or exposure to courses and programs which enable some of our people to learn what they want or, for that matter, what they may need.

In the 1978, we also did not attempt a full inventory of such secondary abilities and their distribution throughout the nation. Nor were we able to pay attention to all skills which have potential value in an emergency situation.

But we did ask whether the respondent, or another member of the household, had some training in first aid, in radiological monitoring, in shelter management, in other (more general) emergency activities, or in knowing what to do in the event of a nuclear attack.

We also asked about the organizations which may have provided such training.

Table 17
TRAINING CLAIMS OF RESPONDENTS AND
THOSE PERTAINING TO OTHER MEMBERS OF
THE HOUSEHOLDS

	Respondents	Other Household Member(s)*
First aid	42.2	27.7
General emergency related actions	13.7	5.5
What to do in a nuclear attack	13.0	5.1
Radiological monitoring	6.3	2.7
Shelter management	4.6	2.6

*As reported by the respondents.

Reports regarding (some) first aid training are by far most frequent and they are also most likely to have been experienced, by the reports of the respondents themselves, by other members of the household.

The schools, the Red Cross, the military, and industrial firms are most often cited as the organizations which helped the respondents as well as other household members to acquire some first aid know-how.

With regard to other training (general emergency training, radiological monitoring, shelter management, how to act in the event of a nuclear attack), the military, the schools and civil defense--in that order--were the most frequently mentioned organizations which were responsible for the delivery of the training service.

In terms of shelter management, civil defense programs are mentioned more often than are schools with regard to the respondent's training (but the reverse holds in terms of the training of another member of the household), and the pattern is similar when it comes to radiological monitoring.

But the military emerges as the strongest training ground for those who believe to have acquired the respective know-how and also as respondents reflect upon the training roots of other household members.

Further analysis will, of course, show the extent to which the training patterns overlap for one and the same person (a rather likely outcome) as well as among different members of the same household.

How up-to-date or how well remembered the various skills might be as of late 1978 we have no way to tell since we did not ask appropriate self-assessment questions nor did we, of course, subject the respondents to any tests to determine how much of the reported training content they might still be able to use with some degree of effectiveness.

But the claims, taken for what they are, represent a significant and major national resource even were some up-dating or tooling-up quite necessary.

How much interest might there be in the nation to acquire disaster-related skills and know-how? We asked the respondents about their own willingness to be trained, about their estimate of the willingness of other members of the household, and about the desirability of including emergency-related educational content in the nation's public schools. The results are summed up in Table 18.

Table 18
INTEREST IN DISASTER-RELATED TRAINING

	Favorable Responses	Unfavorable Responses	Favorableness Index
Respondent willingness	59.5	19.3	.650
Willingness attributed by respondents to other household member(s)	42.4	13.8	.637
Willingness to see disaster- related programs in the curricula of public schools	93.9	3.2	.891

Thus the nation is nearly unanimous about the desirability, and appropriateness, of exposing school-age Americans to information which would enable them to cope with emergencies more effectively. Nor did the wording of the question leave any doubt that a "nuclear war" was one such specific emergency.

There is also a strong interest in the adult public to acquire disaster-relevant training or education. The percentages of those who expressed their willingness to be so educated, however, cannot be used as solid guides for the planning of educational or training programs. They overestimate what would actually happen and quite significantly so.

This is simply due to the fact that particular courses or programs have to be scheduled for specific days and hours, and involve some durations (at least, for the most part). No matter how willing or interested people might be in general, many would find a given day impossible or impractical; many would find the particular hours of the day impossible or impractical; and still others might not last for programs which require repeated, and regular, attendance.

The actual participation in training and educational programs, however, would come to approximate the "intention data" of the survey the more such constraints could be minimized and flexibilities in the types of programs and their scheduling be enhanced as much as possible.

The realistic participation rates, however, would probably never reach the full potential of expressed willingness because there always

exist activities which compete for the same time and which may, at any given moment, be more appealing or have a higher subjective priority for whatever reason.

In all, however, there exists strong eagerness to learn more about emergency-related problems and actions, and prudent educational and training programming could easily capitalize on the prevailing dispositions of the nation's public.

IX. VOLUNTEERING

Some 30.8 percent of the respondents engaged in some voluntary activity in the course of the 12 months preceding the 1978 study. This is in no way out of line with other data on national volunteering. Most of those who did volunteer participated in one major activity only (54.6 percent--some 16.6 percent of the total sample), while 24.9 percent reported two, and 15.0 percent three voluntary activities in the course of the year.

On the average, the volunteers were involved in 1.7 activities and invested about 129.8 hours of their time--in other words, a little over 2 hours per week per volunteer.

- * Religious (32.0 percent), civic and community affairs (31.4 percent), health (29.8 percent) and education-related (24.2 percent) activities dominated the overall pattern of involvements among those who did participate in voluntary efforts.
- * Volunteering in social welfare programs (19.0 percent), recreational activities (11.0 percent), and citizenship programs (8.0 percent) was also relatively frequent, while
- * political activities (4.8 percent) and voluntarism in the nation's justice system (1.8 percent) along with fund-raising (2.8 percent) attracted the fewest of these volunteers.

By any standard, the expressed willingness to volunteer in civil defense efforts is very high indeed.

- * 61.7 percent of the respondents said that they would "definitely" or "probably" volunteer for civil defense programs if the occasion arose--a finding which produces an aggregate index of volunteering willingness of .616.
- * The finding is supported by 1972 data: 54.1 percent expressed their willingness to volunteer, and the corresponding index was .581.

* The finding is further supported by 1966 results in terms of which 62.4 percent of the sample said that they would "definitely" or "probably" volunteer for civil defense--the summary index being .623 for these 1966 respondents.

Among those who stated that they would "probably" or "definitely" not volunteer (28.1 percent of the total sample), practical problems were much more important than ideological motives.

* 16.6 percent cited "age" as the main factor for their inability to volunteer;

* 22.9 percent mentioned lack of time as the decisive factor;

* 14.9 percent referred to health reasons.

Of all those unlikely to volunteer, ideological opposition to civil defense played a major role in the decision in 16.4 percent of the instances--thus on the part of 5.2 percent of the total sample.

Further analysis will show whether those Americans who have already participated as volunteers in one activity or another would also be most inclined to become involved in civil defense efforts, or whether the civil defense programs might draw upon the current national pool of non-volunteers.

The survey certainly does not find that it ought to be difficult, should it also prove desirable in light of the various program needs, to mobilize significant numbers of civil defense volunteers.

As with all other voluntary involvements, their continued participation would then depend on their perception of meaningfulness of the activities, and on flexibility with which they could allocate their time on days, and at hours, most compatible with their rhythm of life.

The problem, in general, would turn out to be what to do with volunteers to reap the most benefits from their time and effort rather than whether Americans might be willing to participate.

X. INFORMATION

We cannot tell how much, or little, our people know about civil defense either in general, or specific terms. This would require the inclusion of some form of knowledge test along with careful probes as to the sources of both information and possible misinformation.

In view of the time budget of the 1978 survey, we did not incorporate such batteries of questions into the instrument. But, as a proxy, we asked the respondents to evaluate, in the most general manner, their own knowledge about civil defense.

To be able to place the resulting indices into some kind of a relative frame of reference, we included parallel questions about the self-rated amount of information about the nation's economy, about national defense, about the energy situation, and about the Soviet Union.

In recent months, there has been a good deal of publicity concerning various aspects of civil defense. Thus a NOVA program was aimed on television and a segment of 60 Minutes, too, was devoted to civil defense (more specifically, to a limited subregional perspective on crisis relocation). Numerous articles and editorials have appeared in the nation's printed media as interest in civil defense has quite clearly been revived.

In fact, the months of 1978 probably saw more publicity concerning civil defense, both interpretive and critical, than had appeared in the course of the whole past decade.

Hence, there have been some new, or renewed, opportunities for our public to acquire additional information about the nation's civil defense systems.

We chose to include a probe about exposures to media material on civil defense along with a query as to the more specific sources, or types of material involved.

But since the increased media interest might also have some effects on the extent to which matters of civil defense enter into discussions and conversations, we also wanted to assess, if in summary fashion only, whether civil defense issues did become a topic of recent conversations and with whom.

A. Information Self-Assessments

In Table 19 the information level indices are summarized.

Table 19
INFORMATION LEVEL: RESPONDENT SELF-EVALUATIONS

	Percent		Information*** Index
	Very Low* Information	Very High** Information	
U.S. economy	10.0	22.1	5.57
Energy situation	11.4	21.4	5.43
General world situation	12.8	17.0	5.10
National defense	22.8	10.1	4.27
Soviet Union	35.0	7.3	3.56
Civil defense	35.2	6.4	3.43

*"Very low information" includes scale values 0-2.

**"Very high information" includes scale values 3-10.

***The index range lies between 0 and 10 for zero information to maximum respectively.

Of the broad issues about which we asked, civil defense yields the lowest information level score. Thus the respondents tend to admit in large numbers that they know very little about the nation's civil defense (and also about the Soviet Union in general), and not much at all about the national defense picture as well.

Coupled with frequent desire to be trained and educated in know-how and problems of mass emergencies, including the hazards of nuclear war, and with the strong willingness to offer voluntary services on behalf of a civil defense program, the potential receptivity to upgrading the national information level is quite high and considerable

effects can be felt relatively easily because the information floor-level is, for the most part, so low.

It may, of course, be the case that improved information--even by self-evaluations of our people--could modify the favorable opinion climate and turn people against civil defense, or against particular civil defense programs. In turn, increased information might prove to further solidify the levels of support, and enhance the saliency of the attendant problems to the point where some demands for a viable national program could make themselves felt in the political arena of discourse.

In further analysis, we will not be able to speak about the effects of information and knowledge increases, but we can compare the perspectives on civil defense of those who claim to be quite knowledgeable at this time with those who admit to very little, or no, knowledge.

B. Recent Media Exposure

Asked about noticing anything at all in the nation's mass media about civil defense in "recent months," 19.6 percent of the respondents recalled such exposures:

- * 8.6 percent mentioned television.
- * 6.9 percent were unable to refer to a more specific information source.
- * 4.9 cited the printed media, and
- * 2.2 percent heard something about civil defense on the radio.

Of those who recalled some recent media publicity, only 7 percent remembered the 60-Minutes segment, and only one respondent specifically singled out the NOVA program. Other, more general, television coverage was the dominant form of exposure, and further probing also revealed more recall of newspaper and magazine articles (5.5 percent of the total sample and 28 percent of the exposed respondents) than did the initial question about "seeing, hearing or reading" anything in the mass media.

Again, further analysis will make it possible to compare the views of those with recall of recent exposure to information about civil defense with the non-exposed respondents (or, more precisely, with those not remembering any recent exposures), and it will prove worthwhile to compare the self-assessed knowledge level about civil defense of the exposed and the unexposed Americans.

C. Discussions

Even though, objectively, 1978 was marked by increased media coverage of civil defense issues and just about 20 percent of the sampled Americans recalled some recent exposure(s) to media information, there has been little in the way of discussions or conversations. It is, of course, quite correct to argue that it is controversial subjects, or subject matters at controversial times, which tend to stimulate communications.

Our data show that, for the most part, civil defense is not seen as controversial by the public in that there exists strong consensus on its positive value. This alone might make it less of an "interesting" topic for discussion, except--as the data from the Cuban crisis period indicate--under exceptional international circumstances when there is concern with obtaining usable crisis-response information.

- * 3.9 percent of the 1978 respondents reported to have discussed various aspects of civil defense with their friends.
- * 3.7 percent held such recent discussions with members of their family, and 1.4 percent with relatives other than immediate family members.
- * 2.8 percent recalled having talked about civil defense with co-workers, and
- * 1.9 percent with neighbors.
- * 2.2 percent were sure that they did discuss civil defense issues in recent months but were unable, or possibly unwilling, to identify the human context of the conversation.

Were these discussions more likely among those who claimed exposure to media publicity? Further study of the data will, of course, enable us to answer this question as it will allow us to see whether those involved in civil defense conversations are differently informed from those who have not discussed civil defense, and whether their views regarding various programs are similar to, or different from, the non-discussants.

D. Conclusions

By comparison with other major issues about which we asked, the self-rated information level about civil defense is low, and it is

lowest among the various broad concerns raised by our questions. There has been some exposure recall--about one in five Americans remembered having noticed some form of media coverage of civil defense in the months preceding the 1978 survey.

Nationwide discussions regarding civil defense matters were few in this period. Continuing media coverage, should it prove to be the case in the first place, might, of course, have eventual cumulative effects in both affecting the nation's knowledge level and in stimulating more of an interest or concern which could manifest itself also in increased discussions about civil defense with family, relatives, friends and neighbors or coworkers.

We did not measure, in the 1978 inquiry, possible exposures to civil defense matters in public meetings or on the agenda of various organizations and associations. Though a few respondents mentioned such events, no conclusions regarding such public and organizational meetings agenda can be drawn except to say that spontaneous mentions, by recall, are so limited as to suggest a negligible level of such communication processes.

XI. SOVIET AND AMERICAN STRENGTH

To anchor some of the views of our people regarding the international threat, its nature, and some means of coping with it (with an emphasis, in this inquiry, upon civil defense systems), we wanted to know how the respondents compare Soviet and American military might.

By their own admission, of course, the judgments do not rest on a very solid information base and are, therefore, perhaps more intuitive or ambient than knowledgeable. We know this simply by noting that the self-evaluations of information level are lowest when it comes to U.S. civil defense, the Soviet Union in general, and national defense in general.

Whether the more knowledgeable Americans look at the comparative Soviet and American might differently will be determinable upon subsequent analysis of the data.

The 1978 respondents were asked the same three questions as were the 1972 interviewees: to compare the strength of the two superpowers with regard to strategic weapons; to compare the two nations with respect to overall defense capabilities; and to contrast them in terms of civil defense systems specifically.

A summary of the results, both for the 1978 and the 1972 nationwide surveys, is presented in Table 20.

The major conclusions which can be derived from these aggregate data are about as follows:

1. With regard to strategic, or attack, weapons there has been little change in the nation's views since 1972. The strength index favors the Soviets on both occasions, but equality in strategic military might remains the dominant response.
2. In general defense capabilities as well as in civil defense, there is a sense of increased Soviet might. This is especially so regarding civil defense programs of the two nations.

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
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
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
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Table 20
PERCEPTIONS OF COMPARATIVE SOVIET AND AMERICAN MILITARY POWER

	<u>Strategic Capabilities</u>		<u>Defense Systems</u>		<u>Civil Defense</u>	
	1978	1972	1978	1972	1978	1972
The Soviets are seen stronger or much stronger	29.1	29.7	29.1	25.6	39.7	26.0
Soviet and American military might is seen as about equal	47.0	51.5	47.0	45.6	28.8	27.3
The United States is seen stronger or much stronger	14.8	11.7	13.9	19.2	10.1	17.7
Relative strength index*	.556	.561	.555	.529	.634	.529

*Index values over .5 indicate greater Soviet than American strength perception; index value of .5 indicates equality in military power; index values below .5 would indicate that the respondents believe that America is stronger than are the Soviets.

XI. SOVIET AND AMERICAN STRENGTH

To anchor some of the views of our people regarding the international threat, its nature, and some means of coping with it (with an emphasis, in this inquiry, upon civil defense systems), we wanted to know how the respondents compare Soviet and American military might.

By their own admission, of course, the judgments do not rest on a very solid information base and are, therefore, perhaps more intuitive or ambient than knowledgeable. We know this simply by noting that the self-evaluations of information level are lowest when it comes to U.S. civil defense, the Soviet Union in general, and national defense in general.

Whether the more knowledgeable Americans look at the comparative Soviet and American might differently will be determinable upon subsequent analysis of the data.

The 1978 respondents were asked the same three questions as were the 1972 interviewees: to compare the strength of the two super-powers with regard to strategic weapons; to compare the two nations with respect to overall defense capabilities; and to contrast them in terms of civil defense systems specifically.

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The major conclusions which can be derived from these aggregate data are about as follows:

1. With regard to strategic, or attack, weapons there has been little change in the nation's views since 1972. The strength index favors the Soviets on both occasions, but equality in strategic military might remains the dominant response.
2. In general defense capabilities as well as in civil defense, there is a sense of increased Soviet might. This is especially so regarding civil defense programs of the two nations.

3. The modal response regarding overall defense strength is one of equality both in 1972 and 1978.
4. With respect to civil defense capabilities, the 1978 modal response favors the Soviets rather sharply, while the 1972 data showed about as many people believing that the civil defense programs of the superpowers were about equal as felt that the Soviets already had a superior capability.
5. In terms of strategic systems, defenses as well as civil defense the percentages of Americans who believe the Soviets to be stronger than our country exceed, by significant margins, those who maintain America's superiority. For strategic weapons and general defense capabilities, the difference is one of a factor of about 2; for civil defense comparison, the difference favors the Soviets by a factor of nearly 4.
6. All the "strength" indices, both in 1972 and 1978 (with increases over the years with respect to defense capabilities in general and civil defense in particular) imply a national belief that the Soviet military might surpasses that of America though not, except with regard to civil defense, by impressive margins as yet.

Whether the prevailing sense of having become the "military power number two" has an important bearing on the way our people look at the world or on civil defense (or other defense) needs can be ascertained to an important extent once we make comparisons between those who consider the Soviets stronger, those who believe that the two superpowers are of about equal strength, and those who are convinced of America's continued military superiority.

XII. ARMS CONTROL

Systems of civil defense can, in a variety of ways, subserve different national objectives. It may be, indeed, quite arguable whether some civil defense program themselves contribute to deterrence or not. It may be arguable whether or not, by contrast, such systems may imbalance the tenuous equilibrium on which (nuclear) peace might be seen to rest.

It may well be that, in effect, the major contribution of civil defense lies in the nation's improved capabilities to cope with natural and man-made disasters rather than with hazards of nuclear war since such other emergencies are both more likely and more frequent.

Yet, the major underlying objective of all civil defense systems which have any responsibility in an environment of nuclear confrontations is to minimize damage to life and property. Thus civil defense measures aim, above all, at blunting the effectiveness of an attack on the United States should such an attack ever actualize.

It is similarly clear that, apart from other broader national goals, measures of arms control and disarmament focus on the reduction in war probabilities or, as a minimum, on changes in the natures and magnitudes of possible attacks.

But if arms control agreements, past or hoped for, alter, in some degree, the likelihood of war--perhaps even mainly by simply creating an international climate in which such agreements are possible, and thus keeping the superpowers around the diplomatic table--short of dramatic measures of disarmament, the threat of war cannot quite go away altogether. Some successful efforts in threat reduction are then not, objectively or otherwise, tantamount to the disappearance of the danger.

In the 1978 survey, we repeated a series of questions concerning more general arms control and disarmament agreements. In the 1972 study, we also asked about partial agreements regarding the deployment of ABM's--

and this, in fact, was the key outcome of the Moscow agreement of 1972, reached a few weeks after the completion of the survey.

The data of Table 21 summarize the aggregate findings for the identical items of both the 1972 and the new, 1978, inquiry.

Table 21
THE NATION'S VIEWS ON SEVERAL ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT MEASURES

	Percent				Desirability Index	
	Positive Responses		Negative Responses		1978	1972
	1978	1972	1978	1972		
Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons	69.8	69.3	14.4	13.3	+ 1.55	+ 1.60
Agreeing to stop arms shipments to all other nations	64.5	64.6	18.4	15.4	+ 1.26	+ 1.41
Agreement to maintain not more than current nuclear force levels	62.4	64.3	17.1	13.3	+ 1.16	+ 1.40
Agreement to decrease the current nuclear force levels	61.7	not asked	22.1	not asked	+ 1.07	not asked
A safe secure mutual inspection system	56.2	59.5	25.7	22.3	+ 0.78	+ 0.97
Eliminating all nuclear tests	51.1	55.2	29.4	27.7	+ 0.61	+ 0.83
Agreement with all nuclear powers to destroy their whole nuclear arsenals	48.3	46.9	34.4	32.9	+ 0.40	+ 0.45
Agreement to have no ABM's at all	45.8	39.4	34.3	35.6	+ 0.34	+ 0.15
Agreement among nations to maintain armed forces large enough only to keep internal order	46.5	51.7	35.3	28.8	+ 0.25	+ 0.63
A U.N. police force armed with nuclear weapons to be the strongest army in the world	29.1	30.7	48.6	43.3	- 0.62	- 0.46

1. Except for a far-reaching agreement which would, in effect, make the United Nations the military world government, all the postulated major options find more support than opposition in the nation's public both in 1978 and 1972.
2. The most desired measures have to do with the "N-th" country problem--a finding which holds again both in the early 1970's and in the late part of the decade: the prevention of proliferation of both nuclear and conventional arms.
3. Maintaining current nuclear force levels or, in fact, decreasing them by mutual agreement are other programs which find strong support in the nation.
4. Except for an agreement to do away with ABM's altogether, there is a slight shift in desirability of all measures between 1972 and 1978: the data indicate a small, but consistent, drift toward slightly lower levels of support for the various alternatives which the study postulated.

In principle then, the nation's public is favorably disposed both to almost all methods to reduce the risks of war by arms control and disarmament agreements and to civil defense programs to decrease the negative consequences of an attack should it ever happen.

The main implication of this general finding, of course, is that the nation does not see arms control agreements (such as might result from SALT) at odds with prudent measures of civil defense.

To be able to interpret the data further, we wanted to ascertain whether people might be less supportive of arms control systems because, perhaps, they feel that such agreements as they would like to see happen are improbable anyway.

Subsequent analysis will permit us to address this issue in greater detail, and to consider its implications for the opinions which our people hold about various programs of civil defense.

- * "Major progress" in arms control "between ourselves and the Soviet Union" by 1980 has a likelihood of .435 (55.5 percent of the respondents rating the likelihood at 50-50 or higher).
- * By 1985, such "major progress" has a likelihood of .499--with 62.4 percent assigning probabilities of 50-50 or better.

Thus the prospects of significant agreements with the Soviets in the next two years are seen as fairly high, and further improving toward 1985. But our data on the threat of war and the timing of such a war also indicate that such significant progress in arms control agreements does not seem to convince our people that the measures would turn out to be such as to make war either extremely unlikely or even impossible.

XIII. EXPOSURE TO DISASTERS

It seemed altogether logical to argue that people who have had direct experiences with various major disasters may have a different perspective on emergency preparedness systems, including system of civil defense, than might people without such prior encounters. For this reason, the 1978 study included several specific questions: whether the respondents ever had an experience with a tornado, hurricane, flood or earthquake; how affected they were; and how "close" to them was the experience--whether it impacted them personally, or primarily their friends or neighbors, or their residential area.

Beyond the questions about the specific disaster experiences (of which, to repeat, we singled out four types--floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, and earthquakes) we wanted to "capture" other major exposures to emergencies. Thus the 1978 respondents were also asked about disasters other than those which we focussed upon more specifically.

Do, in fact, such prior experiences make people more concerned over emergency preparedness systems? Are there greater, or different, receptivities to warning systems? Is, indeed, the international environment viewed differently in terms of the (war) threat it may pose? Are there differences with respect to the amount of money people believe ought to be spent on civil defense programs? Are there differences in the desire to acquire education and training or the willingness to volunteer?

All these are important issues. The answers must await further analysis of the data. At this time, however, we can consider, as a minimum, the aggregate patterns of experiences.

A. Tornadoes

In the sample as a whole, we find 20.8 percent of respondents who claimed experience with a tornado.

- * 53 percent of these exposures are dated beyond 1960 (12.9 percent since 1975).
- * Texas (9.5 percent), Ohio (8.8 percent), Oklahoma (8.2 percent), Illinois (7.3 percent), Kansas (7.0 percent), Michigan (5.5 percent), Alabama (4.6 percent) are the states most frequently cited as the loci of the disaster.
- * Among the respondents with an exposure to a tornado (or, in fact, to several of them), only 29.4 percent reported no damage or injury at all, while 29.8 percent mentioned a severe impact (property damage, personal injury and the like) and 18.7 percent were impacted "moderately" (less severe damage, less severe injury--but one requiring medical intervention).
- * Of these exposed Americans, 71.9 percent mentioned such damage or injury experience to themselves or their family members, while an additional 13.3 percent mentioned the "neighborhood" and 9.5 percent the wider community of their residence.

B. Hurricane

The overall exposure rate to hurricanes turned out to be 21.8 percent.

- * 54.2 percent of these experiences date since 1970
- * Florida (19.9 percent), New York (12.7 percent), a foreign country (10.4 percent), North Carolina (9.0 percent), New Jersey (7.5 percent), Louisiana (7.2 percent), Massachusetts (6.6 percent) and Texas (6.4 percent) are the locations of the hurricane experience which the respondents mention most often.
- * Moderate or severe impact was experienced by 59.7 percent of those exposed, and
- * In 68.9 percent of the cases this was a direct, personal experience (14.3 percent, neighborhood; 10.0 percent, community).

C. Floods

Experiences with major floods were reported by 17.9 percent of the respondents.

- * 56.8 percent of the reported exposures occurred since 1960, and 18.2 percent, in all, since 1975.
- * Louisiana (5.8 percent), California, Ohio and Texas (5.4 percent each), Pennsylvania and a foreign country (5.0 percent each), Illinois and Montana (4.7 percent each) were the main locations.
- * In 60.9 percent of the instances, "moderate" or "severe" damage was reported, and
- * It affected the respondent and family in 80.3 percent of the cases.

D. Earthquakes

An exposure to an earthquake was referred to by 16.1 percent of the respondents.

- * 79.0 percent of such exposures were of a vintage beyond 1960 with 21.0 percent in the past three years.
- * California (53.4 percent), a foreign country (12.9 percent) and the state of Washington (7.6 percent) were mentioned more than any other states of the nation as the main loci of the earthquake experiences.
- * "Severe" or "moderate" damage was incurred by 25.0 percent of those with earthquake exposure,
- * With 90.6 percent of all those exposed having been impacted directly and personally.

E. Other Emergencies

In all, 11.7 percent of the respondents reported disasters other than those about which they were specifically asked (floods, hurricanes, tornadoes and earthquakes). And a very few of them mentioned two or even three emergencies which they recalled.

- * Fires, blizzards, wind storms and "other" emergencies were most often cited (and, among these "other" emergencies, mentioned by 12.7 percent of those reporting exposure to begin with, "gas leaks," "toxic spillages" were the dominant themes).

- * 69.9 percent of the experiences are relatively recent ones: they occurred since 1960, and 42.6 percent, in fact, are exposures of the 1970's.
- * Most often, these were emergencies encountered in foreign countries (24.9 percent in all).
- * In the United States, the reports mention New York, California and Michigan more often than any of the other states of the nation as the loci of the emergency experience. But, in light of overall population data, the subsamples from the respective sampling units of these states are also larger than they are from other states so that the outcome is not necessarily representative of the distribution of such hazards across the nation.
- * "Moderate" (18.6 percent) or even "severe" (51.2 percent) damage or injury were cited, as the discrete percentages indicate, by 69.8 percent of those who reported such disaster experiences, and
- * about 77.7 percent of the reports pertained to the most direct and personal impact on the respondent or his/her family.

F. Conclusions

The data indicate a fair, indeed quite non-negligible, amount of exposure to various mass emergency situations. The experiences are, of course, location-specific. But when mentioned, they seem to have led to relatively serious impacts in the way of damage or injury, and they tended to reflect personal-and-family experiences for the most part rather than just a contextual (community, area) exposure.

About half of the reported experiences have a 1960 or post-1960 date--and the most recent experiences, those of the 1970's (and especially since 1975), seem to come up most frequently. Only further analysis of the relation of these exposures to disasters and the age composition of the sample can tell us whether or not recall factors, or mainly objective age itself, play a significant role in the manner in which the respondents report the pattern of their past experiences.

To repeat, further analysis, of course, will also show the extent to which such disaster experiences color the feelings of the respondents regarding the need, or necessity, for various measures of civil defense or how, if at all, these traumatic events of the past might sensitize our people differently in their evaluation of possible threats.

XIV. NO CIVIL DEFENSE

The limiting case, indeed, is one in which the nation might have no civil defense program at all. Whether it serves mainly as a conceptual benchmark or, in fact, might reflect some realities of future policy, it is a relevant and important consideration.

In our discussion of the threat dimension, we argued that strict improbability (real zero likelihood) of a threat might well induce a preference for not spending any effort or funds on civil defense programs (apart from their possible contribution to the management of non-war emergencies).

Our study focus, however, was placed on civil defense with its traditional mandate to help protect life and property of the nation against a nuclear attack.

Thus it was quite clear to the respondents that the central issue of civil defense was not to improve the national capability to deal with natural or other man-made disasters, but that it was, above all, a program oriented toward perparedness capabilities in face of possible nuclear war hazards.

Two items in the questionnaire are relevant to give us a clue on the public's dispositions. One has to do with doing away with civil defense, or not having a program at all, as a kind of unilateral national decision. The second item has to do with a possible agreement with the Soviet Union to mutually do away with civil defense programs--itself one of the imaginable dimensions of arms control and disarmament trade-offs.

The same issues were raised in the 1972 survey so that we do have some comparable data.

The results are straightforward:

- * Unilateral discontinuation of civil defense programs has a desirability index of -1.92 in 1978 and -1.96 in 1972 with 78.3 percent and 78.7 percent, respectively, falling into the "negative" desirability response categories.

- * Even a Soviet-American agreement to discontinue all civil defense programs meets with strong disapproval. The 1978 index is -1.55, and it has exactly the same aggregate value in 1972. In turn, 65.8 percent in 1978 and 70.5 percent in 1972, were opposed to this form of arms control (with 12.7 percent and 15.5 percent respectively being supportive).
- * Except for having the United Nations, given appropriate arms control and disarmament agreements, in control of the world's nuclear weaponry and thus of the global policing functions, the cessation of civil defense programs, even in agreement with the Soviets, is the only effort on the arms control front which yields a negative index. Furthermore, the opposition to doing away with civil defense is much stronger even than is the opposition to a United Nations strategic policing capability.

The results are, as a matter of fact, not surprising. We have documented the strong support for civil defense not only in light of 1978 data but also given the findings of previous national inquiries. The "no civil defense" case then further validates the main findings in that it underscores the fact that our people, while not jumping in the streets to demand "civil defense," are both concerned with, and committed to, efforts by which our country would have some reasonable capabilities to be prepared against all contingencies, including the risk of nuclear war.

XV. CONCLUSIONS

In this report, we present the aggregate results of the 1978 national survey on civil defense issues. As we have done in previous studies (of the 1960's and early 1970's), many questions were repeated in the 1978 survey verbatim. This permits us to ascertain basic trends in the climate of the nation's opinions. Whenever appropriate, we have included an aggregate comparison with the 1972 data and, on occasions, with prior studies.

Many questions in the 1978 inquiry are also new ones. These focus on a more detailed assessment of issues bearing on the credibility and acceptance of crisis relocation. These items are new simply because it is precisely in the latter part of the decade of the 70's that crisis relocation thinking has become important, that various detailed feasibility studies have been undertaken and that the civil defense efforts, in part, have come to be centered around the possibility or relocating our people from higher risk areas to safer parts of the country.

But even with regard to some of the key new questions pertaining to crisis relocation, we have been able to achieve a modicum of comparability. In the Summer of 1978, Congressman Ike Skelton carried out a survey among his constituents in the 16 counties of the 4th Congressional District of Missouri, and since the survey instrument was designed by us, it replicates questions which were later on raised in the nationwide study of the fall and early winter weeks of 1978.

Thus, as appropriate, we also include some aggregate comparisons of the national perspective with the thinking of the Missourians of the 4th Congressional District (by far most of which, according to TR-82, lies in a high risk area).

A. Main Findings

Since we have provided more detail in each respective section of the report, only the highlights of the key results will be summarized here.

1. The likelihood of nuclear war in the future straddles the 50-50 mark. It may be that some readers may wish to consider

this to represent rather high likelihood, while others may construe it to reflect only modest, or even low, war expectation.

(a) Regardless of whether one might view the likelihood index as high or relatively low, it is nonetheless true that it mirrors an increased expectation of a possible nuclear confrontation when compared with the early 1970's, and that the anticipated trajectory of the changing level of international tensions also points toward expected worsening of the situation (though not dramatically so).

(b) Regardless of whether the index is considered high or relatively low, it does indicate that our people believe that there exists a real threat so that it would be quite surprising to find Americans in disfavor of programs, including civil defense, which might mitigate the hazard in some manner.

2. The likelihood of selected other nuclear risks is also, by the same standard, relatively high and especially the expectation that, by 1985, some terrorist group might acquire a nuclear device and hold, as it were, an American city as "hostage" to enforce whatever demands.
3. A Soviet-Chinese confrontation, too, seems quite plausible to our people and U.S. entanglement in such a conflict is believed to be quite likely on the part of those who are convinced that the Soviets and the Chinese may well end up fighting each other.
4. Yet, the central threat of a nuclear war is generally somewhat remote: the danger is real but not acute in as much as most respondents think in terms of a 10 year span--and thus temporally locate the main risk toward the end of the 1980's and beyond.
5. Even though we sought to phrase the question in such a way as to elicit responses regarding strategic warning clues (the time which the respondents feel that might have between becoming rather sure that a war might erupt and the onset of hostilities), the majority of Americans think in terms of tactical warning times (a few hours at best) and thus indicate essentially a feeling that a Soviet-American conflict, if it were to come, would most likely be of the sudden attack variety.

6. A strong majority of these respondents underscore the problem by expressing a conviction that there probably, or even definitely, would not be enough time to evacuate our population.
7. In a "next week's war" (and thus implicitly assuming only the capabilities of the current civil defense system), by far most Americans view their survival chances as being quite poor. The survivability index (.315), intuitive as it is, yields a result quite comparable to computer output under the types of attacks on which TR-82 was predicted. Thus our people expect no miracles.
8. Full fallout protection, blast shelters or crisis relocation yield survivability estimates higher by about a factor of 2 over the "next week's war" prospect. Hence, civil defense systems are expected to have a strong effect on survivability—but it is quite essential to recognize that even such protection systems as were postulated in the study lead to non-survival estimates on the part of over 40 percent of our people.
9. The performance of fallout shelters may well be somewhat overestimated, the survivability value of blast protection systems somewhat underestimated, and the worth of crisis relocation also rather underestimated (even on the premise that an adversary might deliberately target against the relocated population).
10. Almost 70 percent of the respondents are convinced that they live in a high risk area (an area that would be a target) and similarly many are convinced of high fallout danger even were their area not directly targetted.
11. Some 16 percent of the respondents, however, believe to be in a non-target area while, in terms of TR-82, they are actually in high risk locations, and many Americans in areas that are "safer" (TR-82) are convinced that they actually reside in a probable target part of the country.
12. Public fallout shelters find strong support in the nation's body politic. This holds whether we ask about a more general attitude, or about marking and stocking (which has the effect

of leading to the use of "best available space"), or, for that matter, about the desirability of including fallout shelters in new construction (of schools, hospitals, public buildings and the like).

13. Many Americans believe that blast shelters would really be needed in their respective areas. They support the possibility of construction of blast shelters (which they consider as enhancing survivability the most).
14. But also home basement sharing is favored. The results show that the willingness to share, as well as the willingness to have potential shelterees assigned to their homes, is as strong among those with basements as it is among those who would have to use someone else's basement because they do not have one.
15. Crisis relocation, too, finds considerable support in the nation. More than two thirds of our people are convinced that there might, indeed, exist circumstances under which the President would decide to urge, or order, evacuation; and there is strong--in fact, overwhelming--support for crisis relocation planning.
16. Spontaneous evacuation, in face of a deepening international crisis, could reach such magnitudes as to amount almost to directed relocation. But there are indications in the data that some such spontaneous movement might be maladaptive because of the current state of rather inadequate information: some movement might, in fact, take people out of safer areas to riskier ones; others are prone to move from one high risk to another high risk area; still others might move from safe areas to other safe areas thereby both diminishing the resource base in areas from which they would leave and creating an additional, perhaps intolerable, burden on other host areas. There are also indications that some of our people consider movement to shelter as a form of evacuation and this, too, from the vantage point of crisis relocation planning, would prove to be a maladaptive response.
17. Over 70 percent of Americans claim that they would comply with a Presidential directive to relocate--and they attribute a similar pattern of response to other residents of their communities as well.

18. Potential host communities are expected to be helpful to relocatees, indeed, even to the point of sharing their homes (and, coupled with the data on basement sharing, obviously providing shelter should a crisis lead to a war). This finding is further underscored by the fact that the respondents' own communities are viewed as even more likely to help than are the nation's communities at large, and that the respondents themselves are even more inclined to house relocatees in their own homes than they believe other Americans to be willing to do so.
19. Although more than two-thirds of the respondents (paralleling the national pattern as a whole) live in cities, both they and residents of more rural areas of the country are strongly convinced that a program to relocate people from higher risk areas into the nation's farmlands would meet with high levels of helpfulness by the nation's farmers and other rural residents.
20. Thus altruistic expressions as well as expectations are both intense and widespread. This finding is further support in a more indirect manner (though further analysis will permit a more direct assessment): even though survival expectations are not overly optimistic for any of the major civil defense postures (in-place fallout shelters, in-place blast shelters, crisis relocation)--but greatly improved over the "current" system state--the support for various options runs much stronger. This cannot but mean that many people may not expect that they would survive themselves, but still favor measures to enhance the nation's survival potential--and, basically, they favor any and all such programs and quite strongly so.
21. There exists, furthermore, something of an impressive resource base.
 - (a) With between half and two-thirds tankfull of gasoline, people tend to feel that they could drive some 160 miles without the need to refuel.
 - (b) There are enough foodstuffs around the house for most people to manage for a 2 week period although most Americans would go out and buy some additional foods (canned goods and dried foods predominately) in a last minute effort.

- (c) Those in need of regular drugs and medications would, on the whole, last almost a month without the need to purchase additional needed drugs.
- (d) By far most of those few Americans (some 12 percent) who did not have cars themselves were sure that friends, relatives or neighbors would provide transportation for them and their family members should the need arise.
- (e) More than half of the respondents reported having friends, relatives or family members with whom they would stay within 100 or 200 miles of their place of residence. Furthermore, these are accommodations located outside of city areas-- something we explicitly stated in the question itself.
- (f) Campers, camping equipment and accustomed campsite, along with some summer cottages and homes in the countryside seem to be also available to quite a few of the respondents.
- (g) Over 70 percent of the respondents thought that they and their family members could manage to live essentially "off the land" for a couple of weeks.
- (h) Quite a few of the respondents mentioned some emergency preparedness training capability (for the most part "first aid"), mainly acquired through the Red Cross or in military training. But there is, of course, no way to say how up-to-date such skills might be or how well developed they were (or are).
- (i) There exists strong interest in participating in emergency preparedness training programs as well as in civil defense volunteering, and the nation's public is almost unanimous about the desirability of disaster-related education in the public school system.

22. As of late 1978, the pluralities of Americans are convinced that the Soviet Union and the United States are about equally strong in strategic capabilities as well as in terms of overall defensive might; but those who do not place the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. at parity are generally inclined to believe that the Soviet Union has now become the stronger of the two superpowers.

23. With regard to civil defense systems, the respondents are convinced that the Soviets are substantially better off than the United States—more so than in either strategic or defensive might overall.
24. For the most part, our people overestimate what the nation is spending on civil defense; and, even with the overestimates regarding current pattern of expenditures, they would like to see an investment which sharply exceeds the nation's actual spending fiscal 1979 or the projected budgets (1980). By contrast, the spending level for antipoverty programs is seen, on the average, as just about appropriate while foreign aid spending far exceeds what Americans say we "ought" to be spending on such efforts.
25. Information level about civil defense, by the admission of the respondents themselves, is rather low--the index being lower than for any of the other issues about which we asked.
26. That there exists strong support for measures of civil defense is further underscored by the fact that there exist, at the same time, robust feelings against unilateral dismantling of civil defense programs as well as against arms control type agreements with the Soviets to discontinue civil defense.
27. In turn, other measures of arms control and disarmament are supported--and often quite strongly so--except for the possibility of turning over the nuclear arsenal to a United Nations (police) force even were this agreed upon by all the major powers. But since most of the more realistic arms control options are supported, it also follows that our people do not see any contradiction in wanting both viable arms control agreements and prudent programs of civil defense.

B. Some Major Points

Some of our conclusions are so central in any usable interpretation of the 1978 findings that we must focus on them in their own right.

1. The 1978 results are quite similar to the findings of the 1972 national survey and those results, in turn, paralleled the data from studies in the 1960's.

This is, of course, of vital importance. In the 1970's nothing in the global development would have led us to suspect that basic views regarding civil defense ought to have changed in any but tangential ways. The 1978 study confirms this expectation: the prevailing sentiments concerning civil defense issues (as well as the selected arms control issues which we considered in the inquiry) represent a straightforward and underlying theme in the nation's thinking.

2. Nor is the basic conclusion limited to the items which were repeated from previous surveys at the national level. On those questions which were new in the 1978 study but which were also incorporated into the Missouri survey, we find strong similarities between the Missourians (Summer, 1978) and the nation as a whole. Indeed, we had no reason to suspect that the residents of the 4th Congressional District of Missouri should be somehow very different from other Americans. They are not.
3. Similar to past studies is also the finding that some 8 to 10 percent of the respondents are consistently negative toward any and all civil defense efforts (though on specific programs, the percentage of those with an unfavorable opinion is occasionally somewhat higher).
4. The findings imply not merely generic support for civil defense but also a sense of the nation that some mix of programs might be best (in-place public fallout shelters; home basement sharing; blast protection; crisis relocation): none of the major civil defense postures is evaluated negatively, and there are only shades of difference in the positive assessment of all the key alternatives.
5. Similar to previous studies, we find again that the strong level of acceptance of civil defense is not coupled with any sense of urgency. Thus there is nothing in the data to suggest that there would exist, or that there might be emerging, a vocal constituency which would levy demands for an improved civil defense program. The data on costs of civil defense, in turn indicate that many Americans seem to feel that more has been done than has actually happened (but the survivability index

in a "next week's war" in its stark realism seems to counterbalance this interpretation). And the data show that more should be done if the pattern of expenditures is taken as a useful indicator. Yet, an analysis grouping for "meanings behind the meanings" of the various statistics would look in vain for any suggestion of existing, or budding, public "mobilization" to seek, from the Federal Government, more in the way of civil defense capability.

C. Attitudes and Actions

Would there, in fact, be as much willingness to share basements as our data suggest? Would relocatees be likely to find as much help in the nation's host communities as we must conclude on the basis of the 1978 information? Would as many residents of host communities provide home (and shelter) for the relocatees? Would spontaneous evacuation reach the kinds of proportions the data seem to imply? Would compliance with a Presidentially directed relocation be as high as we are led to surmise? Would as many Americans participate in emergency training programs? Would as many of them volunteer as the index indicates?

Questions concerning the translatability of attitudinal dispositions into actual behavior are always pertinent even though they are sometimes raised as if to imply that people essentially lie in interviews and that they wouldn't think of doing what they say they are likely to do.

There is, of course, no certainty that the nation's actions would be well predicted by the kind of data we have acquired. The actual dynamics of the evolving international situation would have a major bearing on triggering some forms of behavior more than other forms of action. The circumstances more specific to each community at that time, too, would have some effect on the actualization of the types of intentions and expressions of plans which our data address more directly.

Thus, for instance, even a serious international crisis might not produce anything like 50 percent spontaneous evacuation if the crisis does not appear to be further deepening.

Similarly, during winter months, both spontaneous and directed outflow of people from higher risk areas might be so severely impeded that the evacuation would fall quite a bit short from what the 1978 study leads us to estimate.

Gasoline shortages or costs or both, too, might amount to strong disincentives to relocate (except under the direst circumstances and upon strong and repeated Presidential urging).

In other words, we cannot simply jump to the conclusion that the 1978 data, collected under conditions of relative normalcy, would precisely forecast the aggregate actions by millions of Americans under circumstances of a future crisis of unknown parameters or dynamics. But proxy data provide rather compelling evidence that attitudes do translate themselves into actions, if roughly so and only in the aggregate.

Preelection polls reflect attitudes and intentions: but the aggregate national voting patterns tend to be predicted very well indeed. Even the 1948 Truman-Dewey polls did well in forecasts of the overall votes though they failed to identify the winner.

Aggregate purchases of consumer goods are quite well predicted by expressed intentions, and plans, to buy. Intentions regarding college attendance on the part of high school students serve as good predictors of the pattern of college enrollments.

Insofar as evacuation has taken place in face of natural or man-made disasters (or under an acute threat of an impending disaster), most evacuees do find housing in private homes. The pattern holds for small scale evacuations (of dozens or hundreds of families) as it does for massive movements (as in the evacuation from the Gulf Coast or in the British war time experience). The favorable response of building owners in allowing their facility to be marked (and stocked) as a public shelter, too, reflected attitudinal acceptance of such a program.

The response of households to the Bureau of the Census Home Basement Survey (in 28 states) yielded actual responses which we were well able to forecast on the basis of data obtained in national surveys of attitudes and opinions.

The need for (modest numbers of) volunteers in connection with the Colorado Springs area feasibility studies of crisis relocation (Mark I inquiries) allowed still another direct test: the actual volunteering rates turned out to be well predicted for Colorado Springs by the national statistics regarding statements about the willingness to volunteer.

In the 1978 survey, some 11 percent of the respondents already experienced having had some evacuees in their places of residence somewhere along the line; and about as many experienced having been evacuated or having to evacuate their own homes.

In all then, inasmuch as we have data expressing the willingness to undertake some action, or an intention to do something, we would have to conclude that the evidence supports the conclusion that, apart from the situation and time-specific constraints, the results must be used as well predictive of the manner in which the behavioral dispositions--attitudes--would actually become transformed into actions in keeping with the attitudinal states.

D. Some Problems

Even at this (aggregate) level of analysis we can identify several important problems. These are, in effect, some difficulties which may face the civil defense planner although most of them can be reduced to matters of public education and information. But not all of these issues are translatable into problems of public enlightenment.

1. There exists, indeed, a low level of public insight into civil defense matters. We base this conclusion on the information level selfassessments on the part of the respondents--thus not as a guess, or interpretation, by the researcher.
2. Given a real though not imminent perception of a threat of nuclear war, the data suggest that most Americans tend to think in terms of tactical warning time only. Thus the "scenario" which seems to dominate the nation's thinking involves an essentially "out-of-the-blue" type of attack, or an onset of war quite suddenly.
3. Given these perceptions of potentially available warning clues, it is not surprising that many Americans believes that there simply would not be enough time to evacuate the likely target areas. At the same time, many who consider the probable warning time to be inadequate appear to be willing to relocate should the President so urge, thus indicating that the Presidential action itself would serve, perhaps, as a signal that there may be, after all, enough time to "do the job."

4. The results indicate the possibility of such massive spontaneous evacuation that, at some point along its trajectory it may have to be dealt with, and planned for, as an aspect of directed relocation.
5. The findings point to the likelihood of a significant amount of maladaptive spontaneous movement: from safe to safe areas, from high risk to other high risk areas, and from safer to higher risk areas. This seems to be clearly an aspect of inadequate information as to which areas should be considered at risk and which ones might be safer.
6. There are some indications that some Americans are also confused about the meaning of crisis relocation (or, if you wish, strategic evacuation) and that, using common sense whereby evacuation occurs when people have to leave their homes to stay somewhere else, they construe evacuation to mean "movement to shelter." This, of course, adaptive behavior in terms of in-place programs, but maladaptive in high risk areas relative to crisis relocation efforts.
7. The data on current and desired funding levels for civil defense suggest that many people might conclude that the nation is doing more in the way of civil defense than it has been doing--even though many are rather sure that the Soviet capabilities exceed our own anyway.
8. The resources and capabilities "on hand" are impressive indeed. But we must consider, of course, those that would not be as well off as might most Americans:
 - (a) 15.6 percent of the respondents, against an overwhelming majority of others, do not feel that they, and their families could "rough it" and manage to live "off the land" for a two week period if it were necessary to do so.
 - (b) 24.3 percent of the respondents would not have enough money readily available to manage for two weeks even if free accommodations were provided.
 - (c) 14.5 percent had only about a one-fourth tankfull of gasoline or less (4.1 percent reported that they were essentially out of fuel).

(d) Without refueling, 21.1 percent felt that they could travel 75 miles or less, and 14.4 percent said that they could travel 50 miles or less.

(e) 3.3 percent would definitely have to rely on public transportation--not having a car or not anticipating that friends, neighbors or relatives could, or would, provide them with the needed transportation.

(f) 14.0 percent do not have enough food on hand to manage for more than 3 days, and 9.4 percent could manage for 2 days at most (without further purchases).

(g) Even those with enough food on hand, however, would tend to go and buy more so that some significant "runs" on foodstores must be expected.

9. In efforts to relocate, 61.5 percent would tend to prefer to follow instructions as to where to go and what to do, but 27.5 percent would like to make their own decisions in this matter--something not easy to incorporate into a systematic crisis relocation plan.

10. Even in a Presidentially directed relocation, almost 30 percent might not be willing to relocate (though this, in an actual crisis, is quite likely to change in favor of higher relocatabilities) and such stayput magnitudes would certainly present important difficulties in planning for the flow of essential services in the otherwise relocated areas, as well as provisions for sheltering (though it would, by definition, "ease" the burdens of relocation).

11. About half of the "essential workers," however, that turn out to be designated, are expected to be willing to commute from host areas to the relocation sites to maintain the required production and services. Thus prudent planning might well be based on estimating whether the necessary activities in evacuated areas could be carried out by about half of the "essential worker" force and how this might be done.

12. Even convinced that a war is about to come, some 19 percent of our respondents say that they would "do nothing at all"--and others claim that they would just "pray." Whether for an in-place or relocated posture, such actions would clearly not be adaptive. In a crisis, and seeing others attempting to cope in some manner

or other would certainly "cut" into such percentages but it is quite important to take the underlying sentiment (of doing nothing or of praying without any other survival-enhancing action) into account.

None of the problems we have already identified, real and important though they are, seem unsurmountable since planners would take such factors as those implied in these difficulties into account in any event. Our results then sensitize the planners to the relative magnitudes of some difficulties into account in any event. Our results then sensitize the planners to the relative magnitudes of some difficulties which have to be confronted both in the planning process and in any eventual situation-triggered activation of the plans.

E. Final Remarks

Whether the nation's Government--the Administration as well as Congress--chooses to do more to "protect the life and property against nuclear attack" (as the Truman-Presidency period Congressional mandate reads) than it has done thus far is clearly quite difficult to say. Nor would our own view on this make much of a difference, if any at all. Whether the Government chooses to promote the development of relocation plans, either as the key focus of future civil defense or as a genuine alternative to in-place options, is similarly problematic to evaluate. Again, what we may think on this subject is somewhat tangential to the issue involved.

The fact is, of course, that at any given budget level only some things can be done and others must be foregone. The fact is also that with whatever levels of civil defense spending, given the inherent limitations of resources (not only fiscal but also in terms of qualified manpower), the nation may have to forego some other opportunities--that is programs into which such funds could be diverted (or for which they would be used) or else, "opportunities" to save (by not spending such monies at all).

Our research does not address such questions in any direct manner since it cannot encompass the gamut of alternatives across the complex fabric of Government decision making or budgeting which, in an altogether systemic manner, places civil defense programs into an interdependent fabric of national priorities and choices partially grounded in such prioritizations as may prevail at a time.

Our study, however, does show--as did the previous national surveys since the early 1950's (initially carried out at the University of Michigan and in the 1960's and 1970's at the University of Pittsburgh)--that the decisions of our Government regarding civil defense occur in an underlying climate of strong support and in a context in which the common sense of our people says that you shelter yourself from danger when you can and as best you can or that you abandon a danger zone for a safer one if time permits it, or if the insult is such as to make in-place sheltering ineffective against the particular natural or man-made hazard.

Often, it may be quite prudent for the Government to make difficult decisions even in face of public non-support, or even opposition, information, lack of information or even disinformation. This, too, is part of the process of leadership in that some choices have to be made without any (or very limited) hope that the decisions may prove "popular."

In the business of civil defense, however, the Government's options have been, and remain, wide open because there exists such strong underlying favorable sentiment that it is difficult to make decisions which would prove to be so unacceptable to our people as to present serious social or political dilemmas for the nation's statesmen.

The nation's leaders, perhaps, need to apply the same common sense in addressing questions of whether, and how, to protect the people of our country against all major hazards--among which a nuclear confrontation does not represent a negligible risk!--as do Americans as a whole when asked a whole host of difficult questions about the underlying problems.

The central question quite possibly might be of the following kind: What, in fact, would be the likely reaction of our people toward the Government if in an acute international crisis the nation were to discover that little, or close to nothing, has been done to make it possible for as many Americans to survive as current physical and social technologies coupled with a modicum of political resolve might enable us to do?

APPENDIX A

SUMMARY DATA

SUMMARY DATA: INTRODUCTION

V122 Q90. Now just before we finish I have a few background questions about you yourself.

What is your marital status?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Single, Never married	300	18.5	18.5
Married	1014	62.6	62.6
Divorced	110	6.8	6.8
Widowed	155	9.6	9.6
Separated	40	2.5	2.5
No Response	<u>1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V123 Q91A. What is the last grade or year in school you completed?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
No Schooling	4	0.2	0.2
Elementary School	133	8.2	8.2
Some High School	223	13.8	13.8
High School Graduate	623	38.5	38.6
Some College	309	19.1	19.1
College Graduate	200	12.3	12.4
College Graduate Plus	123	7.6	7.6
Don't Know	1	0.1	Missing
No Answer	<u>4</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V124 Q91B. What is the last grade or year in school your spouse completed?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
No Schooling	4	0.2	0.4
Elementary School	90	5.6	9.6
Some High School	133	8.2	14.3
High School Graduate	376	23.2	40.3
Some College	148	9.1	15.9
College Graduate	125	7.7	13.4
College Graduate Plus	57	3.5	6.1
Inapplicable	300	18.5	Missing
Don't Know	105	6.5	Missing
No Answer	<u>282</u>	<u>17.4</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

Q92. What sort of work (does/did) (main earner) usually do?

V308 Q. 92A. Occupation

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Professionals	275	17.0	17.9
Managerial and Administrative	183	11.3	11.9
Sales	87	5.4	5.6
Clerical	105	6.5	6.8
Craftsman	307	19.0	19.9
Operatives	165	10.2	10.7
Laborers	66	4.1	4.3
Farmer	33	2.0	2.1
Farm Laborers	3	0.2	0.2
Service	121	7.5	7.9
Household Worker	5	0.3	0.3
Other	190	11.7	12.3
Don't Know	4	0.2	Missing
No Answer	76	4.7	Missing
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

Q92. What sort of work (does/did) (main earner) usually do?

V308 Q. 92B. Industry

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Agriculture	42	2.6	2.9
Mining	15	0.9	1.0
Construction	88	5.4	6.0
Manufacturing	327	20.2	22.4
Transportation	76	4.7	5.2
Communications	21	1.3	1.4
Utilities	26	1.6	1.8
Wholesale and Retail Trade	144	8.9	9.9
Finance	66	4.1	4.5
Small Business	65	4.0	4.5
Personal Services	34	2.1	2.3
Entertainment	10	0.6	0.7
Professionals	201	12.4	13.8
Public Administration	149	9.2	10.2
Other	196	12.1	13.4
Don't Know	4	0.2	Missing
No Answer	156	9.6	Missing
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V125. Q93. Is the main wage earner currently employed full-time, part-time, unemployed or retired?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Full-time	1128	69.6	70.3
Part-time	91	5.6	5.7
Unemployed	110	6.8	6.9
Retired	275	17.0	17.1
Inapplicable	11	0.7	Missing
No Answer	<u>5</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V126 Q94. Are there other persons in the household currently employed either full-time or part-time?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Yes	676	41.7	50.4
No	665	41.0	49.6
Inapplicable	276	17.0	Missing
Don't Know	1	0.1	Missing
No Answer	<u>2</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

VI27 Q95. Counting rents, interest, and things like that, in which one of the groups on this card did your total family income fall, before taxes, last year?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Under \$3000	75	4.6	5.3
\$3000-\$4999	129	8.0	9.1
\$5000-\$7499	147	9.1	10.4
\$7500-\$9999	130	8.0	9.2
\$10,000-\$14,999	289	17.8	20.5
\$15,000-\$24,999	375	23.1	26.6
\$25,000 +	266	16.4	18.9
Don't Know	158	9.8	Missing
No Answer	<u>51</u>	<u>3.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

VI28 Q96. Do you own your own home here, or do your rent?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Own	1087	67.1	67.4
Rent	497	30.7	30.8
Other	29	1.8	1.8
No Answer	<u>7</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V103 Q97. Including yourself, how many people live in this household?

	V130, Q97A			V131, Q97B			V132, Q97C			V133, Q97D		
	Under 5 Years of Age			5 to 13 Years of Age			13 to 18 Years of Age			over 65		
	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq. (%)	Adj. Freq. (%)	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq. (%)	Adj. Freq. (%)	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq. (%)	Adj. Freq. (%)	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq. (%)	Adj. Freq. (%)
None	1021	63.0	76.3	911	56.2	68.0	994	61.4	74.5	1165	71.9	81.3
One	234	14.4	17.5	249	15.4	18.6	217	13.4	16.3	197	12.2	13.7
Two	76	4.7	5.7	133	8.2	9.9	95	5.9	7.1	66	4.1	4.6
Three	6	0.4	0.4	33	3.0	2.5	19	1.2	1.4	3	0.2	0.2
Four	1	0.1	0.1	11	0.7	0.8	8	0.5	0.6	2	0.1	0.1
Five	---	---	---	2	0.1	0.1	1	0.1	0.1	---	---	---
Inapplicable	261	16.1	Missing	261	16.1	Missing	257	15.9	Missing	169	10.4	Missing
No Answer	21	1.3	Missing	20	1.2	Missing	29	1.8	Missing	18	1.1	Missing
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0	1620	100.0	100.0	1620	100.0	100.0	1620	100.0	100.0

V134 Q98. Does anyone in this household belong to a labor union?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Yes	409	25.2	25.3
No	1206	74.4	74.7
Don't Know	2	0.1	Missing
No Answer	<u>3</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

VI35 Q99. Which social class do you believe yourself to be in--the lower class, working class, middle class, or upper class?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Upper	68	4.2	4.3
Middle	762	47.0	48.6
Working	612	37.8	39.0
Lower	93	5.7	5.9
There Are No Classes	34	2.1	2.2
Don't Know	36	2.2	Missing
No Answer	<u>15</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V136 Q100. How old were you on your last birthday?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
18-24 Years Of Age	273	16.7	16.9
25-34 Years Of Age	427	26.3	26.5
35-44 Years Of Age	263	16.3	16.4
45-54 Years Of Age	201	12.3	12.5
55-64 Years Of Age	222	13.8	13.8
65 And Over	217	13.5	13.5
No Answer	<u>17</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V137 Q101 (Have you) or (Has your husband) ever served in the armed forces?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Yes	703	43.4	43.9
No	899	55.5	56.1
Don't Know	7	0.4	Missing
No Answer	<u>11</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

(Have you) or (Has your husband) ever served in the armed forces?

V138 Q101A. (Were you) (Was he) ever in combat?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Yes	293	18.1	42.3
No	400	24.7	57.7
Inapplicable	906	55.9	Missing
Don't Know	7	0.4	Missing
No Answer	<u>14</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V139 Q102. One final question. In all how many separate residences have you lived in since age 18?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
1 Residence	128	7.9	8.3
2 Residences	178	11.0	11.5
3 Residences	255	15.7	16.5
4 Residences	233	14.4	15.1
5 Residences	183	11.3	11.8
6 Residences	125	7.7	8.1
7 Residences	75	4.6	4.8
8 Residences	64	4.0	4.1
9 Residences	34	2.1	2.2
10 Residences	86	5.3	5.6
11-15 Residences	99	6.1	6.4
16-20 Residences	47	2.8	3.0
More than 20 Residences	41	2.7	2.8
Don't Know	48	3.0	Missing
No Answer	<u>24</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

If Respondent answered two or more residences, one of the following questions was asked, depending on current residence.

Response	Yes			No			Inapplicable			Don't Know			No Response		
	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq. (Z)	Adj. Freq. (Z)	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq. (Z)	Adj. Freq. (Z)	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq. (Z)	Adj. Freq. (Z)	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq. (Z)	Adj. Freq. (Z)	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq. (Z)	Adj. Freq. (Z)
V140 Q102A (If currently lives in a city or town) Did you ever live on a farm or in a rural community of 2500 or less population?	619	38.2	47.0	697	43.0	53.0	268	16.5	Missing	1	0.1	Missing	35	2.2	Missing
V141 Q102B Did you ever live in a town of about 2500 to 10,000 population?	699	43.1	57.7	512	31.6	42.3	269	16.6	Missing	3	0.2	Missing	137	8.5	Missing
V142 Q102C (If currently lives on a farm or in a rural community of 2500 or less) Did you ever live in a city?	124	7.7	64.9	67	4.1	35.1	1419	87.6	Missing	---	---	---	10	0.6	Missing

SUMMARY DATA: THE THREAT

V1 Q1. What number would you say best represents the level of world tensions just about now?

Response Scale		Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
No World Tension	0	4	0.2	0.3
	1	2	0.1	0.1
	2	13	0.8	0.8
	3	50	3.1	3.2
	4	103	6.4	6.5
	5	278	17.2	17.5
	6	246	15.2	15.5
	7	346	21.4	21.8
Extreme World Tension	8	296	18.3	18.7
	9	96	5.9	6.1
Don't Know	10	151	9.3	9.5
		<u>35</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL		1620	100.0	100.0

V2 Q2. Which number on the card best represents the world tensions that you personally expect by about 1980--that is, just about two years from now?

Response Scale		Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
No World Tension	0	10	0.6	0.6
	1	9	0.6	0.6
	2	32	2.0	2.1
	3	53	3.3	3.4
	4	100	6.2	6.4
	5	183	11.3	11.8
	6	152	9.4	9.8
	7	237	14.6	15.3
	8	312	19.3	20.1
Extreme World Tension	9	200	12.3	12.9
	10	263	16.2	17.0
Don't Know		67	4.1	Missing
No Answer		<u>2</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL		1620	100.0	100.0

V3 Q3. And which number represents best your opinion as to world tensions just about two years ago in late 1976?

Response Scale		Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
No World Tension	0	7	0.4	0.4
	1	8	0.5	0.5
	2	25	1.5	1.6
	3	78	4.8	5.0
	4	132	8.1	8.4
	5	311	19.2	19.8
	6	277	17.1	17.7
	7	340	21.0	21.7
	8	236	14.6	15.1
Extreme World Tension	9	83	5.1	5.3
	10	71	4.4	4.5
Don't Know		50	3.1	Missing
No Answer		<u>2</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL		1620	100.0	100.0

V4 Q4. How likely do you think it is that we're in for another big World War--one where nuclear weapons would be used?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Very Likely	221	13.6	14.0
Likely	244	15.1	15.4
50-50 Chance	484	29.9	30.6
Unlikely	420	25.9	26.5
Very Unlikely	176	10.9	11.1
Never Will Happen	37	2.3	2.3
Don't Know	37	2.3	Missing
No Answer	<u>1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V5 Q5. Between now and about 1985, how likely do you feel it is that a war will occur between China and the Soviet Union?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Very Likely	105	6.5	7.1
Likely	310	19.1	21.0
50-50 Chance	507	31.3	34.4
Unlikely	437	26.4	28.9
Very Unlikely	126	7.8	8.5
Don't Know	<u>145</u>	<u>9.0</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V6 Q5A. (IF "VERY LIKELY," "LIKELY" OR "50-50" TO Q5): What do you feel the likelihood would be that the United States would be drawn into such a war, that is one between China and the Soviet Union?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Very Likely	191	11.8	21.1
Likely	263	12.2	29.1
50-50 Chance	250	15.4	27.7
Unlikely	147	9.1	16.3
Very Unlikely	53	3.3	5.9
Inapplicable	698	43.1	Missing
Don't Know	12	0.7	Missing
No Answer	<u>6</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V7 Q6. Now we have a good number of nuclear power plants around the country to produce electricity. Other nuclear power plants are under construction and more of them may be built in the future. How likely is it that, between now and 1985, there would be a major accident at a nuclear power plant, that is, an accident which would release significant radioactive fallout?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Very Likely	185	11.4	12.0
Likely	337	20.8	21.8
50-50 Chance	395	24.4	25.6
Unlikely	415	25.6	26.9
Very Unlikely	211	13.0	13.7
Don't Know	76	4.7	Missing
No Answer	<u>1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V8 Q7. How likely is it that some group of terrorists might take over a nuclear facility and threaten nearby communities unless they get their way. That is, how likely is it that an occupation of a nuclear power plant by terrorists to threaten the lives of people in the area would happen between now and 1985?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Very Likely	183	11.3	11.7
Likely	318	19.6	20.3
50-50 Chance	402	24.8	25.7
Unlikely	451	27.8	28.8
Very Unlikely	211	13.0	13.5
Don't Know	54	3.3	Missing
No Answer	<u>1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V9 Q8. Between now and 1985, how likely do you consider it to be that some group of terrorists will claim that they have constructed a nuclear weapon and that they will use it against a city or another community unless their demands are met? In other words, how likely is it that we might experience an American city to be hostage to terrorists armed with a nuclear device?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Very Likely	222	13.7	14.2
Likely	378	23.3	24.2
50-50 Chance	395	24.4	25.3
Unlikely	388	24.0	24.8
Very Unlikely	181	11.2	11.6
Don't Know	52	3.2	Missing
No Answer	<u>4</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V10 Q9. If it were to come about at all, when do you suppose a nuclear war is most likely to happen? Within a year or two, within about five years, within ten years, within twenty years, or more than twenty years from now?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Year Or Two (1980)	29	1.8	2.0
Five Years	189	11.7	12.9
Ten Years	425	26.2	29.0
Twenty Years	300	18.5	20.4
More Than Twenty Years	351	21.7	23.9
Depends	47	2.9	3.2
Never Will Happen	126	7.8	8.6
Don't Know	152	9.4	Missing
No Answer	<u>1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

VL50 Q13. In case of nuclear war, how great a danger do you think there is that the area around here would be a target?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Certain Danger	404	24.9	26.0
Great Danger	463	29.6	29.8
Some Danger	381	23.5	24.5
Little Danger	236	14.6	15.2
No Danger At All	71	4.4	4.6
Don't Know	61	3.8	Missing
No Answer	<u>4</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

Q13A. What is it around here that would make this area a target?

Response	V211, Primary Target			V212, Secondary Target			V213, Tertiary Target			All		
	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq.	Adj. Freq.	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq.	Adj. Freq.	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq.	Adj. Freq.	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq.	Adj. Freq.
Military Base	291	18.0	24.4	92	5.7	17.5	14	0.9	11.0	397	24.6	52.9
Missile Base	19	1.2	1.6	7	0.4	1.3	2	0.1	1.6	28	1.7	4.5
Ammunition Depot	18	1.1	1.5	17	1.0	3.2	5	0.3	3.9	40	2.4	8.6
Utilities, Power Plants	123	7.6	10.3	78	4.8	14.8	17	1.0	13.4	218	13.4	38.5
Industry	301	18.6	25.2	122	7.5	23.2	24	1.5	18.9	447	27.6	67.3
Transportation Center	78	4.8	6.5	93	5.7	17.7	29	1.8	22.8	200	12.3	47.0
Government Center	53	3.3	4.4	13	0.8	2.5	5	0.3	3.9	71	4.4	10.8
Cities In General	191	11.8	16.0	36	2.2	6.8	9	0.6	7.1	236	14.6	29.9
Population In General	50	3.1	4.2	45	2.8	8.6	10	0.6	7.9	105	6.5	20.7
Other Reasons	71	4.4	5.9	23	1.4	4.4	12	0.7	9.4	106	6.5	19.7

V12 Q14. If a nuclear war occurred and this area itself was not the target of a direct attack, how great a danger do you think there would be from fallout around here?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Certain Danger	272	16.8	17.7
Great Danger	510	31.5	33.1
Some Danger	571	35.2	37.1
Little Danger	162	10.0	10.5
No Danger At All	25	1.5	1.6
Don't Know	76	4.7	Missing
No Answer	<u>4</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V18 Q20. How do you feel about nuclear power plants? Are you strongly in favor, somewhat in favor, somewhat opposed or strongly opposed to the construction of new nuclear power plants to produce electricity around the county?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Strongly Favor	354	21.9	23.5
Somewhat Favor	636	39.3	42.3
Somewhat Oppose	288	17.8	19.1
Strongly Oppose	226	14.0	15.0
Don't Know	110	6.8	Missing
No Answer	<u>6</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V19 Q21. How about a nuclear power plant in this area? That is, within a 50-mile radius from here? Are you strongly in favor, somewhat in favor, somewhat opposed or strongly opposed to having such a plant nearby?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Strongly Favor	282	17.4	18.6
Somewhat Favor	448	27.7	29.6
Somewhat Oppose	352	21.7	23.2
Strongly Oppose	434	26.8	28.6
Don't Know	101	6.2	Missing
No Answer	<u>3</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V20 Q22. To your knowledge is there a nuclear power plant withing about 50 miles from here?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Yes	526	32.5	40.2
No	783	48.3	59.8
Don't Know	309	19.1	Missing
No Answer	<u>2</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V21 Q22A, (IF "NO" TO Q22): Is one being built or planned for this general area:

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Yes	110	6.8	20.1
No	437	27.0	79.9
Inapplicable	835	51.5	Missing
Don't Know	216	13.3	Missing
No Answer	<u>22</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

SUMMARY DATA: SURVIVABILITY

V13 Q15. If a nuclear war started next week, how good are the chances that people around here would survive?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Very Good	20	1.2	1.3
Fairly Good	183	11.3	11.6
50-50 Chance	474	29.3	30.2
Fairly Bad	405	25.0	25.8
Very Bad	490	30.2	31.2
Don't Know	47	2.9	Missing
No Answer	<u>1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V14 Q16. How good would the chances be that people in this area would survive if they were in fallout shelters?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Very Good	191	11.8	12.2
Fairly Good	527	32.5	33.7
50-50 Chance	551	34.0	35.3
Fairly Bad	204	12.6	13.1
Very Bad	89	5.5	5.7
Don't Know	56	3.5	Missing
No Answer	<u>2</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V17 Q19. How good would the chances be that people in this area would survive if they were in blast shelters?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Very Good	318	19.6	21.7
Fairly Good	473	29.2	32.2
50-50 Chance	485	29.9	33.0
Fairly Bad	108	6.7	7.4
Very Bad	84	5.2	5.7
Don't Know	150	9.3	Missing
No Answer	<u>2</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V76 Q59. In general, how good would the chances be that people in this area would survive if they were evacuated to another location some distance away?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Very Good	121	7.5	8.2
Fairly Good	430	26.5	29.2
50-50 Chance	677	41.8	46.2
Fairly Bad	158	9.8	10.7
Very Bad	87	5.4	5.9
Don't Know	141	8.7	Missing
No Answer	<u>6</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

SUMMARY DATA: WARNING

V200

Q10. Circumstances affecting decision that
war is about to come.

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)
<u>Military Crises</u>		
Soviet Invasion of Allies	77	4.7
Soviet invasion of China	25	1.6
Soviet-Chinese War	31	2.0
Other military actions	245	15.0
Racial wars	3	0.2
Terrorist actions	33	2.0
Proliferation of weapons	75	4.6
<u>Political Crises</u>		
General disruption of talks, negotiations	158	9.8
US-USSR negotiations break- down	69	4.2
SALT breakdown	21	1.3
General political crises	341	21.0
General governmental breakdown (unspecified governments)	7	0.4
US government breakdown	4	0.3
Soviet government breakdown	1	0.1
<u>Economic Crises</u>		
General economic crises	56	3.4
Energy crises	35	2.1
Food shortages, famines	23	1.4
<u>Accident</u>	15	0.9
<u>Media announcements, news</u>	101	6.2
<u>Biblical predictions</u>	36	8.3
<u>Other reasons</u>	125	7.7
<u>Never will happen</u>	66	4.1

76.9 percent gave one answer.

19.4 percent gave two answers.

VII Q11. In your judgement, how much time would there be between your becoming pretty certain that a nuclear war is coming and the beginning of the war itself?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
No Time	317	19.6	23.6
Minutes (15-30)	189	11.7	14.0
Hours	247	15.2	18.4
About One Day	92	5.7	6.8
Two - Three Days	166	10.2	12.3
A Week or More	335	20.7	24.9
Don't Know	271	16.7	Missing
No Answer	<u>3</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

Q12. What are some of the main things that you would do in this period between concluding that a war is going to come and the actual start of the war? Please tell us what steps if any at all, you and your family would take in such circumstances.

Response	No			Yes			Don't Know			No Answer		
	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq. (%)	Adj. Freq. (%)	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq. (%)	Adj. Freq. (%)	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq. (%)	Adj. Freq. (%)	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq. (%)	Adj. Freq. (%)
V202 Relocate*	1184	73.1	92.1	101	6.2	7.9	172	10.6	Missing	163	10.1	Missing
V203 Evacuate**	1122	69.3	87.3	163	10.1	12.7	172	10.6	Missing	163	10.1	Missing
V204 Modify House	1181	72.9	91.9	104	6.4	8.1	172	10.6	Missing	163	10.1	Missing
V205 Get Information From Friends	1279	79.0	99.5	6	0.4	0.5	172	10.6	Missing	163	10.1	Missing
V206 Get Information From Public Sources	1184	73.1	92.1	101	6.2	7.9	172	10.6	Missing	163	10.1	Missing
V207 Stock Supplies	987	60.9	76.8	298	18.4	23.2	172	10.6	Missing	163	10.1	Missing
V208 Pray	1124	69.4	87.5	161	9.9	12.5	172	10.6	Missing	163	10.1	Missing
V209 Do Nothing	967	59.7	75.3	318	19.6	24.7	172	10.6	Missing	163	10.1	Missing
V210 Go to Shelter	946	58.4	73.6	339	20.9	26.4	172	10.6	Missing	163	10.1	Missing

*Relocation is defined as having a specified destination.

**Evacuation is defined as not having a specified destination.

V33 Q32. It has been suggested that households might benefit from an inexpensive emergency warning device attached to a radio or television set. In other words, it would turn the set on to warn you against major natural disasters or in the event of a nuclear war. How do you feel about this? That is, are you strongly in favor, in favor, undecided, opposed, or strongly opposed to this suggestion?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Strongly Favor	551	34.0	35.5
Favor	605	37.3	39.0
Undecided	209	12.9	13.5
Oppose	147	9.1	9.5
Strongly Oppose	41	2.5	2.6
Don't Know	65	4.0	Missing
No Answer	<u>2</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

It has been suggested that households might benefit from an inexpensive emergency warning device attached to a radio or television set. In other words, it would turn the set on to warn you against major natural disasters or in the event of a nuclear war. How do you feel about this? That is, are you strongly in favor, in favor, undecided, opposed, or strongly opposed to this suggestion?

V34 Q32A. (IF "STRONGLY FAVOR," "FAVOR" OR "UNDECIDED" TO Q. 32): If you thought it was a good idea to purchase such a device, what is the most you would be willing to spend for it?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Not Spend Any Money	40	2.5	4.2
\$1-\$10	146	9.0	15.5
\$11-\$25	271	16.7	28.6
\$26-\$50	228	14.3	24.3
\$51-\$99	34	2.1	3.5
\$100-\$999	188	11.9	19.9
\$1000-\$5000	13	0.9	1.3
No Limit	24	1.5	2.5
Inapplicable	253	15.6	Missing
Don't Know	358	22.1	Missing
No Answer	64	4.0	Missing
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V72 Q54. If all the people in this area were to evacuate and go somewhere else because of the chance of nuclear war, would there be enough time for all of them to do so; that is, from the time a nuclear war is viewed as pretty certain to the beginning of the war itself?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Definitely Yes	27	1.7	1.7
Probably Yes	270	16.7	17.5
Undecided, Depends	268	16.5	17.3
Probably No	678	41.9	43.9
Definitely No	302	18.6	19.5
Don't Know	<u>75</u>	<u>4.6</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

SUMMARY DATA: IN-PLACE PROTECTION

V15 Q17. In general, how do you yourself feel about public fallout shelters--are you strongly in favor of them, somewhat in favor, somewhat opposed, or strongly opposed to them?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Strongly Favor	654	40.4	42.9
Somewhat Favor	681	42.0	44.7
Somewhat Oppose	130	8.0	8.5
Strongly Oppose	58	3.6	3.8
Don't Know	92	5.7	Missing
No Answer	<u>5</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V16 Q18. Around here, do you feel that shelters against radioactive fallout would be enough or do you believe that there ought to be stronger shelters constructed that could help protect people against the primary effects of nuclear weapons as well; that is, against blast?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Fallout Shelters	414	25.6	29.0
Blast Shelters Needed	815	50.3	57.0
Depends	201	12.4	14.1
Don't Know	184	11.4	Missing
No Answer	<u>6</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V22 Q23. Have you heard the suggestion that some home basements might be useful as protection against the effects of nuclear fallout?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Yes	831	51.3	51.4
No	787	48.6	48.6
No Answer	<u>2</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V23 Q24. Have you heard anything about how much fallout protection basements give or about how to make them more useful as fallout shelters?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Yes	442	27.3	27.3
No	1175	72.5	72.7
No Answer	<u>3</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V24 Q25. Is there a basement in this house (apartment building)?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Yes	834	51.5	51.5
No	780	48.1	48.3
Don't Know	<u>6</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V25 Q25A. (IF "YES" TO Q25): Have you ever thought about using the basement as a fallout shelter in case of nuclear attack?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Yes	308	19.0	37.1
No	523	32.3	62.9
Inapplicable	786	48.5	Missing
No Answer	<u>3</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V26 Q25B. (IF "YES" TO Q. 25): Have you every obtained information about the possibility of using the basement as a fallout shelter?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Yes	100	6.2	13.2
No	657	40.6	86.8
Inapplicable	786	48.5	Missing
No Answer	<u>77</u>	<u>4.8</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V27 Q26. How would you feel about a national program to make such spaces in private homes available to other people in the event of nuclear attack on the United States? Would you strongly favor, favor, neither favor nor oppose, oppose, or strongly oppose such a program?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Strongly Favor	388	24.0	24.8
Favor	654	40.4	41.8
Neither Favor Nor Oppose	265	16.4	16.9
Oppose	167	10.3	10.7
Strongly Oppose	91	5.6	5.8
Don't Know	<u>55</u>	<u>3.4</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V28 Q27. How do you suppose most private home owners around the country might feel? Again, would most of them strongly favor such a program, favor it, neither favor nor oppose it, oppose it, or strongly oppose it?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Strongly Favor	139	8.6	9.5
Favor	555	34.3	37.8
Neither Favor Nor Oppose	242	14.9	16.5
Oppose	422	26.0	28.7
Strongly Oppose	111	6.9	7.6
Don't Know	<u>151</u>	<u>9.3</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V29 Q28. Suppose local civil defense people were to include private home basements in an overall plan in the community. That is, they would use all public shelter spaces as well as such private homes with, of course, the approval of the owners. They would then actually assign people to specific shelters in the event of a nuclear attack. How would you feel about this? Would you strongly favor, favor, neither favor nor oppose, oppose or strongly oppose the assigning of people to specific home shelter spaces?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Strongly Faver	347	21.4	22.6
Favor	738	45.6	48.0
Neither Favor Nor Oppose	215	13.3	14.0
Oppose	179	11.0	11.6
Strongly Oppose	59	3.6	3.8
Don't Know	<u>82</u>	<u>5.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V30 Q29. Would you personally allow your basement to be used as a fallout shelter for other people? That is, would you definitely permit it to be used, probably permit it, probably not permit it, or definitely would not permit it?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Definitely Yes	237	14.6	31.4
Probably Yes	310	19.1	41.1
Undecided	70	4.3	9.3
Probably Not	79	4.9	10.5
Definitely Not	58	3.6	7.7
Inapplicable	833	51.4	Missing
Don't Know	27	1.7	Missing
No Answer	<u>6</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V31 Q30. How about the possibility of putting a sign on your home to make sure people would know they could find fallout protection here? Would you definitely, probably, probably not, or definitely not permit this?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Definitely Yes	144	8.9	19.1
Probably Yes	299	14.1	30.5
Undecided	105	6.5	14.0
Probably Not	137	8.5	18.2
Definitely Not	137	8.5	18.2
Inapplicable	833	51.4	Missing
Don't Know	29	1.8	Missing
No Answer	<u>6</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V32 Q31. And how about having specific people assigned to your home; that is, people who would know that they are supposed to come here to be protected against fallout in the event of an attack? Again, would you definitely permit this, probably permit this, probably not permit this, or definitely not permit this?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Definitely Yes	209	12.9	27.9
Probably Yes	334	20.6	44.7
Undecided	74	4.6	9.9
Probably Not	61	3.8	8.2
Definitely Not	70	4.3	9.4
Inapplicable	833	51.4	Missing
Don't Know	33	2.0	Missing
No Answer	<u>6</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

Next I'm going to read you some statements about situations which may exist in our nation's civil defense. Not all of them are likely to come about. Regardless of their likelihood, please tell me how much you personally would like to see each one happen or not happen. We will use a simple scale, where minus three indicates you would find the situation highly undesirable, zero indicated you neither favor nor oppose it, and plus three indicates you would find the situation highly desirable

V46 Q42A. Let's assume that all available spaces in public buildings which provide good protection against fallout will be marked as shelters and stocked with everything necessary for survival. How desirable would that be?

Response Scale		Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Highly Undesirable	-3	57	3.5	3.6
	-2	21	1.3	1.3
	-1	45	2.8	2.8
Neutral	0	97	6.0	6.1
	+1	239	14.8	15.0
	+2	294	18.1	18.4
Highly Desirable	+3	841	51.9	52.8
Don't Know		24	1.5	Missing
No Answer		<u>2</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL		1620	100.0	100.0

Next I'm going to read you some statements about situations which may exist in our nation's civil defense. Not all of them are likely to come about. Regardless of their likelihood, please tell me how much you personally would like to see each one happen or not happen. We will use a simple scale, where minus three indicates you would find the situation highly undesirable, zero indicates you neither favor nor oppose it, and plus three indicates you would find the situation highly desirable.

V47 Q42B. Suppose all private homes would be surveyed as possible fallout shelters and the owners informed if their home qualifies as a shelter or provided with the necessary information to bring it up to standards for protection. How desirable do you feel that would be?

Response Scale		Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Highly Undesirable	-3	127	7.8	8.1
	-2	85	5.2	5.4
	-1	99	6.1	6.3
Neutral	0	231	14.3	14.7
	+1	305	18.8	19.4
	+2	285	17.6	18.2
Highly Desirable	+3	438	27.0	27.9
Don't Know		45	2.8	Missing
No .		<u>5</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL		1620	100.0	100.0

Next I'm going to read you some statements about situations which may exist in our nation's civil defense. Not all of them are likely to come about. Regardless of their likelihood, please tell me how much you personally would like to see each one happen or not happen. We will use a simple scale, where minus three indicates you would find the situation highly undesirable, zero indicates you neither favor nor oppose it, and plus three indicates you would find the situation highly desirable.

V48 Q42C. Let's assume there would be a program for the Federal government to pay the additional cost of putting fallout shelters in buildings constructed by non-profit organizations such as hospitals and schools. How desirable would that be?

Response Scale		Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Highly Undesirable	-3	68	4.2	4.3
	-2	28	1.7	1.8
	-1	44	2.7	2.8
Neutral	0	122	7.5	7.7
	+1	245	15.1	15.4
	+2	314	19.4	19.8
Highly Desirable	+3	767	47.3	48.3
Don't Know		28	1.7	Missing
No Answer		<u>4</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL		1620	100.0	100.0

Next I'm going to read you some statements about situations which may exist in our nation's civil defense. Not all of them are likely to come about. Regardless of their likelihood, please tell me how much you personally would like to see each one happen or not happen. We will use a simple scale, where minus three indicates you would find the situation highly undesirable, zero indicates you neither favor nor oppose it, and plus three indicates you would find the situation highly desirable.

V51 Q42F. Suppose the Federal Government decided to end the civil defense program entirely. How desirable would that be?

Response Scale		Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Highly Undesirable	-3	914	56.4	58.5
	-2	198	12.2	12.7
	-1	174	10.7	11.1
Neutral	0	118	7.3	7.6
	+1	61	3.8	3.9
	+2	40	2.5	2.6
Highly Desirable	+3	57	3.5	3.6
Don't Know		49	3.0	Missing
No Answer		<u>9</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL		1620	100.0	100.0


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
PITTSBURGH UNIV PA UNIV CENTER FOR SOCIAL AND URBAN--ETC F/G 15/3
ISSUES OF CIVIL DEFENSE: VINTAGE 1978 -- SUMMARY RESULTS OF THE--ETC(U)
FEB 79 J NEHNEVAJSA, G ROGERS, S MANNERS DCPA01-77-C-0218
UCSUR-79-CD2 NL

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AD
A068 729





MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

SUMMARY DATA: CRISIS RELOCATION

Next I'm going to read you some statements about situations which may exist in our nation's civil defense. Not all of them are likely to come about. Regardless of their likelihood, please tell me how much you personally would like to see each one happen or not happen. We will use a simple scale, where minus three indicates you would find the situation highly undesirable, zero indicates you neither favor nor oppose it, and plus three indicates you would find the situation highly desirable.

V49 Q42D. Suppose, in tense situations which might precede a war, it were the government's policy to evacuate the populations of large cities and communities near military installations. How desirable do you feel that would be?

Response Scale		Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Highly Undesirable	-3	111	6.9	7.2
	-2	64	4.0	4.2
	-1	89	5.5	5.8
Neutral	0	217	13.4	14.1
	+1	277	17.1	18.0
	+2	290	17.9	18.9
Highly Desirable	+3	487	30.1	31.7
Don't Know		79	4.9	Missing
No Answer		<u>6</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL		1620	100.0	100.0

V152 Q46. Suppose there were a major international crisis and it seemed very likely that it might lead directly into a nuclear war. Would you (and your family) be inclined to evacuate your place of residence and go somewhere else under these circumstances?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Definitely Yes	341	21.0	21.9
Probably Yes	358	22.1	23.0
Undecided, Depends	269	16.6	17.3
Probably No	400	24.7	25.7
Definitely No	175	10.8	11.2
Other	15	0.9	1.0
Don't Know	60	3.7	Missing
No Answer	<u>2</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V245 Q46A. (IF "DEFINITELY YES," "PROBABLY YES" OR "UNDECIDED" TO Q46):
Where would you go to should you decide to leave your place
of residence during a crisis of this kind?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Non Adaptive* (NEC)	5	0.3	0.7
To City, Or Military Base	7	0.4	0.9
To Shelter	250	15.4	32.9
Adaptive Evacuation** (NEC)	321	19.8	42.2
To Cottage, Summer Home Or Country side	25	1.5	3.3
To Relative Or Friends Home	108	6.7	14.2
Other Or Unable To Classify	44	2.7	5.8
Inapplicable	646	39.9	Missing
Don't Know	203	12.5	Missing
No Answer	<u>11</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

*Non-adaptive means to a high risk destination. (Not Elsewhere
Classified)

**Adaptive evacuation means to a low or no risk destination (Not
Elsewhere Classified)

V246 Q46B. (IF "DEFINITELY YES," "PROBABLY YES" OR "UNDECIDED," TO Q46):
About how far is that from here?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Less Than 1 Mile	78	4.8	14.3
1 Mile To 5 Miles	87	5.4	16.0
5 ≤ 10 Miles	24	1.5	4.4
10 ≤ 25 Miles	35	2.2	6.5
25 ≤ 50 Miles	34	2.1	6.3
50 ≤ 100 Miles	62	4.0	11.5
100 ≤ 200 Miles	62	4.0	11.5
200 ≤ 500 Miles	63	4.0	11.6
Over 500 Miles	99	6.1	18.3
Inapplicable (would not evacuate)	648	40.0	Missing
No Answer	428	26.5	Missing

V247 Q46C. (IF "DEFINITELY YES," "PROBABLY YES" OR "UNDECIDED" TO Q46):
Why would you go to that place (area) rather than somewhere
else?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Safer	418	25.8	62.3
Be With Family	95	5.9	14.2
Only Place Know Of	38	2.3	5.7
Closest Or Nearest Place	54	3.3	8.0
Other	66	4.1	9.8
Inapplicable	648	40.0	Missing
Don't Know	<u>224</u>	<u>13.8</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V65 Q47. Now when you think about your friends here and people in this community (area) in general, how many of them do you believe would evacuate their residence and go somewhere else should there be a major crisis and a big war seemed very likely? What percentages would represent your best guess?

Response		Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
No One At All	0	85	5.2	5.5
	1	4	0.2	0.3
	3	3	0.2	0.2
	5	10	0.6	0.6
	6	1	0.1	0.1
	7	1	0.1	0.1
	8	1	0.1	0.1
	10	148	9.1	9.6
	13	1	0.1	0.1
	15	7	0.4	0.5
	20	120	7.4	7.8
	25	23	1.4	1.5
	30	107	6.6	7.0
	33	1	0.1	0.1
	35	3	0.2	0.2
	40	77	4.8	5.0
	45	2	0.1	0.1
About Half	50	460	28.4	29.9
	59	1	0.1	0.1
	60	54	3.3	3.5
	65	3	0.2	0.2
	70	86	5.3	5.6
	75	41	2.5	2.7
	80	111	6.9	7.2
	85	10	0.6	0.6
	90	84	5.2	5.5
	95	9	0.6	0.6
	98	2	0.1	0.1
	99	1	0.1	0.1
All Or About All	100	83	5.1	5.4
Don't Know		66	4.1	Missing
No Answer		15	0.9	Missing
TOTAL		1620	100.0	100.0

V66 Q48. Suppose now you were to hear or read that the Russians began evacuating their cities and other unsafe areas. How would this affect your own thinking? Would you be likely to leave your place of residence and go somewhere else until the situation would change?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Definitely Yes	128	7.9	8.2
Probably Yes	323	19.9	20.7
Undecided Depends	396	24.4	25.4
Probably No	480	29.6	30.8
Definitely No	230	14.2	14.8
Don't Know	61	3.8	Missing
No Answer	<u>2</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V67 Q49. And what percentage of other people in this community (area) do you think would evacuate if it were known that the Russians asked their own people to leave the cities?

Response Scale		Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
No One At All	0	156	9.6	10.3
	1	2	0.1	0.1
	2	3	0.2	0.2
	4	1	0.1	0.1
	5	15	0.9	1.0
	7	2	0.1	0.1
	8	3	0.2	0.2
	10	213	13.1	14.1
	12	1	0.1	0.1
	13	1	0.1	0.1
	15	3	0.2	0.2
	20	116	7.2	7.7
	23	1	0.1	0.1
	25	26	1.6	1.7
	27	2	0.1	0.1
	30	95	5.9	6.3
	35	5	0.3	0.3
	40	91	5.6	6.0
	45	5	0.3	0.3
About Half	50	395	24.4	26.1
	35	1	0.1	0.1
	60	68	4.2	4.5
	70	79	4.9	5.2
	75	39	2.4	2.6
	79	1	0.1	0.1
	80	85	5.2	5.6
	85	6	0.4	0.4
	90	56	3.5	3.7
	95	3	0.2	0.2
All Or About All	98	1	0.1	0.1
	100	36	2.2	2.4
Don't Know		101	6.2	Missing
No Answer		8	0.5	Missing
TOTAL		1620	100.0	100.0

V68 Q50. As best you can tell, do the Soviets have actual plans to evacuate their cities or other risk areas in the event of a crisis and a war threat?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Yes	249	26.5	43.7
Unsure	310	19.1	31.6
No	242	14.9	24.7
Don't Know	<u>639</u>	<u>39.4</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V69 Q51. Can you imagine any situation in which the President of the United States would ask people to evacuate the cities and perhaps some other areas of the country?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Yes	1081	66.7	71.6
Unsure	152	9.4	10.1
No	276	17.0	18.3
Don't Know	108	6.7	Missing
No Answer	<u>3</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V70 Q52. As best you know, do we in America have actual plans to evacuate cities and other risk areas in the event of a crisis in which war seems very likely?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Yes	435	26.9	34.5
Unsure	302	18.6	23.9
No	525	32.4	41.6
Don't Know	357	22.0	Missing
No Answer	<u>1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V71 Q53. Should we have such plans?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Definitely Yes	754	46.5	48.3
Probably Yes	513	31.7	32.8
Undecided, Depends	162	10.0	10.4
Probably No	82	5.1	5.2
Definitely No	51	3.1	1.1
Don't Know	54	3.3	Missing
No Answer	<u>4</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V73 Q55. Suppose that the President would urge evacuation or relocation of our people. Would you and your family leave your place of residence and evacuate under these circumstances, that is, after the President had announced such action?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Realtive Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Definitely Yes	516	31.9	32.6
Probably Yes	620	38.3	39.2
Undecided, Depends	246	15.2	15.5
Probably No	122	7.5	7.7
Definitely No	79	4.9	5.0
Don't Know	35	2.2	Missing
No Answer	<u>2</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V74 Q56. If you chose to leave, would you follow instructions as to where to go or would you want to evacuate to a place of your own choice?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Would Follow Instructions	997	61.5	69.1
Would Go To Place Of Own Choice	446	27.5	30.9
Don't Know	168	10.4	Missing
No Answer	<u>9</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V75 Q57. Now what approximate percentage of the people in this community (area) would evacuate if the President strongly recommended that people do so?

Response Scale		Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
No One At All	0	14	0.9	0.9
	5	6	0.4	0.4
	8	1	0.1	0.1
	10	31	1.9	2.0
	15	1	0.1	0.1
	20	45	2.8	2.9
	25	16	1.0	1.0
	30	35	2.2	2.3
	35	3	0.2	0.2
	40	33	2.0	2.1
	45	2	0.1	0.1
About Half	50	313	9.3	20.2
	51	2	0.1	0.1
	60	79	4.9	5.1
	65	10	0.6	0.6
	70	139	8.6	9.0
	75	69	4.3	4.5
	78	1	0.1	0.1
	80	264	16.3	17.1
	85	15	0.9	1.0
	88	1	0.1	0.1
	90	248	15.3	16.0
	91	1	0.1	0.1
	93	1	0.1	0.1
	95	38	2.3	2.5
	98	3	0.2	0.2
	99	7	0.4	0.5
All Or About All	100	170	10.5	11.0
Don't Know		62	3.8	Missing
No Answer		10	0.6	Missing
TOTAL		1620	100.0	100.0

V248 Q58. Now some people might not evacuate no matter what, that is, either on their own or even should the President urge people to relocate. What do you suppose would be the main reasons why people might not leave?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Safer In Present Location	147	9.1	9.7
Protect Their Possessions	373	23.0	24.7
Health Reasons	63	3.9	4.2
Age Reasons	147	9.1	9.7
Not Enough Time	7	0.4	0.5
Nowhere To Go	106	6.5	7.0
Ideological Reasons	588	36.3	39.0
Other Reasons	77	4.8	5.1
No Answer	<u>112</u>	<u>6.0</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V153 Q60. Suppose evacuation, or crisis relocation, were necessary and people would have to go to assigned places. One way to assign people would be to ask them to evacuate on a neighborhood basis. Another way to assign people would be to have them evacuate from their work place or some other organization to which they may belong. If you had a choice, would it be better for you and your family to be assigned to a place with your neighbors or to be assigned with people from your work place or some other organization?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Neighborhood	1052	64.9	67.8
Work	133	8.2	8.6
Other Organization	121	7.5	7.8
Makes No Difference	245	15.1	15.8
Don't Know	66	4.1	Missing
No Answer	<u>3</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V249 Q60A. (IF "OTHER ORGANIZATION" TO Q60): Which organization(s) might that be?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Family	7	0.4	6.1
Church	64	4.0	56.1
Labor Union	1	0.1	0.9
Service Club	1	0.1	0.9
Civil Defense	9	0.6	7.9
Red Cross (Civil Air Patrol)	10	0.6	8.8
Other	22	1.4	19.3
Inapplicable	1493	92.2	Missing
Don't Know	7	0.4	Missing
No Answer	<u>6</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V77 Q61. Now if people from our cities and other risk areas were actually relocated, they would find themselves in various other communities for the duration of the evacuation. How do you suppose people in these communities to which evacuees would come to, that is, in these host communities, would react?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Very Helpful	428	26.4	28.0
Somewhat Helpful	792	48.9	51.8
Neither	123	7.6	8.0
Somewhat Unhelpful	144	8.9	9.4
Very Unhelpful	43	2.7	2.8
Don't Know	87	5.4	Missing
No Answer	<u>3</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V78 Q62. Suppose you and your family were in an area which did not have to be evacuated and which, in fact, became a host area for evacuees from elsewhere. How helpful or unhelpful would people be in this community to the evacuees?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Very Helpful	566	34.9	36.0
Somewhat Helpful	762	47.0	48.5
Neither	94	5.8	6.0
Somewhat Unhelpful	109	6.7	6.9
Very Unhelpful	40	2.5	2.5
Don't Know	48	3.0	Missing
No Answer	<u>1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V79 Q63. In the host areas in general, would people be willing to have the evacuees stay in their homes even if it meant that they might have to stay there for a couple of weeks?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Definitely Yes	219	13.5	14.1
Probably Yes	849	52.4	54.6
Undecided	274	16.9	17.6
Probably No	184	11.4	11.8
Definitely No	28	1.7	1.8
Don't Know	65	4.0	Missing
No Answer	<u>1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V80 Q64. If this community and this area were to receive evacuees rather than being itself relocated, how about the people around here? Would most be willing to have evacuees stay in their homes for two weeks?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Definitely Yes	201	12.4	13.1
Probably Yes	836	51.6	54.5
Undecided	262	16.2	17.1
Probably No	198	12.2	12.9
Definitely No	38	2.3	2.5
Don't Know	<u>85</u>	<u>5.2</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V250 Q65. Would you (and your family) be willing to have evacuees stay at your place of residence?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Definitely Yes	553	34.1	36.3
Probably Yes	624	38.5	41.0
Undecided, Depends	197	12.2	12.9
Probably No	92	5.7	6.0
Definitely No	56	3.5	3.7
Don't Know	<u>98</u>	<u>6.0</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V251 Q65A. (IF "DEFINITELY YES," "PROBABLY YES," "DEPENDS" TO Q65):
 About how many people would you consider accommodating?
 Would it be one, two or even more families?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
One Family*	636	39.3	50.0
Two Families	395	24.4	31.0
Three Families	55	3.4	4.3
Four Families	37	2.3	2.9
Five Families	5	0.3	0.4
Six And More Families	145	9.0	11.4
Inapplicable	244	15.1	Missing
Don't Know	81	5.0	Missing
No Answer	<u>22</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

*If number of people was given, rather than number of families, we calculated the number of families as: the number of people divided by 2.68 (the average family size, 1970) and truncated to nearest whole number.

V252 Q65B. (IF "PROBABLY NO" OR "DEFINITELY NO" TO Q65): There are many reasons why people may be unable to help in this manner. And they have, of course, every right to make that choice. Why might you be disinclined to have evacuees stay with you at your place of residence?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Space Shortage	68	4.2	47.2
Ideological Reasons	56	3.5	38.9
Uncertain As To Who	1	0.1	0.7
Other Reasons	19	1.2	13.2
Inapplicable	1464	90.4	Missing
Don't Know	3	0.2	Missing
No Answer	<u>9</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V81 Q66. Under some circumstances, it might be best to evacuate people into the countryside where there are only a few others living. Many people in those relatively uninhabited areas of the country would be, of course, farmers. How do you feel about the way farmers and other people in the most rural areas would react to people who would be relocated there? Would they definitely help, probably help, probably not help or definitely not help?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Definitely Help	354	21.9	22.9
Probably Help	926	57.2	59.9
Undecided	140	8.6	9.1
Probably Not Help	101	6.2	6.5
Definitely Not Help	24	1.5	1.6
Don't Know	65	4.0	Missing
No Answer	<u>10</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V82 Q67. If you and your family were to evacuate into the countryside and not be able to stay at someone's house or farm, how able do you feel you would be to manage? Would you be able to deal with the situation, that is, live with your family in the countryside and off the land, even for a couple of weeks?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Definitely Yes	466	28.8	29.9
Probably Yes	703	43.4	45.2
Undecided	135	8.3	8.7
Probably No	175	10.8	11.2
Definitely No	78	4.8	5.0
Don't Know	52	3.2	Missing
No Answer	<u>11</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

In the evacuated areas, some essential services may have to continue. For example, policing for firefighting, some of the main utilities, some of the major industrial activities and the like. Some people then would have to be designated as critical workers because their occupation would be essential even if there were large scale relocation of our people. On this card are listed some of the main options. First of all please look them over.

V83 Q68A. Which one do you think would be the best one?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Evacuate critical workers and their families and have critical workers commute back and forth to maintain essential services	450	27.8	28.9
Evacuate only families of critical workers, urge the critical workers to stay and maintain essential services and provide full protection for them against blast as well as fallout	383	23.6	24.6
Evacuate only families of critical workers urge the critical workers in the areas to stay and maintain essential services and evacuate them at the last moment, that is, if the danger of nuclear attack becomes imminent	336	20.7	21.6
Urge critical workers and their families in the evacuated areas to stay and maintain essential services and provide full protection for them against blast and fallout	243	15.0	15.6
Urge critical workers and their families in the evacuated areas to stay and maintain essential services and make plans to evacuate them at the last possible moment	147	9.1	9.4
Don't Know	25	1.5	Missing
No Answer	<u>36</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

In the evacuated areas, some essential services may have to continue. For example, policing for firefighting, some of the main utilities, some of the major industrial activities and the like. Some people then would have to be designated as critical workers because their occupation would be essential even if there were large scale relocation of our people. On this card are listed some of the main options. First of all please look them over.

V84 Q68B. And which one would be the second best one?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Evacuate critical workers and their families and have critical workers commute back and forth to maintain essential services	264	16.3	17.1
Evacuate only families of critical workers urge the critical workers to stay and maintain essential services and provide full protection for them against blast as well as fallout	492	30.4	31.9
Evacuate only families of critical workers urge the critical workers in the areas to stay and maintain essential services and evacuate them at the last moment, that is, if the danger of nuclear attack becomes imminent	358	22.1	23.2
Urge critical workers and their families in the evacuated areas to stay and maintain essential services and provide full protection for them against blast and fallout	258	15.9	16.7
Urge critical workers and their families in the evacuated areas to stay and maintain essential services and make plans to evacuate them at the last possible moment	170	10.5	11.0
Don't Know	31	1.9	Missing
No Answer	<u>47</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

In the evacuated areas, some essential services may have to continue. For example, policing for firefighting, some of the main utilities, some of the major industrial activities and the like. Some people then would have to be designated as critical workers because their occupation would be essential even if there were large scale relocation of our people. On this card are listed some of the main options. First of all please look them over.

V85 Q68C. How about the option that you consider to be the worst?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Evacuate critical workers and their families and have critical workers commute back and forth to maintain essential services	328	20.2	21.4
Evacuate only families of critical workers urge the critical workers to stay and maintain essential services and provide full protection for them against blast as well as fallout	153	9.4	10.0
Evacuate only families of critical workers urge the critical workers in the areas to stay and maintain essential services and evacuate them at the last moment, that is, if the danger of nuclear attack becomes imminent	250	15.4	16.3
Urge critical workers and their families in the evacuated areas to stay and maintain essential services and provide full protection for them against blast and fallout	311	19.2	20.3
Urge critical workers and their families in the evacuated areas to stay and maintain essential services and make plans to evacuate them at the last possible moment	492	30.4	32.1
Don't Know	34	2.1	Missing
No Answer	<u>52</u>	<u>3.2</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

In the evacuated areas, some essential services may have to continue. For example, policing for firefighting, some of the main utilities, some of the major industrial activities and the like. Some people then would have to be designated as critical workers because their occupation would be essential even if there were large scale relocation of our people. On this card are listed some of the main options. First of all please look them over.

V86 Q68D. And the next worst one?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Evacuate critical workers and their families and have critical workers commute back and forth to maintain essential services	196	12.1	12.8
Evacuate only families of critical workers urge the critical workers to stay and maintain essential services and provide full protection for them against blast as well as fallout	227	14.0	14.8
Evacuate only families of critical workers urge the critical workers in the areas to stay and maintain essential services and evacuate them at the last moment, that is, if the danger of nuclear attack becomes imminent	252	15.6	16.4
Urge critical workers and their families in the evacuated areas to stay and maintain essential services and provide full protection for them against blast and fallout	413	25.5	26.9
Urge critical workers and their families in the evacuated areas to stay and maintain essential services and make plans to evacuate them at the last possible moment	445	27.5	29.0
Don't Know	38	2.3	Missing
No Answer	<u>49</u>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V87 Q69. Suppose critical workers as well as their families were asked to evacuate. Approximately what percentage of people designated as critical workers would be willing to commute between the host area and the area they evacuated in order to maintain essential services and activities?

Response Scale		Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
No One At All	0	27	1.7	1.9
	1	1	0.1	0.1
	2	2	0.1	0.1
	4	2	0.1	0.1
	5	14	0.9	1.0
	7	1	0.1	0.1
	9	1	0.1	0.1
	10	98	6.0	6.8
	13	1	0.1	0.1
	15	14	0.9	1.0
	20	101	6.2	7.1
	25	23	1.4	1.6
	30	90	5.6	6.3
	33	1	0.1	0.1
	35	7	0.4	0.5
	40	69	4.3	4.8
	45	3	0.2	0.2
About Half	50	451	27.8	31.5
	55	1	0.1	0.1
	60	86	5.3	6.0
	65	2	0.1	0.1
	66	1	0.1	0.1
	70	109	6.7	7.6
	75	37	2.3	2.6
	78	1	0.1	0.1
	80	111	6.9	7.8
	85	9	0.6	0.6
	88	1	0.1	0.1
	90	92	5.7	6.4
	95	1	0.1	0.1
	98	2	0.1	0.1
	99	1	0.1	0.1
All Or About All	100	72	4.4	5.0
Don't Know		88	5.4	Missing
No Answer		<u>100</u>	<u>6.2</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL		1620	100.0	100.0

Now some of the things on this card may apply to you and others may not. Please tell me all that apply to you. Do you have:

Response	Absolute Frequency	Yes	
		Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
V88 Q70A. A cottage or summer home within about 100 miles from here?	100	6.2	6.2
V89 Q70B. A cottage or summer home within about 200 miles from here?	76	4.7	4.7
V90 Q70C. A camping site or similar place within about 100 miles?	333	20.6	20.8
V91 Q70D. A camping site or similar place within about 200 miles?	315	19.4	19.7
V92 Q70E. Relatives or friends with whom you could stay who live within about 100 miles but not in a city area?	941	58.1	58.4
V93 Q70F. Relatives or friends with whom you could stay who live within about 200 miles but not in a city?	884	54.6	55.2
V94 Q70G. A family car, or cars, in which you could evacuate if you should do so?	1422	87.8	88.0
V95 Q70H. A camper or similar equipment which you could take along if you were to evacuate?	325	20.1	20.1
V96 Q70I. Camping equipment (tents and the like)?	534	33.0	33.1
V97 Q70J. A boat which could be taken some miles away from land?	203	12.5	12.7

V98 Q71. If you and your family had to leave your home today, for how long, approximately, could you manage on the food items that you would take along, without having to buy anything?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Unable To Manage At All	17	1.0	1.1
1 Day	53	3.3	3.3
Couple Or 2 Days	82	5.1	5.2
Several Or 3 Days	75	4.6	4.7
4 Days	27	1.7	1.7
Light Week Or 5 Days	26	1.6	1.6
6 Days	5	0.3	0.3
About One Week Or 7 Days	451	27.8	28.5
1 To 2 Weeks	439	27.1	27.7
2 Weeks To 1 Month	319	19.8	20.1
1 Month To 1 Year	82	5.2	5.4
More Than 1 Year*	8	0.5	0.5
Don't Know	22	1.4	Missing
No Answer	<u>14</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

* Includes indefinite time period.

V253 Q72. Are there, however, food items you would definitely want to buy before you would leave?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Yes	1177	72.7	77.2
No	347	21.4	22.8
Don't Know	94	5.8	Missing
No Answer	<u>2</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

Q72A. (IF "YES" TO Q72): What are some of the main items you would want to buy?

	V254, Item 1			V255, Item 2			V256, Item 3			All		
	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq. (%)	Adj. Freq. (%)	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq. (%)	Adj. Freq. (%)	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq. (%)	Adj. Freq. (%)	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq. (%)	Adj. Freq. (%)
Other non-perishable goods	51	3.1	4.4	59	3.6	8.3	21	1.3	8.8	131	8.0	21.5
Canned goods	621	37.8	52.4	172	10.6	24.1	33	2.0	13.8	826	50.4	90.3
Dried goods	202	12.5	17.3	243	15.0	34.1	60	3.7	25.0	505	31.2	76.4
Bottled water	32	2.0	2.7	72	4.4	10.1	40	2.5	16.7	144	8.9	29.5
Perishable goods (Fresh milk, meat vegetables)	249	15.4	21.3	131	8.1	18.4	51	1.1	21.3	431	24.6	61.0
Other perishable goods	2	0.1	0.2	16	1.0	2.2	14	0.9	5.8	32	2.0	8.2
Other (e.g., tobacco, liquor, vitamins)	19	1.2	1.6	20	1.2	2.8	21	1.3	8.8	60	3.7	13.2
Inapplicable	438	27.0	Missing	439	27.1	Missing	439	27.1	Missing	1316	81.2	Missing
Don't Know	5	0.3	Missing	5	0.3	Missing	5	0.3	Missing	15	0.9	Missing
No Answer	10	0.6	Missing	463	28.6	Missing	936	57.8	Missing	1409	87.0	Missing

V99 Q73. Is anyone in this family in need of regular medications or drugs of any kind?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Yes	513	31.7	31.9
No	1097	67.7	68.1
Don't Know	9	0.6	Missing
No Answer	<u>1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

Is anyone in this family in need of regular medications or drugs of any kind?

V100 Q73A. (IF "YES" TO Q. 73): How long would your current supply of these needed medicines last without having to buy new ones?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Unable To Manage At All	2	0.1	0.4
1 Day	6	0.4	1.2
Couple Or 2 Days	6	0.4	1.2
Several Or 3 Days	4	0.2	0.8
Light Week Or 5 Days	4	0.2	0.8
6 Days	2	0.1	0.4
About One Week Or 7 Days	57	3.5	11.7
1 To 2 Weeks	97	6.1	19.9
2 Weeks To 1 Month	236	14.5	48.4
1 Month To 1 Year	70	4.5	14.2
More Than 1 Year*	3	0.2	0.6
Inapplicable	1106	68.3	Missing
Don't Know	4	0.2	Missing
No Answer	<u>23</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

*Includes indefinite time period.

V101 Q74. Right now, would you have money readily available that would be enough for you and your family to stay somewhere for two weeks, if you did not have to pay for accommodations? That is, would you have enough cash that you could get today to manage for about two weeks?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Yes	1155	71.3	72.2
No	394	24.3	24.6
Depends	50	3.1	3.1
Don't Know	18	1.1	Missing
No Answer	<u>3</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

Q75. If you were to evacuate your place of residence today, what items other than food or medicine would you take along?

Response	V257, Item 1			V258, Item 2			V259, Item 3			All		
	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq. (Z)	Adj. Freq. (Z)	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq. (Z)	Adj. Freq. (Z)	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq. (Z)	Adj. Freq. (Z)	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq. (Z)	Adj. Freq. (Z)
Guns, And/or Fishing Equipment	52	3.2	3.4	38	2.3	3.5	29	1.8	5.6	119	7.3	12.5
Camping Equipment	52	3.2	3.4	65	4.0	6.0	51	3.1	9.8	168	10.3	19.2
Communication Equipment (radio, TV)	41	2.5	2.7	82	5.1	7.5	55	3.4	10.6	178	11.0	20.8
Tools	7	0.4	0.5	19	1.2	1.7	13	0.8	2.5	39	2.4	4.7
Clothing And Shoes	889	54.9	58.6	229	14.1	21.0	59	3.6	11.4	1177	72.6	91.0
Family Items (e.g., books, photos, musical instruments, important papers)	134	8.3	8.8	120	7.4	11.0	55	3.4	10.6	309	19.1	30.4
Blankets And Bedding	193	11.9	12.7	332	20.5	30.5	73	4.5	14.1	598	36.9	57.3
Health Aid Accessories	24	1.5	1.6	61	3.8	5.6	49	3.0	9.5	134	8.3	16.7
Kitchen Utensils	5	0.3	0.3	31	1.9	2.8	36	2.2	6.9	72	4.4	10.0
Pets And Animals	40	2.5	2.6	18	1.1	1.7	15	0.9	2.9	73	4.5	7.2
Water	14	0.9	0.9	20	1.2	1.8	12	0.7	2.3	46	2.8	5.0
Batteries or Portable power Supplies	8	0.5	0.5	16	1.0	1.5	16	1.0	3.1	40	2.5	5.1
Vehicles	12	0.7	0.8	9	0.6	0.8	6	0.4	1.2	27	1.7	2.8
Nothing	22	1.4	1.5	4	0.2	0.4	---	---	---	26	1.6	1.9
Other (e.g., beer, tobacco)	24	1.5	1.6	46	2.8	4.2	49	3.0	9.5	119	7.3	15.3
Don't Know	87	5.4	Missing	87	5.4	Missing	87	5.4	Missing	261	16.2	Missing
No Answer	16	1.0	Missing	443	27.3	Missing	1015	62.7	Missing	1474	91.0	Missing

V260 Q76. Would you have to go and buy some of these items first?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Yes	138	8.5	9.2
No	1368	84.4	90.8
Inapplicable	82	5.1	Missing
Don't Know	27	1.7	Missing
No Answer	<u>5</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V261 Q76A. (IF "YES" TO Q76): Which ones would you have to go out and buy?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Camping Equipment (including heat and light sources)	47	2.9	35.3
Communication Equipment (including radio, TV and 2-way radio)	10	0.6	7.5
Tools	7	0.4	5.3
Other (e.g. guns, ammunition, diapers, etc.)	69	4.3	51.9
Inapplicable	1475	91.0	Missing
Don't Know	1	0.1	Missing
No Answer	<u>11</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V102 Q77. Do you have a car or cars?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Yes	1441	89.0	89.0
No	<u>179</u>	<u>11.0</u>	<u>11.0</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

Do you have a car or cars?
V103 Q77A. How Many?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
1 Car	609	37.6	43.8
2 Cars	565	34.9	40.6
3 Cars	160	9.9	11.5
4 Cars	34	2.1	2.4
5 Cars	15	0.9	1.1
6+ Cars	7	0.4	0.5
Inapplicable	179	11.0	Missing
Don't Know	1	0.1	Missing
No Answer	<u>50</u>	<u>3.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

Do you have a car or cars?

V104 Q77B. How much gasoline is there in the car you consider to be your main family car right now? What is your best estimate? Is the tank full? Three-quarters full? About half-full? Only about a quarter full? Or almost empty?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Empty Or Almost Empty	66	4.1	4.7
About A Quarter Tank	169	10.4	12.1
About A Half Tank	513	31.7	36.8
About Three-Quarter Tank	320	19.8	23.0
Full Or Almost Full	326	20.1	23.4
Inapplicable	179	11.0	Missing
Don't Know	22	1.4	Missing
No Answer	<u>25</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

Do you have a car or cars?

V105 Q77C. About how many miles would you be able to travel without having to refill your car?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Less Than 50 Miles	129	8.3	9.7
50-99 Miles	186	11.7	13.8
100-149 Miles	265	16.4	19.7
150-199 Miles	245	15.1	18.2
200-249 Miles	251	15.5	18.8
250-299 Miles	91	5.7	6.7
300-349 Miles	103	6.5	7.8
350-399 Miles	18	1.3	1.5
More Than 400 Miles	54	3.5	4.1
Inapplicable	179	11.0	Missing
Don't Know	89	5.5	Missing
No Answer	<u>10</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V106 Q78. If you were to leave your place of residence to relocate, would you rely on friends, relatives, or neighbors to take you and your family along in their car or would you use public transportation that would be made available for that purpose?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Friends-Relatives	123	7.6	69.5
Public Transportation	54	3.3	30.5
Inapplicable	1441	89.0	Missing
No Answer	<u>2</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V107 Q79. Do you have any pets in the house, that is, cats or dogs and the like ?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Yes	821	50.7	50.9
No	791	48.8	49.1
No Answer	<u>8</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

Do you have any pets in the house, that is, cats or dogs and the like?

V108 Q 79A. What pet(s) do you have:

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Cat Or Cats	144	8.9	18.0
Dog Or Dogs	471	29.1	58.7
Cats And Dogs	145	9.0	18.1
Other	42	2.6	5.2
Inapplicable	791	48.8	Missing
No Answer	<u>27</u>	<u>1.7</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

Do you have any pets in the house, that is, cats or dogs and the like?

V109 Q79B. Would you take your (Dog(s), Cat(s), etc.) with you if you were evacuating?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Yes	613	37.8	76.7
No	83	5.1	10.4
Depends	103	6.4	12.9
Inapplicable	791	48.8	Missing
Don't Know	16	1.0	Missing
No Answer	<u>14</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

SUMMARY DATA: CIVIL DEFENSE COSTS

I would like to ask you a few questions about how much money you think we, as a country, are spending on a few programs. The card shows the amount in dollars and cents to indicate what you think we are spending per each man, woman and child for one year. It also shows the approximate total amount for one year to give you an idea of how much the dollar and cents come to when you add them up for our whole population

V40 Q41A. Using this card, how much do you believe we spent last year on civil defense programs? Which letter on the card best represents the approximate amount you think we spent?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
No Money	24	1.5	2.0
\$0-\$10 Million	37	2.3	3.1
\$10 Million	220	13.6	18.2
\$10-\$20 Million	12	0.7	1.0
\$20 Million	137	8.5	11.4
\$20-\$50 Million	11	0.7	0.9
\$50 Million	125	7.7	10.4
\$50-\$100 Million	7	0.4	0.6
\$100 Million	112	6.9	9.3
\$100-\$200 Million	18	1.1	1.5
\$200 Million	106	6.5	8.8
\$200-\$400 Million	5	0.3	0.4
\$400 Million	103	6.4	8.5
\$400-\$1 Billion	10	0.6	0.8
\$1 Billion	98	6.0	8.1
\$1-\$2 Billion	7	0.4	0.6
\$2 Billion	57	3.5	4.7
\$2-\$5 Billion	8	0.5	0.7
\$5 Billion	44	2.7	3.6
\$5-\$10 Billion	7	0.4	0.6
\$10 Billion	59	3.6	4.9
Don't Know	412	25.4	Missing
No Answer	<u>1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

I would like to ask you a few questions about how much money you think we, as a country, are spending on a few programs. The card shows the amount in dollars and cents to indicate what you think we are spending per each man, woman and child for one year. It also shows the approximate total amount for one year to give you an idea of how much the dollar and cents come to when you add them up for our whole population

V41 Q41B. How about foreign aid? How much do you think we spent last year on foreign aid programs, not including programs that are entirely military in character.

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
No Money	1	0.1	0.1
\$0-\$10 Million	9	0.6	0.7
\$10 Million	37	2.3	3.0
\$10-\$20 Million	5	0.3	0.4
\$20 Million	46	2.8	3.7
\$20-\$50 Million	6	0.4	0.5
\$50 Million	59	3.6	4.7
\$50-\$100 Million	7	0.4	0.6
\$100 Million	95	5.9	7.6
\$100-\$200 Million	6	0.4	0.5
\$200 Million	102	6.3	8.1
\$200-\$400 Million	9	0.6	0.7
\$400 Million	147	9.1	11.7
\$400-\$1 Billion	13	0.8	1.0
\$1 Billion	145	9.0	11.6
\$1-\$2 Billion	18	1.1	1.4
\$2 Billion	137	8.5	10.9
\$2-\$5 Billion	18	1.1	1.4
\$5 Billion	175	10.8	14.0
\$5-\$10 Billion	19	1.2	1.5
\$10 Billion	199	12.3	15.9
Don't Know	366	22.6	Missing
No Answer	<u>1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

I would like to ask you a few questions about how much money you think we, as a country, are spending on a few programs. The card shows the amount in dollars and cents to indicate what you think we are spending per each man, woman and child for one year. It also shows the approximate total amount for one year to give you an idea of how much the dollars and cents come to when you add them up for our whole population.

V42 Q41C. And about how much did we spend on anti-poverty programs last year?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
No Money	15	0.9	1.2
\$0-\$10 Million	15	0.9	1.2
\$10 Million	99	6.1	8.1
\$10-\$20 Million	10	0.6	0.8
\$20 Million	93	5.7	7.6
\$20-\$50 Million	10	0.6	0.8
\$50 Million	93	5.7	7.6
\$50-\$100 Million	10	0.6	0.8
\$100 Million	117	7.2	9.6
\$100-\$200 Million	15	0.9	1.2
\$200 Million	114	7.0	9.3
\$200-\$400 Million	9	0.6	0.7
\$400 Million	136	8.4	11.1
\$400-\$1 Billion	15	0.9	1.2
\$1 Billion	127	7.8	10.4
\$1-\$2 Billion	12	0.7	1.0
\$2 Billion	85	5.2	7.0
\$2-\$5 Billion	13	0.8	1.1
\$5 Billion	99	6.1	8.1
\$5-\$10 Billion	10	0.6	0.8
\$10 Billion	126	7.8	10.3
Don't Know	395	24.4	Missing
No Answer	<u>2</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

I would like to ask you a few questions about how much money you think we, as a country, are spending on a few programs. The card shows the amount in dollars and cents to indicate what you think we are spending per each man, woman and child for one year. It also shows the approximate total amount for one year to give you an idea of how much the dollars and cents come to when you add them up for our whole population.

V43 Q41D. Now, using the same card how much do you think we ought to spend every year on civil defense programs?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
No Money	30	1.9	2.5
\$0-\$10 Million	11	0.7	0.9
\$10 Million	79	4.9	6.5
\$10-\$20 Million	11	0.7	0.9
\$20 Million	57	3.5	4.7
\$20-\$50 Million	5	0.3	0.4
\$50 Million	132	8.1	10.8
\$50-\$100 Million	4	0.2	0.3
\$100 Million	152	9.4	12.4
\$100-\$200 Million	11	0.7	0.9
\$200 Million	129	8.0	10.6
\$200-\$400 Million	7	0.4	0.6
\$400 Million	125	7.7	10.2
\$400-\$1 Billion	15	0.9	1.2
\$1 Billion	149	9.2	12.2
\$1-\$2 Billion	15	0.9	1.2
\$2 Billion	90	5.6	7.4
\$2-\$5 Billion	7	0.4	0.6
\$5 Billion	84	5.2	6.9
\$5-\$10 Billion	9	0.6	0.7
\$10 Billion	100	6.2	8.2
Don't Know	<u>398</u>	<u>24.6</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

I would like to ask you a few questions about how much money you think we, as a country, are spending on a few programs. The card shows the amount in dollars and cents to indicate what you think we are spending per each man, woman and child for one year. It also shows the approximate total amount for one year to give you an idea of how much the dollars and cents come to when you add them up for our whole population.

V44 041E. Again, how much do you think we ought to spend on foreign aid programs, not including military programs?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
No Money	169	10.4	13.6
\$0-\$10 Million	27	1.7	2.2
\$10 Million	151	9.3	12.1
\$10-\$20 Million	9	0.6	0.7
\$20 Million	91	5.6	7.3
\$20-\$50 Million	18	1.1	1.4
\$50 Million	136	8.4	10.9
\$50-\$100 Million	8	0.5	0.6
\$100 Million	148	9.1	11.9
\$100-\$200 Million	11	0.7	0.9
\$200 Million	100	6.2	8.0
\$200-\$400 Million	11	0.7	0.9
\$400 Million	102	6.3	8.2
\$400-\$1 Billion	13	0.8	1.0
\$1 Billion	109	6.7	8.8
\$1-\$2 Billion	2	0.1	0.2
\$2 Billion	63	3.9	5.1
\$2-\$5 Billion	2	0.1	0.2
\$5 Billion	48	3.0	3.9
\$5-\$10 Billion	2	0.1	0.2
\$10 Billion	24	1.5	1.9
Don't Know	<u>376</u>	<u>23.2</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

I would like to ask you a few questions about how much money you think we, as a country, are spending on a few programs. The card shows the amount in dollars and cents to indicate what you think we are spending per each man, woman and child for one year. It also shows the approximate total amount for one year to give you an idea of how much the dollars and cents come to when you add them up for our whole population.

V45 Q41F. Finally, how much do you think we should spend on anti-poverty programs?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
No Money	50	3.1	3.9
\$0-\$10 Million	14	0.9	1.1
\$10 Million	91	5.6	7.2
\$10-\$20 Million	13	0.8	1.0
\$20 Million	83	5.1	6.5
\$20-\$50 Million	4	0.2	0.3
\$50 Million	114	7.0	9.0
\$50-\$100 Million	15	0.9	1.2
\$100 Million	121	7.5	9.5
\$100-\$200 Million	11	0.7	0.9
\$200 Million	119	7.3	9.4
\$200-\$400 Million	8	0.5	0.6
\$400 Million	119	7.3	9.4
\$400-\$1 Billion	12	0.7	0.9
\$1 Billion	171	10.6	13.5
\$1-\$2 Billion	14	0.9	1.1
\$2 Billion	88	5.4	6.9
\$2-\$5 Billion	8	0.5	0.6
\$5 Billion	86	5.3	6.8
\$5-\$10 Billion	6	0.4	0.5
\$10 Billion	122	7.5	9.6
Don't Know	<u>351</u>	<u>21.7</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

SUMMARY DATA: TRAINING AND EDUCATION

Q35. Have you or any member of your household received training or education in activities related to emergencies or natural disasters? Please indicate whether you personally or another member of the household have undergone such training.

Response	Respondent					
	Yes			No		
	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
V221 Q35A First Aid Training	684	42.2	42.3	932	57.5	57.7
V225 Q35B Radiological Monitoring Training	102	6.3	6.3	1515	93.5	93.7
V229 Q35C Shelter Management Training	75	4.6	4.6	1542	95.2	95.4
V233 Q35D Training In What To Do In The Event Of An Attack	210	13.0	13.0	1400	86.4	87.0
V237 Q35E Any Other Emergency Or Disaster-Related Training Or Education	222	13.7	13.7	1394	86.0	86.3
				4	0.2	Missing
				4	0.2	Missing
				10	0.6	Missing
				3	0.2	Missing
				3	0.2	Missing
				4	0.2	Missing

Q35. Have you or any member of your household received training or education in activities related to emergencies or natural disasters? Please indicate whether you personally or another member of the household have undergone such training.

	Other Household Member														
	Yes			No			Inapplicable			Don't Know			No Answer		
	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq. (Z)	Adj. Freq. (Z)	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq. (Z)	Adj. Freq. (Z)	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq. (Z)	Adj. Freq. (Z)	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq. (Z)	Adj. Freq. (Z)	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq. (Z)	Adj. Freq. (Z)
V223 Q35A	449	27.7	36.8	770	47.5	63.2	290	17.9	Missing	100	6.2	Missing	11	0.7	Missing
V227 Q35B	43	2.7	3.5	1186	73.2	96.5	293	18.1	Missing	87	5.4	Missing	11	0.7	Missing
V231 Q35C	32	2.0	2.6	1217	75.1	97.4	292	18.0	Missing	68	4.2	Missing	11	0.7	Missing
V235 Q35D	82	5.1	6.7	1144	70.6	93.3	293	18.1	Missing	90	5.6	Missing	11	0.7	Missing
V239 Q35E	89	5.5	7.2	1141	70.4	92.8	294	18.1	Missing	84	5.2	Missing	12	0.7	Missing

Q35AA. (IF "YES" TO FIRST AID): Who or what organization provided this training or education?

Response	V222, Respondent			V224, Other Household Member		
	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Military Training	113	7.0	17.0	71	4.4	16.4
Civil Defense	29	1.8	4.4	22	1.4	5.1
Red Cross	152	9.4	22.8	88	5.4	20.3
Salvation Army Or Church	7	0.4	1.1	1	0.1	0.2
Scouting or 4-H Club	49	3.0	7.4	21	1.3	4.8
Schools	156	9.6	23.4	91	5.6	21.0
HAM, CB Radio (media)	2	0.1	0.3	3	0.2	0.7
Emergency Medical Training (or life saving)	48	3.0	7.2	34	2.1	7.9
Industrial (or on-the-job training)	59	3.6	8.9	56	3.5	12.9
Nurse, Nurse's Aid	31	1.9	4.7	25	1.5	5.8
Fire Department	20	1.2	3.0	21	1.3	4.8
Inapplicable	935	57.7	Missing	1160	71.6	Missing
Don't Know	3	0.2	Missing	5	0.3	Missing
No Answer	16	1.0	Missing	22	1.4	Missing

Q35BA. (IF "YES" TO RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING): Who or what organization provided this training or education?

Response	V226, Respondent			V228, Other Household Member		
	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Military Training	39	2.4	39.8	15	0.9	36.6
Civil Defense	16	1.0	16.3	7	0.4	17.1
Red Cross	1	0.1	1.0	---	---	---
Salvation Army Or Church	1	0.1	1.0	---	---	---
Scouting or 4-H Club	---	---	---	---	---	---
School	14	0.9	14.3	8	0.5	19.5
HAM, CB Radio (media)	1	0.1	1.0	---	---	---
Emergency Medical Training (or life saving)	6	0.4	6.1	4	0.2	9.8
Industrial (on-the-job training)	15	0.9	15.3	6	0.4	14.6
Nurse, Nurse Aid	---	---	---	1	0.1	2.4
Fire Department	5	0.3	5.1	---	---	---
Inapplicable	1518	93.7	Missing	1566	96.7	Missing
Don't Know	---	---	---	1	0.1	Missing
No Answer	4	0.2	Missing	12	0.7	Missing

Q35CA. (IF "YES" TO SHELTER MANAGEMENT): Who or what organization provided this training or education?

Response	V230, Respondent			V232, Other Household Member		
	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Military Training	24	1.5	33.3	15	0.9	50.0
Civil Defense	18	1.1	25.0	3	0.2	10.0
Red Cross	4	0.2	5.6	2	0.1	6.7
Salvation Army Or Church	---	---	---	---	---	---
Scouting or 4-H Club	---	---	---	---	---	---
Schools	15	0.9	20.8	5	0.3	16.7
HAM, CB Radio (media)	1	0.1	1.4	---	---	---
Emergency Medical Training (or life saving)	3	0.2	4.2	2	0.1	6.7
Industrial (or on-the-job training)	4	0.2	5.6	2	0.1	6.7
Nurse, Nurse Aid	2	0.1	2.8	1	0.1	3.3
Fire Department	1	0.1	1.4	---	---	---
Inapplicable	1545	95.4	Missing	1576	97.3	Missing
Don't Know	2	0.1	Missing	2	0.1	Missing
No Answer	1	0.1	Missing	12	0.7	Missing

Q35DA. (IF "YES" TO WHAT TO DO IN THE EVENT OF NUCLEAR ATTACK): Who or what organization provided this training or education?

Response	V234, Respondent			V236, Other Household Member		
	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Military Training	81	5.0	39.9	30	1.9	39.5
Civil Defense	29	1.8	14.3	8	0.5	10.5
Red Cross	2	0.1	1.0	2	0.1	2.6
Salvation Army Or Church	1	0.1	0.5	---	---	---
Scouting or 4-H Club	3	0.2	1.5	---	---	---
Schools	58	3.6	28.6	22	1.4	28.9
HAM, CB Radio (media)	8	0.5	3.9	4	0.2	5.3
Emergency Medical Training (or life saving)	8	0.5	3.9	5	0.3	6.6
Industrial (on-the-job training)	11	0.7	5.4	4	0.2	5.3
Nurse, Nurse Aid	---	---	---	1	0.1	1.3
Fire Department	2	0.1	1.0	---	---	---
Inapplicable	1410	87.0	Missing	1525	94.1	Missing
Don't Know	2	0.1	Missing	3	0.2	Missing
No Answer	5	0.3	Missing	16	1.0	Missing

Q35EA. (IF "YES" TO OTHER EMERGENCY OR DISASTER-RELATED TRAINING OR EDUCATION): Who or what organization provided this training or education?

Response	V238, Respondent			V240, Other Household Member		
	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Military Training	57	3.5	25.7	22	1.4	25.0
Civil Defense	31	1.9	14.0	13	0.8	14.8
Red Cross	22	1.4	9.9	5	0.3	5.7
Salvation Army or Church	---	---	---	---	---	---
Scouting or 4-H Clubs	1	0.1	0.5	2	0.1	2.3
Schools	31	1.9	14.0	13	0.8	14.8
HAM, CB Radio (media)	8	0.5	3.6	4	0.2	4.5
Emergency Medical Training (or life saving)	37	2.3	16.7	14	0.9	15.9
Industrial (or on-the-job training)	16	1.0	7.2	7	0.4	8.0
Nurse, Nurse Aid	5	0.3	2.3	3	0.2	3.4
Fire Department	14	0.9	6.3	5	0.3	5.7
Inapplicable	1397	86.2	Missing	1519	93.8	Missing
Don't Know	---	---	---	---	---	---
No Answer	1	0.1	Missing	13	0.8	Missing

Q35EB. (IF "YES" TO OTHER EMERGENCY OR DISASTER-RELATED TRAINING OR EDUCATION): What kind of training was it?

	V241, Respondent			V242, Other Household Member		
	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Military Training	17	1.0	9.8	5	0.3	7.7
Civil Defense	50	3.1	28.9	22	1.4	33.8
Red Cross	8	0.5	4.6	1	0.1	1.5
Salvation Army Or Church	---	---	---	---	---	---
Scouting or 4-H Clubs	1	0.1	0.6	---	---	---
Schools	9	0.6	5.2	3	0.2	4.6
HAM, CB Radio (media)	4	0.2	2.3	1	0.1	1.5
Emergency Medical Training (or life saving)	63	3.9	36.4	22	1.4	33.8
Industrial (or on-the-job training)	7	0.4	4.0	2	0.1	3.1
Nurse, Nurse Aid	1	0.1	0.6	3	0.2	4.6
Fire Department	13	0.8	7.5	6	0.4	9.2
Inapplicable	1406	86.8	Missing	1520	93.8	Missing
Don't Know	---	---	---	5	0.3	Missing
No Answer	41	2.5	Missing	30	1.9	Missing

Q36. If there were an opportunity to be trained or educated regarding problems of emergencies or natural disaster, how likely is it that you or another member of your household would get such training or education? Please tell me whether you or another member of the household would be definitely willing, probably willing, probably not willing, or definitely not willing to get such training or whether the chances are about 50-50 that you or a household member would do so?

Response	V35, Q36A, Respondent			V36, Q36B, Other Household Member		
	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Definitely Willing	426	26.3	26.8	251	15.5	21.4
Probably Willing	538	33.2	33.8	435	26.9	37.0
50-50	314	19.4	19.7	266	16.4	22.6
Probably Not Willing	195	12.0	12.2	154	9.5	13.1
Definitely Not Willing	119	7.3	7.5	69	4.3	5.9
Inapplicable				311	19.2	Missing
Don't Know	26	1.6	Missing	116	7.2	Missing
No Answer	3	0.2	Missing	18	1.1	Missing
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0	1620	100.0	100.0

V243 Q37. How do you feel about a program in our schools to educate children and young people about various emergencies and what to do in the event of a disaster or nuclear war? Would you be strongly in favor, in favor, opposed or strongly opposed to providing the nation's young people with such education as part of their school program?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Strongly Favor	1060	65.4	66.1
Favor	461	28.5	28.8
Oppose	37	2.3	2.3
Strongly Oppose	14	0.9	0.9
Depends	31	1.9	1.9
Don't Know	<u>17</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V244 Q37A. (IF "OPPOSE" OR "STRONGLY OPPOSE" TO Q37): What are some of the main reasons why you would not be in favor of such educational efforts in our schools?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Cost Reasons	5	0.3	10.0
Fear Induced In Children	16	1.0	32.0
Inapplicable In Schools	16	1.0	32.0
Other Reasons	13	0.8	26.0
Inapplicable	1567	96.7	Missing
Don't Know	<u>3</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

SUMMARY DATA: VOLUNTEERING

V151 Q33. If a call went out for volunteers to participate in a community Civil Defense Program, would you definitely volunteer, probably volunteer, probably not, or definitely not volunteer?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Definitely yes	323	19.9	20.6
Probably yes	676	41.7	43.0
Undecided	116	7.2	7.4
Probably not	314	19.4	20.0
Definitely not	142	8.8	9.0
Don't Know	<u>49</u>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V214 Q33A. (IF "PROBABLY NOT," "DEFINITELY NOT" OR "UNDECIDED" TO Q33)
 There are lots of reasons why a person might find it difficult
 to volunteer, or might not want to. What are some of the
 main reasons in your case?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Health Reasons	76	4.7	14.9
Age Reasons	85	5.2	16.6
Time Factors	117	7.2	22.9
Other Family Reasons	76	4.7	14.9
Ideological Reasons	84	5.2	16.4
All Other Reasons	73	4.5	14.3
Inapplicable	1043	64.4	Missing
No Answer	66	4.0	Missing

V215 Q34. In the past 12 months, have you been involved in any voluntary work, that is, activities for which you do not get paid and that are done for people outside of your immediate family or circle of close relatives?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Yes, Volunteered	499	30.8	30.8
No, Did Not Volunteer	1121	69.2	69.2

V216 Q34A. (IF "YES" TO Q.34): Approximately how many hours overall would you say you spent doing voluntary work during the past 12 months?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Up to 12 Hours (1 hour or less per per month)	67	4.1	14.6
13 - 24 Hours (1 ≤ 2 hours per month)	56	3.4	12.1
25 - 52 Hours (more than 2 hours per month and up to one hour per week)	110	6.8	23.7
53 - 104 Hours (1 ≤ 2 hours per week)	96	5.9	20.9
105 - 156 Hours (2 ≤ 3 hours per week)	28	1.7	6.1
157 - 260 Hours (3 ≤ 5 hours per week)	46	3.0	10.0
261 - 780 Hours (5 ≤ 15 hours per week)	42	2.6	9.0
781 Hours and More (more than 15 hours per week)	15	0.9	3.2
Inapplicable	1120	69.1	Missing
No Answer	<u>40</u>	<u>2.4</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V217 Q34B1. Number of volunteer activities respondent involved in.

	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
One	269	16.6	54.6
Two	123	7.6	24.9
Three	74	4.6	15.0
Four	20	1.2	4.1
Five Or More	7	0.5	1.4
Inapplicable	1121	69.2	Missing
No Answer	<u>6</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

Q34B2. (If "yes" to Q.34): What kinds of voluntary activities were you involved in?

Response	V218, Activity 1			V219, Activity 2			V220, Activity 3			All		
	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq. (%)	Adj.	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq. (%)	Adj.	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq. (%)	Adj.	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq. (%)	Adj.
Health (Hospitals, Health Organizations)	98	6.0	19.9	37	2.3	16.4	14	0.9	14.1	149	9.2	50.4
Education (Teachers Aid, Tutors)	55	3.4	11.2	50	3.1	22.2	16	1.0	16.2	121	7.5	49.6
Justice (Court Volunteers, Legal Aids)	4	0.2	0.8	3	0.2	1.3	2	0.1	2.0	9	0.5	4.1
Citizenship (Scouts, 4H)	31	1.9	6.3	5	0.3	2.2	4	0.2	4.0	40	2.4	12.5
Recreation (Activity Leaders, Youth Sports)	34	2.1	6.9	10	0.6	4.4	11	0.7	11.1	55	3.4	22.4
Social, welfare (Home for Aged, Orphanages)	54	3.3	11.0	30	1.9	13.3	11	0.7	11.1	95	5.9	35.4
Civic, Community (Consumer Groups)	71	4.4	14.4	36	2.2	16.0	20	1.2	20.2	127	7.8	50.6
Religious (Sunday School Teachers, Usher)	105	6.5	21.3	38	2.3	16.9	17	1.0	17.2	160	9.8	55.4
Political (Fundraiser, Poll Watcher)	18	1.1	3.7	5	0.3	2.2	1	0.1	1.0	24	1.5	6.9
Help friends and neighbors	6	0.4	1.2	2	0.1	0.9	2	0.1	2.0	10	0.6	2.0
Fundraiser (NRC)*	9	0.6	1.8	4	0.2	1.8	1	0.1	1.0	14	0.9	4.6
Other volunteering	8	0.5	1.6	5	0.3	2.2	---	---	---	13	0.8	3.8
Inapplicable	1120	69.1	Missing	1121	69.2	Missing	1122	69.3	Missing	3363	207.6	Missing
No Answer	7	0.4	Missing	274	16.9	Missing	399	24.6	Missing	600	41.9	Missing

30.4 percent involved in one volunteer activity.
 13.9 percent involved in two volunteer activities.
 6.1 percent involved in three volunteer activities.

*Fundraiser not elsewhere classified

SUMMARY DATA: INFORMATION

I have only a very few more questions. People have different amounts of information about various things. On this card is a scale from zero to 10. Ten stands for a great deal of information. Zero, of course, stands for no information at all.

V110 Q87A. Using any appropriate number on this scale, how would you characterize the amount of information you have about the overall world situation?

Response Scale		Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
No Information	0	45	2.8	2.8
	1	45	2.8	2.8
	2	117	7.2	7.4
	3	212	13.1	13.4
	4	165	10.2	10.4
	5	380	23.5	24.0
	6	177	10.9	11.2
	7	170	10.5	10.7
	8	171	10.6	10.8
	9	53	3.3	3.3
Great Deal of Information	10	51	3.1	3.2
Don't Know		30	1.9	Missing
No Answer		4	0.2	Missing
TOTAL		1620	100.0	100.0

I have only a very few more questions. People have different amounts of information about various things. On this card is a scale from zero to 10. Ten stands for a great deal of information. Zero, of course, stands for no information at all.

V111 Q87B. About the economy in America?

Response Scale		Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
No Information	0	33	2.0	2.1
	1	39	2.4	2.5
	2	90	5.6	5.7
	3	148	9.1	9.3
	4	157	9.7	9.9
	5	336	20.7	21.2
	6	202	12.5	12.7
	7	221	13.6	13.9
	8	208	12.8	13.1
	9	75	4.6	4.7
Great Deal of Information	10	76	4.7	4.8
Don't Know		33	2.0	Missing
No Answer		<u>2</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL		1620	100.0	100.0

I have only a very few more questions. People have different amounts of information about various things. On this card is a scale from zero to 10. Ten stands for a great deal of information. Zero, of course, stands for no information at all.

V112 087C. About national defense in general?

Response Scale		Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
No Information	0	108	6.7	6.9
	1	93	5.7	5.9
	2	168	10.4	10.7
	3	246	15.2	15.6
	4	222	13.7	14.1
	5	315	19.4	20.0
	6	140	8.6	8.9
	7	119	7.3	7.6
	8	91	5.6	5.8
	9	37	2.3	2.4
Great Deal of Information	10	35	2.2	2.2
Don't Know		43	2.7	Missing
No Answer		<u>3</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL		1620	100.0	100.0

I have only a very few more questions. People have different amounts of information about various things. On this card is a scale from zero to 10. Ten stands for a great deal of information. Zero, of course, stands for no information at all.

V113 Q87D. About the Soviet Union?

Response Scale		Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
No Information	0	176	10.9	11.2
	1	159	9.8	10.1
	2	232	14.3	14.8
	3	287	17.7	18.3
	4	172	10.6	10.9
	5	250	15.4	15.9
	6	96	5.9	6.1
	7	83	5.1	5.3
	8	61	3.8	3.9
	9	29	1.8	1.8
Great Deal of Information	10	27	1.7	1.7
Don't Know		47	2.9	Missing
No Answer		<u>1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL		1620	100.0	100.0

I have only a very few more questions. People have different amounts of information about various things. On this card is a scale from zero to 10. Ten stands for a great deal of information. Zero, of course, stands for no information at all.

V114 Q87E. About civil defense in America?

Response Scale		Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
No Information	0	149	9.2	9.5
	1	161	9.9	10.2
	2	261	16.1	16.6
	3	268	16.5	17.0
	4	214	13.2	13.6
	5	256	15.8	16.3
	6	96	5.9	6.1
	7	67	4.1	4.3
	8	57	3.5	3.6
	9	24	1.5	1.5
Great Deal of Information	10	22	1.4	1.4
Don't Know		43	2.7	Missing
No Answer		<u>2</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL		1620	100.0	100.0

I have only a very few more questions. People have different amounts of information about various things. On this card is a scale from zero to 10. Ten stands for a great deal of information. Zero, of course, stands for no information at all.

V115 Q87F. About the energy situation?

Response Scale		Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
No Information	0	55	3.4	3.5
	1	47	2.9	3.0
	2	82	5.1	5.2
	3	152	9.4	9.6
	4	180	11.1	11.4
	5	335	20.7	21.2
	6	154	9.5	9.7
	7	231	14.3	14.6
	8	189	11.7	11.9
	9	91	5.6	5.7
Great Deal of Information	10	67	4.1	4.2
Don't Know		36	2.2	Missing
No Answer		<u>1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL		1620	100.0	100.0

Q88. Have you seen, heard or read anything in the mass media concerning Civil Defense in the past few months?

Response	Yes			No			Don't Know		
	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
V303 Received Civil Defense Information from Unspecified Source	112	6.9	7.0	1488	91.9	93.0	20	1.2	Missing
V304 Received Civil Defense Information from TV	140	8.6	8.8	1460	90.1	91.3	20	1.2	Missing
V305 Received Civil Defense Information from Radio	36	2.2	2.3	1564	96.5	97.8	20	1.2	Missing
V306 Received Civil Defense Information from Printed Media	79	4.9	4.9	1521	93.9	95.1	20	1.2	Missing

V307 Q88A. (IF ANY "YES" TO Q88): If you recall, would you please tell me where it was from.

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
NOVA, TV Program on civil defense	1	0.1	0.4
CBS, 60 Minutes, TV Program	24	1.5	9.7
Other TV Program*	101	6.2	40.9
Radio Program	18	1.1	7.3
Newspaper or Magazine	89	5.5	36.0
Other Media	14	0.9	5.7
Inapplicable	1303	80.4	Missing
Don't Know	55	3.4	Missing
No Answer	<u>15</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

*Includes unspecified TV Programs.

Q89. In the past few months, have you had any discussions about any problems of Civil Defense with family member, relatives, friends, neighbors or co-workers?

Var No. Response	Yes			No			Don't Know		
	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
V116 Unspecified	35	2.2	2.2	1576	97.3	97.8	9	0.6	Missing
V117 Family Member	60	3.7	3.7	1551	95.7	96.3	9	0.6	Missing
V118 Relatives	23	1.4	1.4	1588	98.0	98.6	9	0.6	Missing
V119 Friends	63	3.9	3.9	1548	95.6	96.1	9	0.6	Missing
V120 Neighbors	17	1.0	1.1	1594	98.4	98.9	9	0.6	Missing
V121 Co-workers	45	2.8	2.8	1566	96.7	97.2	9	0.6	Missing

SUMMARY DATA: SOVIET AND AMERICAN STRENGTH

V37 Q38. Right now, how would you compare the Soviet Union and the United States regarding strategic offensive weapons designed for attack purposes. Would you say the Soviet Union is much stronger, stronger, weaker, or much weaker than the United States? Or are they about equal in strength?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
USSR Much Stronger	132	8.1	8.9
USSR Stronger	420	25.9	28.2
Both About Equal	768	47.4	51.5
USSR Weaker	151	9.3	10.1
USSR Much Weaker	20	1.2	1.3
Don't Know	124	7.7	Missing
No Answer	<u>5</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V38 Q39. How about defensive weapons--those designed only for defending against an attack? Again, at the present time, do you feel the Soviet Union is much stronger, stronger, weaker, or much weaker than the United States in overall defensive strength? Or are they about equal?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
USSR Much Stronger	107	6.6	7.3
USSR Stronger	365	22.5	24.7
Both About Equal	762	47.0	51.7
USSR Weaker	224	13.8	15.2
USSR Much Weaker	17	1.0	1.2
Don't Know	144	8.9	Missing
No Answer	<u>1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V39 Q40. Similarly, both countries have civil defense programs that are designed to protect people in the event of an attack. From what you know, do you feel the Soviet Union's civil defense efforts today are much stronger, stronger, about equal, weaker, or much weaker than the efforts of the United States?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
USSR Much Stronger	211	13.0	16.6
USSR Stronger	432	26.7	33.9
Both About Equal	467	28.8	36.7
USSR Weaker	156	9.6	12.2
USSR Much Weaker	8	0.5	0.6
Don't Know	<u>346</u>	<u>21.4</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

SUMMARY DATA: ARMS CONTROL

Now using the same desirability card as we did just now, I would like to ask you a few questions on disarmament. If our government decided to sign a general disarmament treaty, there are probably some conditions that you would want our country to insist upon. Taking one condition at a time how desirable is it that it be met before our country actually signs a treaty.

V52 Q43A. A safe and secure inspection system operated by the United Nations or by inspection teams from opposing nations (for example, the U.S. would inspect Russia and they would inspect us).

Response Scale		Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Highly Undesirable	-3	235	14.5	15.3
	-2	91	5.6	5.9
	-1	90	5.6	5.9
Neutral	0	210	13.0	13.7
	+1	178	11.0	11.6
	+2	189	11.7	12.3
Highly Desirable	+3	542	33.5	35.3
Don't Know		<u>85</u>	<u>5.2</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL		1620	100.0	100.0

Now using the same desirability card as we did just now, I would like to ask you a few questions on disarmament. If our government decided to sign a general disarmament treaty, there are probably some conditions that you would want our country to insist upon. Taking one condition at a time how desirable is it that it be met before our country actually signs a treaty.

V53 Q43B. Each nation having an army that is only large enough to maintain internal order.

Response Scale		Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Highly Undesirable	-3	303	18.7	19.8
	-2	133	8.2	8.7
	-1	136	8.4	8.9
Neutral	0	205	12.7	13.4
	+1	191	11.8	12.5
	+2	177	10.9	11.6
Highly Desirable	+3	385	23.8	25.2
Don't Know		88	5.4	Missing
No Answer		<u>2</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL		1620	100.0	100.0

Now using the same desirability card as we did just now, I would like to ask you a few questions on disarmament. If our government decided to sign a general disarmament treaty, there are probably some conditions that you would want our country to insist upon. Taking one condition at a time how desirable is it that it be met before our country actually signs a treaty.

V54 Q43C. A U.N. Police Force controlling enough nuclear weapons to be the strongest army in the world.

Response Scale		Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Highly Undesirable	-3	510	31.5	34.2
	-2	135	8.3	9.0
	-1	143	8.8	9.6
Neutral	0	232	14.3	15.5
	+1	137	8.5	9.2
	+2	122	7.5	8.2
Highly Desirable	+3	213	13.1	14.3
Don't Know		127	7.8	Missing
No Answer		<u>1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL		1620	100.0	100.0

Now I'm going to ask some questions about possible partial disarmament agreements that the United States could make with other nations. Please tell me how desirable you think each one would be.

V55 Q43D. Eliminate all nuclear tests, including underground tests.

Response Scale		Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Highly Undesirable	-3	229	14.1	15.1
	-2	115	7.1	7.6
	-1	133	8.2	8.8
Neutral	0	211	13.0	13.9
	+1	170	10.5	11.2
	+2	162	10.0	10.7
Highly Desirable	+3	495	30.6	32.7
Don't Know		101	6.2	Missing
No Answer		<u>4</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL		1620	100.0	100.0

AD-A068 729

PITTSBURGH UNIV PA UNIV CENTER FOR SOCIAL AND URBAN--ETC F/G 15/3
ISSUES OF CIVIL DEFENSE: VINTAGE 1978 -- SUMMARY RESULTS OF THE--ETC(U)
FEB 79 J NEHNEVAJSA, G ROGERS, S MANNERS DCPA01-77-C-0218

UNCLASSIFIED


UCSUR-79-CD2

NL

4 of 5

AD
A068 729





MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

Now I'm going to ask some questions about possible partial disarmament agreements that the United States could make with other nations. Please tell me how desirable you think each one would be.

V56 Q43E. Prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to those countries that do not have them now.

Response Scale		Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Highly Undesirable	-3	107	6.6	7.0
	-2	55	3.4	3.6
	-1	71	4.4	4.6
Neutral	0	167	10.3	10.9
	+1	166	10.2	10.8
	+2	195	12.0	12.7
Highly Desirable	+3	773	47.7	50.4
Don't Know		<u>86</u>	<u>5.3</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL		1620	100.0	100.0

Now I'm going to ask some questions about possible partial disarmament agreements that the United States could make with other nations. Please tell me how desirable you think each one would be.

V57 Q43F. Agree with the Soviets to decrease the number of nuclear weapons they, and ourselves, already have?

Response Scale		Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Highly Undesirable	-3	200	12.3	13.0
	-2	64	4.0	4.2
	-1	94	5.8	6.1
	0	175	11.0	11.7
Neutral	+1	163	10.1	10.6
	+2	201	12.4	13.1
Highly Desirable	+3	635	39.2	41.3
Don't Know		<u>84</u>	<u>5.2</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL		1620	100.0	100.0

Now I'm going to ask some questions about possible partial disarmament agreements that the United States could make with other nations. Please tell me how desirable you think each one would be.

V58 Q43G. All of the nuclear powers agree to maintain not more than the number of nuclear bombs and missiles that they have now.

Response Scale		Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Highly Undesirable	-3	146	9.0	9.6
	-2	62	3.8	4.1
	-1	69	4.3	4.5
Neutral	0	238	14.7	15.6
	+1	208	12.8	13.6
	+2	213	13.1	13.9
Highly Desirable	+3	591	36.5	38.7
Don't Know		<u>93</u>	<u>5.7</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL		1620	100.0	100.0

Now I'm going to ask some questions about possible partial disarmament agreements that the United States could make with other nations. Please tell me how desirable you think each one would be.

V59 Q43H. Agree with all nations to stop all shipments of conventional arms to all other nations.

Response Scale		Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Highly Undesirable	-3	120	7.4	7.8
	-2	73	4.5	4.8
	-1	106	6.5	6.9
Neutral	0	190	11.7	12.4
	+1	202	12.5	13.2
	+2	188	11.6	12.3
Highly Desirable	+3	654	40.4	42.7
Don't Know		85	5.2	Missing
No		<u>2</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL		1620	100.0	100.0

Now I'm going to ask some questions about possible partial disarmament agreements that the United States could make with other nations. Please tell me how desirable you think each one would be.

V60 Q43I. Agree with Russia to have no antimissile missiles (ABM's) at all.

Response Scale		Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Highly Undesirable	-3	332	20.5	22.3
	-2	114	7.0	7.7
	-1	110	6.8	7.4
Neutral	0	191	11.8	12.8
	+1	120	7.4	8.1
	+2	139	8.6	9.3
Highly Desirable	+3	483	29.8	32.4
Don't Know		124	7.7	Missing
No Answer		<u>7</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL		1620	100.0	100.0

Now I'm going to ask some questions about possible partial disarmament agreements that the United States could make with other nations. Please tell me how desirable you think each one would be.

V62 Q43K. Agree with all nuclear powers to destroy all of their bombs and missiles; that is, to do away with all bombs and missiles already in existence.

Response Scale		Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Highly Undesirable	-3	361	22.3	23.7
	-2	90	5.6	5.9
	-1	106	6.5	7.0
Neutral	0	184	11.4	12.1
	+1	132	8.1	8.7
	+2	112	6.9	7.3
Highly Desirable	+3	539	33.3	35.4
Don't Know		94	5.8	Missing
No Answer		<u>2</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL		1620	100.0	100.0

V63 Q44. Here is another card. How likely do you consider it to be that major progress in arms control between ourselves and the Soviets will be made in the next couple of years--by about 1980?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Very Likely	77	4.8	5.1
Likely	270	16.7	18.0
50-50 Chance	551	34.0	36.8
Unlikely	387	23.9	25.8
Very Unlikely	213	13.1	14.2
Don't Know	<u>122</u>	<u>7.5</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V64 Q45. And how likely is major progress in arms control by 1985?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Very Likely	132	8.1	8.9
Likely	361	22.3	24.4
50-50 Chance	519	32.0	35.1
Unlikely	305	18.8	20.6
Very Unlikely	162	10.0	11.0
Don't Know	140	8.6	Missing
No Answer	<u>1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

SUMMARY DATA: EXPOSURE TO DISASTERS

Have you ever had direct experience with:

Response	Yes			No			No Answer		
	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq. (%)	Adj. Freq. (%)	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq. (%)	Adj. Freq. (%)	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq. (%)	Adj. Freq. (%)
V262 Q80 a tornado?	337	20.8	20.8	1283	79.2	79.2	---	---	---
V267 Q81 a flood?	290	17.9	17.9	1327	81.9	82.1	3	0.2	Missing
V272 Q82 a hurricane?	353	21.8	21.8	1266	78.1	78.2	1	0.1	Missing
V277 Q83 an earthquake?	261	16.1	16.1	1357	83.8	83.9	2	0.1	Missing
V282 Q84 any other major disaster, whether natural or man-made? That is, disasters other than earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes or floods?	189	11.7	11.7	1426	88.0	88.3	5	0.3	Missing

(IF YES TO: DIRECT EXPERIENCE, Q. 80 THRU Q. 83): When did this happen?

Response	V263, Q. 80A. Tornado			V268, Q. 81. Flood			V273, Q. 82A. Hurricane			V278, Q. 83A. Earthquake		
	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (Z)	Adjusted Frequency	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (Z)	Adjusted Frequency	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (Z)	Adjusted Frequency	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (Z)	Adjusted Frequency
Before 1920	6	0.4	1.9	6	0.4	2.2	---	---	---	1	0.1	0.4
1920-1924	1	0.1	0.3	1	0.1	0.4	---	---	---	1	0.1	0.4
1925-1929	12	0.7	3.8	8	0.5	2.9	4	0.2	1.3	1	0.1	0.4
1930-1934	12	0.7	3.8	3	0.2	1.1	2	0.1	0.6	5	0.3	2.1
1935-1939	6	0.4	1.9	33	2.0	12.0	22	1.4	7.1	5	0.3	2.1
1940-1944	9	0.6	2.8	5	0.3	1.8	6	0.4	1.9	4	0.2	1.7
1945-1949	7	0.4	2.2	13	0.8	4.7	15	0.9	4.8	6	0.4	2.5
1950-1954	28	1.7	8.8	23	1.4	8.4	50	3.1	16.0	10	0.6	4.2
1955-1959	38	2.3	11.9	27	1.7	9.8	44	2.7	14.1	17	1.0	7.1
1960-1964	31	1.9	9.7	25	1.5	9.1	47	2.9	15.1	24	1.5	10.1
1965-1969	64	4.0	20.1	46	2.8	16.7	66	4.1	21.2	39	2.4	16.4
1970-1974	64	4.0	20.1	34	2.1	12.4	37	2.3	11.9	75	4.6	31.5
1975-Present	41	2.5	12.9	50	3.1	18.2	19	1.2	6.1	50	3.1	21.0
Experience in Lifetime	---	---	---	1	0.1	0.4	---	---	---	---	---	---
Inapplicable	1282	79.1	Missing	1328	82.0	Missing	1264	78.0	Missing	1358	83.8	Missing
Don't Know	8	0.5	Missing	3	0.2	Missing	12	0.7	Missing	4	0.2	Missing
No Answer	11	0.7	Missing	14	0.9	Missing	32	2.0	Missing	20	1.2	Missing
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0	1620	100.0	100.0	1620	100.0	100.0	1620	100.0	100.0

(IF "YES" TO Q80 through Q83): What happened, that is, what severity of danger/damage occurred?

Response	No Danger/Damage			Little Danger/Damage			Moderate Danger/Damage			Severe Danger/Damage			Inapplicable			Don't Know			No Answer		
	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq.	Adj.	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq.	Adj.	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq.	Adj.	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq.	Adj.	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq.	Adj.	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq.	Adj.	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq.	Adj.
V265, Q80C1. Tornado	88	5.4	29.4	66	4.1	22.1	56	3.5	18.7	89	5.5	29.8	1281	79.1	Missing	4	0.2	Missing	36	2.2	Missing
V270, Q81C1. Flood	34	2.1	14.5	58	3.6	24.7	58	3.6	24.7	85	5.2	36.2	1328	82.0	Missing	2	0.1	Missing	55	3.4	Missing
V275, Q82C1. Hurricane	49	3.0	17.2	66	4.1	23.2	86	5.3	30.2	84	5.2	29.5	1264	78.0	Missing	7	0.4	Missing	64	4.0	Missing
V280, Q83C1. Earthquake	87	5.4	42.6	66	4.1	32.4	17	1.0	8.3	34	2.1	16.7	1359	83.9	Missing	2	0.1	Missing	55	3.4	Missing

Little Danger/Damage is defined as involving minor damage or injuries (i.e., no insurance claim filed and/or no medical attention sought).

Moderate Danger/Damage is defined as involving injuries for which medical attention is sought and out patient care is involved and/or parts of buildings destroyed.

Severe Danger/Damage is defined as injuries involving in-patient care and/or total destruction of buildings.

(IF YES TO Q. 80 THRU Q. 83): Locus of Impact

Response	V266, Q. 80C2. Tornado			V271, Q. 81C2. Flood			V276, Q. 82C2. Hurricane			V281, Q. 83C2. Earthquake		
	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency
Indirect, unable to classify	11	0.7	4.2	5	0.3	2.4	14	0.9	5.6	4	0.2	2.1
Within county experience/media exposure	3	0.2	4.1	2	0.1	1.0	3	0.2	1.2	1	0.1	0.5
Within community/ acquaintance experience	25	1.5	9.5	22	1.4	10.6	25	1.5	10.0	6	0.4	3.1
Neighborhood/ Friends and Relatives Experience	35	2.2	13.3	12	0.7	5.8	36	2.2	14.3	7	0.4	3.7
Personal Experience	189	11.7	71.9	167	10.3	80.3	173	10.7	68.9	173	10.7	90.6
Inapplicable	1281	79.1	Missing	1330	82.1	Missing	1265	78.1	Missing	1360	84.0	Missing
Don't Know	3	0.2	Missing	3	0.2	Missing	4	0.2	Missing	2	0.1	Missing
No Answer	73	4.5	Missing	79	4.9	Missing	100	6.2	Missing	67	4.1	Missing
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0	1620	100.0	100.0	1620	100.0	100.0	1620	100.0	100.0

V264 Q. 80B. (IF YES TO Q. 80): Where was that?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Alabama	15	0.9	4.6
Arkansas	14	0.9	4.3
Illinois	24	1.5	7.3
Indiana	11	0.7	3.4
Kansas	23	1.4	7.0
Michigan	18	1.1	5.5
Missouri	12	0.7	3.7
Ohio	29	1.8	8.8
Oklahoma	27	1.7	8.2
Texas	31	1.9	9.5
Other*	124	8.1	37.2
Inapplicable	1281	79.1	Missing
No Answer	<u>11</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

*This includes tornado experiences reported in many other areas with frequencies below 10.

V269 Q. 81B. (IF YES TO Q. 81): Where was that?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
California	15	0.9	5.4
Illinois	13	0.8	4.7
Iowa	10	0.6	3.6
Kansas	11	0.7	4.0
Louisiana	16	1.0	5.8
Montana	13	0.8	4.7
Ohio	15	0.9	5.4
Pennsylvania	14	0.9	5.0
Tennessee	11	0.7	4.0
Texas	15	0.9	5.4
West Virginia	10	0.6	3.6
Foreign Country	14	0.9	5.0
Other*	121	7.5	43.7
Inapplicable	1328	82.0	Missing
No Answer	<u>14</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

*This includes flood experiences reported in many other areas with frequencies below 10.

V274. Q. 82B. (IF YES TO Q. 82): Where was that?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Connecticut	11	0.7	3.2
Florida	69	4.3	19.9
Louisiana	25	1.5	7.2
Massachusetts	23	1.4	6.6
New Jersey	26	1.6	7.5
New York	44	2.7	12.7
North Carolina	31	1.9	9.0
Pennsylvania	10	0.6	2.9
Texas	22	1.4	6.4
Foreign Country	36	2.2	10.4
Other*	49	3.4	14.3
Inapplicable	1265	78.1	Missing
Don't Know	1	0.1	Missing
No Answer	<u>8</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

*This includes hurricane experiences reported in many other areas with frequencies below 10.

V279 Q. 83B. (IF YES TO Q. 83): Where was that?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
California	133	8.2	57.4
Illinois	11	0.7	4.4
Missouri	10	0.6	4.0
Washington	19	1.2	7.6
Foreign Country	32	2.0	12.9
Other*	44	3.1	17.6
Inapplicable	1359	83.9	Missing
No Answer	<u>12</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

*This includes earthquake experiences reported in many other areas with frequencies below 10.

(IF "YES" TO Q84): What happened, that is, what severity of danger/damage occurred?

Response	V289, Q84D1, Disaster 1			V291, Q84D1, Disaster		
	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
No Danger/Damage	11	0.7	8.5	---	---	---
Little Danger/Damage*	28	1.7	21.7	3	0.2	27.3
Moderate Danger/Damage**	24	1.5	18.6	1	0.1	9.1
Severe Danger/Damage*	66	4.1	51.2	7	0.4	63.6
Inapplicable	1429	88.2	Missing	1429	88.2	Missing
Don't Know	2	0.1	Missing	1	0.1	Missing
No Answer	60	3.7	Missing	179	11.0	Missing
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0	1620	100.0	100.0

*Little Danger/Damage is defined as involving minor damage or injuries (i.e., no insurance claim filed and/or no medical attention sought).

**Moderate Danger/Damage is defined as involving injuries for which medical attention is sought and out patient care is involved and/or parts of buildings destroyed.

***Severe Danger/Damage is defined as injuries involving in-patient care and/or total destruction of buildings.

(IF "YES" TO Q84): Locus of Impact

Response	V290, Q84D2, Disaster 1			V292, Q84D2, Disaster 2		
	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Indirect, unable to classify	3	0.2	2.5	---	---	---
Within county experience/ media exposure	4	0.2	3.3	---	---	---
Within community/acquaintances experience	4	0.2	3.3	---	---	---
Neighborhood/friends and relatives experience	16	1.0	13.2	---	---	---
Personal experience	94	5.8	77.7	30	1.9	100.0
Inapplicable	1430	88.3	Missing	1430	88.3	Missing
Don't Know	1	0.1	Missing	1	0.1	Missing
No Answer	68	4.2	Missing	159	9.8	Missing
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0	1620	100.0	100.0

(IF "YES" TO Q84): What was (were) the disaster(s) you are referring to?

Response	V283, Q84A, Disaster Experience 1			V284, Q84A, Disaster Experience 2			Both	
	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)
Fire	66	4.1	34.9	---	---	---	66	4.1
Bombing, War	30	1.9	15.9	---	---	---	30	1.9
Utility Outage	5	0.3	2.6	1	0.1	7.1	6	0.4
Blizzard	31	1.9	16.4	3	0.2	21.4	34	2.1
Cyclone	12	0.7	6.3	---	---	---	12	0.7
Ice Storm	14	0.9	7.4	3	0.2	21.4	17	1.2
Wind Storm	7	0.4	3.7	1	0.1	7.1	8	0.5
Other	24	1.5	12.7	6	0.4	42.9	30	1.9
Inapplicable	1427	86.1	Missing	1427	86.1	Missing	4854	176.2
No Answer	4	0.2	Missing	179	11.0	Missing	182	11.2
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0	1620	100.0	100.0	1620	100.0

12.0 percent reported experience with one other disaster.
1.0 percent reported experience with two other disasters.

(If "YES" TO Q04): When did you experience this (these) other disaster(s)?

Response	V285, Q04B, Disaster 1			V286, Q04B, Disaster 2			Both		
	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Before 1920	4	0.2	2.3	---	---	---	4	0.2	2.3
1920-1924	1	0.1	0.6	---	---	---	1	0.1	0.6
1925-1929	6	0.4	3.4	---	---	---	6	0.4	3.4
1930-1934	2	0.1	1.1	---	---	---	2	0.1	1.1
1935-1939	4	0.2	2.3	---	---	---	4	0.2	2.3
1940-1944	19	1.2	10.8	1	0.1	4.2	20	1.3	15.2
1945-1949	3	0.2	1.2	7	0.4	29.2	10	0.6	30.4
1950-1954	4	0.2	2.3	1	0.1	4.2	5	0.3	6.5
1955-1959	10	0.6	5.7	1	0.1	4.2	11	0.7	9.9
1960-1964	16	1.0	9.1	1	0.1	4.2	17	1.1	13.3
1965-1969	28	1.7	15.9	3	0.2	12.5	31	1.9	28.4
1970-1974	29	1.8	16.5	4	0.2	16.7	33	2.0	33.2
1975-Present	46	2.8	26.1	6	0.4	25.0	52	3.2	51.1
More than 1 Experience	4	0.3	2.3	---	---	---	4	0.3	2.3
Inapplicable	1427	88.1	Missing	1427	88.1	Missing	2854	176.2	Missing
Don't Know	4	0.2	Missing	1	0.1	Missing	5	0.3	Missing
No Answer	13	0.8	Missing	168	10.4	Missing	181	11.2	Missing

V228, Q. 84C, Where disaster 2 occurred.

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Michigan	2	0.1	22.2
Montana	1	0.1	11.1
New Hampshire	1	0.1	11.1
Foreign Country	5	0.3	55.6
Inapplicable	1427	88.1	Missing
No Answer	<u>184</u>	<u>11.4</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V287, Q84C. Where disaster 1 occurred.

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
California	16	1.0	8.8
Michigan	14	0.9	7.7
New York	18	1.1	9.9
Foreign Country	45	2.8	24.9
Other*	88	5.3	49.2
Inapplicable	1427	88.1	Missing
No Answer	<u>12</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

*This includes other major disaster experiences reported in many other areas with frequencies below 10.

V293 Q85. Did you or your family every have to evacuate your home?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Yes	197	12.2	12.2
No	1412	87.2	87.8
No Answer	<u>11</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V294 Q85A. (IF "YES" TO Q85): How did this come about?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Fire	33	2.0	18.5
Power Outage	2	0.1	1.1
Specified Storm	35	2.2	19.7
Unspecified Storm	19	1.2	10.7
Combination of storm and power outage	2	0.1	1.1
Flood	56	3.5	31.5
Other	31	1.9	17.4
Inapplicable	1411	87.1	Missing
No Answer	<u>31</u>	<u>1.9</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V295 Q85B. (IF "YES" TO Q85): Where did you go? (Distance from home to evacuation place.)

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Zero miles	24	1.5	25.0
One mile	10	0.6	10.4
Two miles	9	0.6	9.4
Three miles	9	0.6	9.4
Four miles	2	0.1	2.1
Five miles	6	0.4	6.3
6 to 10 miles	14	0.9	14.5
11 to 25 miles	15	1.1	15.4
26 to 50 miles	4	0.4	4.0
Over 50 miles	3	0.3	3.0
Inapplicable	1413	87.2	Missing
Don't Know	4	0.2	Missing
No Answer	<u>107</u>	<u>6.6</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V296 Q85C. (IF "YES" TO Q85): How long a time was it before you were able to return to your residence?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Did Not Return to Residence	14	0.9	7.9
1 Day, Less Than a Day	48	3.0	27.1
2 Days or Couple of Days	24	1.5	13.6
3 Days or Several Days	18	1.1	10.2
4 Days	11	0.7	6.2
5 Days or Less Than a Week	4	0.2	2.3
6 Days	2	0.1	1.1
7 Days or a Week	17	1.0	9.6
1 \leq 2 Weeks	12	0.8	6.8
2 \leq 3 Weeks	5	0.3	2.9
3 Weeks \leq 1 Month	2	0.2	1.2
More Than a Month	20	1.4	11.5
Inapplicable	1409	87.0	Missing
Don't Know	1	0.1	Missing
No Answer	<u>33</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V297 Q86. Have you ever been in a situation in which you provided temporary housing for other people, whether individuals or families, who had to evacuate their home(s)?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Yes	184	11.4	11.4
No	1433	88.5	88.6
No Answer	<u>3</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V298 Q86A. (IF "YES" TO Q86): How did this happen?
(Reason temporary housing needed.)

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Fire	42	2.6	23.5
Power Outage	12	0.7	6.7
Specified Storm	40	2.5	22.3
Unspecified Storm	19	1.2	10.6
Combination storm and power outage	2	0.1	1.1
Flood	33	2.0	18.4
Other reasons	31	1.9	17.3
Inapplicable	1432	88.4	Missing
Don't Know	1	0.1	Missing
No Answer	<u>8</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V299 Q86B. When was that?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Before 1920	1	0.1	0.6
1925 - 1929	1	0.1	0.6
1930 - 1934	2	0.1	1.2
1935 - 1939	4	0.2	2.4
1940 - 1944	2	0.1	1.2
1945 - 1949	5	0.3	3.0
1950 - 1954	5	0.3	3.0
1955 - 1959	12	0.7	7.1
1960 - 1964	18	1.1	10.7
1965 - 1969	28	1.7	16.6
1970 - 1974	34	2.1	20.1
1975 to present	56	3.5	33.1
More than 1 experience	1	0.1	0.6
Inapplicable	1434	88.5	Missing
Don't Know	5	0.3	Missing
No Answer	<u>12</u>	<u>0.7</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

V300 Q86C. (IF "YES" TO Q86): Where did this take place?

Response	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
California	13	0.8	7.6
Michigan	10	0.6	5.8
New York	15	0.9	8.8
Foreign Country	10	0.6	5.8
Other*	123	7.4	72.2
Inapplicable	1434	88.5	Missing
No Answer	<u>15</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL	1620	100.0	100.0

*This includes temporary housing in many other areas with frequencies less than 10.

Q86D. (IF "YES" TO Q86): On the whole, what was your experience in this situation?

Response	V301, Experience 1			V302, Experience 2			Both		
	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (Z)	Adjusted Frequency	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (Z)	Adjusted Frequency	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (Z)	Adjusted Frequency
Positive	54	3.3	64.3	9	0.6	56.3	63	3.9	120.6
Negative	30	1.9	35.7	7	0.4	43.8	37	2.3	79.5
Inapplicable	1439	88.8	Missing	1456	89.9	Missing	2095	178.7	Missing
No Answer	97	6.0	Missing	148	9.2	Missing	245	15.2	Missing

5.2 percent reported having one experience with temporarily housing other people.

0.1 percent reported having two experiences with temporarily housing other people.

SUMMARY DATA: NO CIVIL DEFENSE

A-217

Next I'm going to read you some statements about situations which may exist in our nation's civil defense. Not all of them are likely to come about. Regardless of their likelihood, please tell me how much you personally would like to see each one happen or not happen. We will use a simple scale, where minus three indicates you would find the situation highly undesirable, zero indicates you neither favor nor oppose it, and plus three indicates you would find the situation highly desirable.

V50 Q42E. How desirable would it be for the Government to have a program to build blast shelters, that is, shelters that could protect people against the primary, or direct, effects of nuclear weapons as well as against fallout?

Response Scale		Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Highly Undesirable	-3	106	6.5	6.8
	-2	59	3.6	3.8
	-1	76	4.7	4.9
Neutral	0	177	10.9	11.4
	+1	244	15.1	15.7
	+2	246	15.2	15.8
Highly Desirable	+3	648	40.0	41.6
Don't Know		57	3.5	Missing
No Answer		<u>7</u>	<u>0.4</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL		1620	100.0	100.0

Now I'm going to ask some questions about possible partial disarmament agreements that the United States could make with other nations. Please tell me how desirable you think each one would be.

V61 Q43J. Agree with Russia not to have any programs of Civil Defense; that is, programs to protect civilian population against nuclear attack.

Response Scale		Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency (%)	Adjusted Frequency (%)
Highly Undesirable	-3	798	49.3	51.7
	-2	181	11.2	11.7
	-1	162	10.0	10.5
Neutral	0	153	9.4	9.9
	+1	86	5.3	5.6
	+2	52	3.2	3.4
Highly Desirable	+3	113	7.0	7.3
Don't Know		74	4.6	Missing
No Answer		<u>1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>Missing</u>
TOTAL		1620	100.0	100.0

APPENDIX B

FIELDWORK REPORT (Marketing Information Service, Atlanta, GA.)

**CIVIL DEFENSE STUDY
METHODOLOGY REPORT**

SUBMITTED TO

**UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR URBAN RESEARCH
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH
121 MEYRON AVENUE
PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA 15213**



**Marketing Information Service
P. O. Box 4402
Atlanta, Georgia 30302**

JANUARY, 1979

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INTRODUCTION

The University Center for Urban Research, University of Pittsburgh, commissioned Marketing Information Service to conduct the 1978 nationwide survey of attitudes toward foreign affairs and Civil Defense. This survey is part of a larger continuing assessment of attitudinal changes over time and one in a series of surveys commissioned by the University. MIS was also selected to conduct the previous survey in 1972.

The current survey concluded with 1,620 completed personal interviews with adults (age 18 or over) residing in the conterminous United States. MIS was responsible for designing the sample, administering the interview and editing the resultant data. This report describes MIS's methodological approach to this survey.

METHODOLOGY

Sample Design

The sample for this study was drawn from the national probability sample cooperatively developed by Marketing Information Service and Morris Hansen, a former statistical director for the United States Bureau of the Census.

Our approach was first to stratify the country into the four census regions (Northeast, North Central, South and West), then stratify by large metropolitan areas, all other metropolitan areas and all other territory. Additional stratifications were made by rate of growth, percent employed in manufacturing, percent non-white, size and age of family, and a special social indicator index composed of housing features.

The results of the stratification gave us 100 separate and distinct strata covering the entire conterminous United States population. Each of these strata was assigned one primary sampling unit (PSU). Within each primary sampling unit, two to twelve sample segments (SSU - secondary sampling unit) were designated. A sample segment consisted of approximately 100 housing units although this varied widely in some cases. Within each of the sample segments, MIS grouped units of 25 housing units to be used as the basic frames for selecting respondents.

A specific selection procedure was then imposed to insure representation of all age groups and family members. (See appendix for copies of the twelve selection tables used.)

The following table outlines the sample frequencies and population comparison:

Sample Frequencies Compared to Population

	<u>#</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Thousands</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Variance</u>
Northeast	374	23.1	35,761	23.4	- .3%
North Central	399	24.6	38,761	25.4	- .8%
South	520	32.1	49,189	32.2	- .1%
West	327	20.2	28,986	19.0	+1.2%
Totals	1,620	100.0	152,697	100.0	0

Regional Composition of Sample

<u>Northeast</u>	<u>North Central</u>	<u>South</u>	<u>West</u>
Maine	Ohio	Delaware	Montana
New Hampshire	Indiana	District of Columbia	Wyoming
Vermont	Illinois	Maryland	Colorado
Massachusetts	Michigan	West Virginia	New Mexico
Connecticut	Wisconsin	Virginia	Arizona
Rhode Island	Missouri	North Carolina	Utah
New York	Iowa	South Carolina	Idaho
New Jersey	Kansas	Kentucky	Washington
Pennsylvania	Nebraska	Tennessee	Oregon
	South Dakota	Georgia	California
	North Dakota	Florida	Nevada
	Minnesota	Alabama	
		Mississippi	
		Louisiana	
		Arkansas	
		Oklahoma	
		Texas	

Although rigorous attempts were made to complete interviews in all of the 100 PSU's four PSU's failed to generate completed interviews. The sample is designed to accommodate this occurrence by the inclusion of "sister" PSU's for those PSU's which are not self-determined. Thus, if representation is not achieved in one PSU but is in the sister PSU, the impact of no interviews coming from a single PSU is minimized. A listing of the PSU's yielding no completed interviews and the "sister" PSU which did yield interviews is as follows:

<u>PSU# /PSU's With No Interviews</u>	<u>PSU# /"Sister PSU's</u>	<u># Completions</u>
122 (Hartford, New Britain)	121 (Bridgeport/Stamford Norwalk)	23
143 (Ulster County, New York)	144 (Montgomery/Otsego Counties, New York)	14
222 (Madison, Wisconsin)	221 (Lansing, Michigan)	15
354 (Calhoun/Clay/Doane, West Virginia)	353 (Orangburg, South Carolina)	9

Estimate of Reliability

Rate of Occurrence:

<u>Less Than</u>	<u>More Than</u>	<u>Total Sample n (1620)</u>	<u>North East (374)</u>	<u>North Central (399)</u>	<u>South (520)</u>	<u>West (327)</u>
		*t 1.4	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2
10%	90% .09	1.0	1.9	1.8	1.6	2.0
20%	80% .16	1.4	2.5	2.4	2.1	2.7
30%	70% .21	1.6	2.8	2.8	2.4	3.0
40%	60% .24	1.7	3.0	2.9	2.6	3.3
50%	.25	1.7	3.1	3.0	2.6	3.3

*The t value used is a prescribed t value suggested for use with this particular sample.

Note: This table may be used in calculating the reliability for specific statistics contained in data tabulations

Data Collection

1. Pretest

Prior to initiating this survey nationwide, MIS conducted a pretest during September, 1978, in the Atlanta area. Over 20 personal interviews were completed, and, subsequently, document revisions were made. The final survey instrument required approximately one hour to administer.

2. Time Period

Actual interviewing took place during October-December, 1978.

3. Interviewers

Since MIS has facilities to provide coverage across the nation, with several thousand salaried and part-time field interviewers, project personnel are recruited primarily from this group, as was the case with this survey. We recruited additional interviewers through organizations and individuals known from previous surveys. The experienced and known or recommended applicants were interviewed and their references validated. Qualities always emphasized were integrity and dependability as well as adequate intellectual capacity.

It is our conviction that the keys to quality data collection are adequate initial briefing and training of interviewers combined with both supervisory and management follow-up. If the interviewer is acquainted not only with the study mechanics but also with the basic study objectives, the tendency to adhere to instructions and specifications is greatly enhanced. Once a clear understanding of what is expected exists, it becomes management's responsibility to evaluate performance and determine what, if any, changes should be made.

For this survey, interviewers were briefed verbally and provided with detailed written instructions. (See appendix.) Ready access to the local supervisor was available on a daily basis so that question which arose could be resolved quickly and consistently. The work of each interviewer was reviewed daily to insure specifications were met. Where additional coaching was necessary, this was accomplished through the local supervisor or MIS headquarters field supervisors who maintained overall operational control of the field work.

4. Callback Procedures

Interviewers were instructed to make three attempts to complete an interview with the designated respondent. One attempt was required after 6:00 p.m.

during the week and another on a weekend. All callbacks were made on different days at different times.

5. Verification

Over 15% of all interviews were validated by field supervisors to insure high quality data. This procedure involved contacting the listed respondent, by telephone or in person, verifying that the correct person in the household was interviewed (reviewing the selection table) and checking responses to selected questions. Our confidence in this procedure results from the consistent production of high quality data over the years.

Editing

The MIS editing process is designed to clarify and validate data for logic and consistency. For this survey, each document was subjected to a two-phased edit process. the first review was conducted by the field supervisor or a designated assistant who was thoroughly familiar with the questionnaire. Completed documents were examined for completeness, skipped pages, illegible responses and unusual or unexplained circumstances. This process served two functions: it was the first cut at getting data reasonably intact for additional processing and also served as an additional measure of interviewer performance. It also had the advantage of spotting and correcting errors and omissions when the interview was still fresh in the minds of both the interviewer and the respondent. Documents which passed the field edit review were sent to headquarters as soon as they were judged complete.

The second review was conducted by the headquarters editing staff. Documents received in editing were carefully read to check for completeness, logic, consistency and correct following of skip patterns. Documents which have defects were

discussed with the edit supervisor individually. Those cases where it appeared necessary to resolve the question by getting more information were handled in one of two ways -- calling the respondent direct or returning the document to the field for additional handling.

In order for the edit unit to appreciate fully the study objectives and instructions, they were briefed and provided with full interviewer instructions as well as the survey document. In this fashion, the editors knew what was expected of field interviewers and how this related to the study objectives.

Initially, the editors met to discuss individual problem areas. During this session, the supervisor introduced real problems which have been encountered. A discussion concerning resolution of the problems followed. This meeting served to enhance understanding of generalized problems and their resolution. Subsequent meetings were held at the option of the edit supervisor or study director. The work of each editor was reviewed by the edit supervisor and/or a designated assistant to insure a consistent quality of data from this unit.

APPENDICES

1. NAME _____ TELEPHONE _____

INTERVIEW # _____ 1-4 ATT. DATES

ADDRESS (OF DESCRIPTION) _____

CITY _____ COUNTY _____ STATE _____

INTERVIEWER NAME _____

2. CALL RECORD: RECORD RESULTS OF EACH ATTEMPT USING CODE AT LEFT.

CALL NUMBER	ONE	TWO	THREE	FOUR	FIVE
DATE OF CALL					
HOUR OF CALL					
RESULTS					

1. VACANT
 2. NO ANSWER/NOT AT HOME
 3. RESPONDENT NOT AT HOME (MAKE APPOINTMENT FOR CALL BACK)
 4. HOUSE-OLD REFUSAL
 5. RESPONDENT REFUSAL
 6. INCOMPLETE INTERVIEW
 7. COMPLETE INTERVIEW

3. DETERMINE IF THERE IS MORE THAN ONE HOUSEHOLD AT THIS HOUSING UNIT AND CIRCLE ONE:

☐ ONE HOUSEHOLD☐ THERE ARE _____ HOUSEHOLDS

HAND OUT COVER SHEETS FOR EACH HOUSEHOLD. ADD TO ITEM #1 A SPECIFIC DESIGNATION (HOUSEHOLD #, HOUSEHOLD #) FOR EACH HOUSEHOLD AS WELL AS IDENTIFYING THE DWELLING ON EACH COVER SHEET. CONTINUE HANDLING FOR EACH HOUSEHOLD.

4. LIST BELOW ALL PERSONS LIVING IN THE HOUSEHOLD WHO ARE 18 YEARS OF OLDER:

(A) RELATIONS-IF TO, OF CONNECTION WITH HEAD	(B) SEX	(C) AGE	(D) CITIZEN (YES OR NO)	(E) NUMBER	(F) CIRCLED RESPONDENT
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD					

A - C. FILL IN ABOVE COLUMNS

D. ASK: "ARE THERE ANY OF THESE PERSONS WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS?" WRITE "NO" FOR ONES WHO ARE NOT AND "YES" FOR ALL CITIZENS.

E. ASSIGN A NUMBER TO EACH CITIZEN IN THE FOLLOWING ORDER: MALES FROM OLDEST TO YOUNGEST; THEN FEMALES FROM OLDEST TO YOUNGEST.

F. USE THE SELECTION TABLE AT THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE WHO TO INTERVIEW. IN THE FIRST COLUMN CIRCLE THE NUMBER OF ELIGIBLE RESPONDENTS. THE NUMBER ACROSS FROM IT IDENTIFIES THE PERSON TO BE INTERVIEWED. (CHECK THIS PERSON AS YOUR RESPONDENT IN COLUMN F.)

SELECTION TABLE ONE*

IF THE NUMBER OF ELIGIBLE PERSONS IS:	INTERVIEW THE PERSON NUMBERED:
ONE	1
TWO	2
THREE	3
FOUR	4
FIVE	5
SIX	6

*See subsequent page for selection information table two-twelve.

SELECTION TABLE TEN

IF THE NUMBER OF ELIGIBLE PERSONS IS:	INTERVIEW THE PERSON NUMBERED:
ONE	1
TWO	1
THREE	3
FOUR	3
FIVE	1
SIX	3

SELECTION TABLE SIX

IF THE NUMBER OF ELIGIBLE PERSONS IS:	INTERVIEW THE PERSON NUMBERED:
ONE	1
TWO	1
THREE	1
FOUR	3
FIVE	5
SIX	1

SELECTION TABLE TWO

IF THE NUMBER OF ELIGIBLE PERSONS IS:	INTERVIEW THE PERSON NUMBERED:
ONE	1
TWO	1
THREE	2
FOUR	3
FIVE	4
SIX	5

SELECTION TABLE ELEVEN

IF THE NUMBER OF ELIGIBLE PERSONS IS:	INTERVIEW THE PERSON NUMBERED:
ONE	1
TWO	2
THREE	2
FOUR	2
FIVE	1
SIX	2

SELECTION TABLE SEVEN

IF THE NUMBER OF ELIGIBLE PERSONS IS:	INTERVIEW THE PERSON NUMBERED:
ONE	1
TWO	2
THREE	3
FOUR	2
FIVE	4
SIX	6

SELECTION TABLE THREE

IF THE NUMBER OF ELIGIBLE PERSONS IS:	INTERVIEW THE PERSON NUMBERED:
ONE	1
TWO	2
THREE	1
FOUR	2
FIVE	3
SIX	4

SELECTION TABLE TWELVE

IF THE NUMBER OF ELIGIBLE PERSONS IS:	INTERVIEW THE PERSON NUMBERED:
ONE	1
TWO	1
THREE	1
FOUR	1
FIVE	2
SIX	1

SELECTION TABLE EIGHT

IF THE NUMBER OF ELIGIBLE PERSONS IS:	INTERVIEW THE PERSON NUMBERED:
ONE	1
TWO	1
THREE	2
FOUR	1
FIVE	3
SIX	5

SELECTION TABLE FOUR

IF THE NUMBER OF ELIGIBLE PERSONS IS:	INTERVIEW THE PERSON NUMBERED:
ONE	1
TWO	1
THREE	3
FOUR	1
FIVE	2
SIX	3

SELECTION TABLE NINE

IF THE NUMBER OF ELIGIBLE PERSONS IS:	INTERVIEW THE PERSON NUMBERED:
ONE	1
TWO	2
THREE	1
FOUR	4
FIVE	2
SIX	4

SELECTION TABLE FIVE

IF THE NUMBER OF ELIGIBLE PERSONS IS:	INTERVIEW THE PERSON NUMBERED:
ONE	1
TWO	2
THREE	2
FOUR	4
FIVE	1
SIX	1

Here is a simple scale. HAND RESPONDENT CARD 1. On this scale, zero stands for a situation in which there are no world tensions at all, and ten represents extreme tensions in the world. POINT TO THE NUMBERS WHILE EXPLAINING.

1. What number would you say best represents the level of world tensions just about now?

(ENTER NUMBER HERE OR
CODE 88 FOR "DON'T KNOW")

-
2. Which number on the card best represents the world tensions that you personally expect by about 1980--that is, just about two years from now?

(ENTER NUMBER HERE OR
CODE 88 FOR "DON'T KNOW")

-
3. And which number represents best your opinion as to world tensions just about two years ago in late 1976?

(ENTER NUMBER HERE OR
CODE 88 FOR "DON'T KNOW")

TAKE BACK CARD 1

Here is another card (HAND RESPONDENT CARD 2). Please tell me which of these statements best represents your opinion on the following issues:

4. How likely do you think it is that we're in for another big World War--one where nuclear weapons would be used? INTERVIEWER:
MARK "NEVER WILL HAPPEN" ONLY IF RESPONDENT GIVES SUCH AN ANSWER SPONTANEOUSLY.

Very likely.....1
Likely.....2
50-50 chance.....3
Unlikely.....4
Very unlikely.....5
Never will happen.....6
Don't know.....8

5. Between now and about 1985, how likely do you feel it is that a war will occur between China and the Soviet Union?

Very likely (ASK A)....1
Likely (ASK A).....2
50-50 Chance (ASK A)...3
Unlikely.....4
Very Unlikely.....5
Don't Know.....8

- A. (IF "VERY LIKELY," "LIKELY" or "50-50" TO Q.5): What do you feel the likelihood would be that the United States would be drawn into such a war, that is one between China and the Soviet Union?

Very likely.....1
Likely.....2
50-50 Chance.....3
Unlikely.....4
Very Unlikely.....5
Don't Know.....8

-
- 6.. Now we have a good number of nuclear power plants around the country to produce electricity. Other nuclear power plants are under construction and more of them may be built in the future. How likely is it that, between now and 1985, there would be a major accident at a nuclear power plant, that is, an accident which would release significant radioactive fallout?

Very likely.....1
Likely.....2
50-50 Chance.....3
Unlikely.....4
Very Unlikely.....5
Don't know.....8

-
7. How likely is it that some group of terrorists might take over a nuclear facility and threaten nearby communities unless they get their way. That is, how likely is it that an occupation of a nuclear power plant by terrorists to threaten the lives of people in the area would happen between now and 1985?

Very likely.....1
Likely.....2
50-50 Chance.....3
Unlikely.....4
Very unlikely.....5
Don't know.....8

8. Between now and 1985, how likely do you consider it to be that some group of terrorists will claim that they have constructed a nuclear weapon and that they will use it against a city or another community unless their demands are met? In other words, how likely is it that we might experience an American city to be hostage to terrorists armed with a nuclear device?

Very likely.....1
Likely.....2
50-50 Chance.....3
Unlikely.....4
Very unlikely.....5
Don't know.....8

TAKE BACK CARD 2

Let us go back to the problem of nuclear war for a moment...

9. If it were to come about at all, when do you suppose a nuclear war is most likely to happen? Within a year or tow, within about five years, within ten years, within twenty years, or more than twenty years from now? INTERVIEWER: MARK "NEVER WILL HAPPEN" ONLY IF RESPONDENT GIVES SUCH AN ANSWER SPONTANEOUSLY.

Year or two (1980)..... 1
Five years..... 2
Ten years..... 3
Twenty years..... 4
More than twenty years..... 5
Depends (Please Explain).... 6

Never will happen..... 7
Don't know..... 8

-
10. What kinds of things would have to happen for you to reach the conclusion that a nuclear war is almost sure to come? (PROBE.)

11. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD 3.) In your judgement, how much time would there be between your becoming pretty certain that a nuclear war is coming and the beginning of the war itself?

No time.....1
Minutes (15-30).....2
Hours.....3
About one day.....4
Two - three days.....5
A week or more.....6
Don't know.....8

TAKE BACK CARD 3

12. What are some of the main things that you would do in this period between concluding that a war is going to come and the actual start of the war? Please tell us what steps, if any at all, you and your family would take in such circumstances. (PROBE.)

Using this card (HAND RESPONDENT CARD 4) would you again please tell me which of the statements best represents your opinion on the following issues?

13. In case of nuclear war, how great a danger do you think there is that the area around here would be a target?

Certain danger (ASK A)..... 1
Great danger (ASK A)..... 2
Some danger (ASK A)..... 3
Little danger..... 4
No danger at all..... 5
Don't know..... 8

- A. (IF "CERTAIN", "GREAT" OR "SOME DANGER" TO Q.13):
What is it around here that would make this area a target? INTERVIEWER: RECORD AS MANY ANSWERS AS RESPONDENT GIVES. IF RESPONDENT GIVES AN ANSWER WHICH DOES NOT INDICATE A FUNCTION, PROBE. FOR EXAMPLE, IF RESPONDENT SAYS "JONES", PROBE FOR "JONES AIR FORCE BASE", ETC.

14. If a nuclear war occurred and this area itself was not the target of a direct attack, how great a danger do you think there would be from fallout around here?

Certain danger.....1
Great danger.....2
Some danger.....3
Little danger.....4
No danger at all.....5
Don't know.....8

TAKE BACK CARD 4

Now with this card (HAND RESPONDENT CARD 5), please indicate which of the statements comes closest to your opinion on these issues:

15. If a nuclear war started next week, how good are the chances that people around here would survive?

Very good.....1
Fairly good.....2
50-50 Chance.....3
Fairly bad.....4
Very bad.....5
Don't know.....8

-
16. How good would the chances be that people in this area would survive if they were in fallout shelters?

Very good.....1
Fairly good.....2
50-50 Chance.....3
Fairly bad.....4
Very bad.....5
Don't know.....8

TAKE BACK CARD 5

-
17. In general, how do you yourself feel about public fallout shelters—are you strongly in favor of them, somewhat in favor, somewhat opposed, or strongly opposed to them?

Strongly favor.....1
Somewhat favor.....2
Somewhat opposed.....3
Strongly opposed.....4
Don't know.....8

18. Around here, do you feel that shelters against radioactive fallout would be enough or do you believe that there ought to be stronger shelters constructed that could help protect people against the primary effects of nuclear weapons as well; that is, against blast?

Fallout shelters 1
Blast shelters needed..... 2
Depends (PLEASE EXPLAIN)..... 3

Don't know 8

-
19. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD 5): How good would the chances be that people in this area would survive if they were in blast shelters?

Very good 1
Fairly good..... 2
50-50 chance..... 3
Fairly bad..... 4
Very bad..... 5
Don't know..... 8

TAKE BACK CARD 5

20. How do you feel about nuclear power plants? Are you strongly in favor, somewhat in favor, somewhat opposed or strongly opposed to the construction of new nuclear power plants to produce electricity around the country?

Strongly favor.....1
Somewhat favor.....2
Somewhat opposed.....3
Strongly opposed.....4
Don't know.....8

21. How about a nuclear power plant in this area? That is, within a 50-mile radius from here? Are you strongly in favor, somewhat in favor, somewhat opposed or strongly opposed to having such a plant nearby?

Strongly favor.....1
Somewhat favor.....2
Somewhat opposed.....3
Strongly opposed.....4
Don't know.....8

22. To your knowledge is there a nuclear power plant within about 50 miles from here?

Yes.....1
No (ASK A).....2
Don't know.....8

- A. (IF "NO" TO Q.22): Is one being built or planned for this general area?

Yes.....1
No.....2
Don't know.....8

23. Have you heard the suggestion that some home basements might be useful as protection against the effects of nuclear fallout?

Yes.....1
No.....2

24. Have you heard anything about how much fallout protection basements give or about how to make them more useful as fallout shelters?

Yes.....1
No.....2

25. Is there a basement in this house (apartment building)?

Yes (ASK A & B).....1
No.....2
Don't know.....8

A. (IF "YES" TO Q. 25): Have you ever thought about using the basement as a fallout shelter in case of nuclear attack?

Yes.....1
No.....2

B. (IF "YES" TO Q. 25): Have you ever obtained information about the possibility of using the basement as a fallout shelter?

Yes.....1
No.....2

Now actually quite a few private homes around the country have basements, or for that matter, other parts of the house which would provide good protection against fallout. In many cases, these places could possibly handle more people than just those living in the house; that is, they could provide fallout shelter for others in addition to the family or household members.

26. How would you feel about a national program to make such spaces in private homes available to other people in the event of nuclear attack on the United States? Would you strongly favor, favor, neither favor nor oppose, oppose, or strongly oppose such a program?

Strongly favor.....1
Favor.....2
Neither.....3
Oppose.....4
Strongly oppose.....5
Don't know.....8

27. How do you suppose most private home owners around the country might feel? Again, would most of them strongly favor such a program, favor it, neither favor nor oppose it, oppose it, or strongly oppose it?

Strongly favor.....1
Favor.....2
Neither.....3
Oppose.....4
Strongly oppose.....5
Don't know.....8

28. Suppose local civil defense people were to include private home basements in an overall plan in the community. That is, they would use all public shelter spaces as well as such private homes with, of course, the approval of the owners. They would then actually assign people to specific shelters in the event of a nuclear attack. How would you feel about this? Would you strongly favor, favor, neither favor nor oppose, oppose or strongly oppose the assigning of people to specific home shelter spaces?

Strongly favor.....1
Favor.....2
Neither.....3
Oppose.....4
Strongly oppose.....5
Don't know.....8

ASK THE FOLLOWING THREE QUESTIONS ONLY OF THOSE PEOPLE WITH BASEMENTS AND IN PRIVATE (ONE OR TWO FAMILY) HOMES (ALL OTHERS, SKIP TO Q.32).

29. Would you personally allow your basement to be used as a fallout shelter for other people? That is, would you definitely permit it to be used, probably permit it, probably not permit it, or definitely would not permit it?

Definitely yes.....1
Probably yes.....2
Undecided.....3
Probably not.....4
Definitely not.....5
Don't know.....8

-
30. How about the possibility of putting a sign on your home to make sure people would know they could find fallout protection here? Would you definitely, probably, probably not, or definitely not permit this?

Definitely yes.....1
Probably yes.....2
Undecided.....3
Probably not.....4
Definitely not.....5
Don't know.....8

-
31. And how about having specific people assigned to your home; that is, people who would know that they are supposed to come here to be protected against fallout in the event of an attack? Again, would you definitely permit this, probably permit this, probably not permit this, or definitely not permit this?

Definitely yes.....1
Probably yes.....2
Undecided.....3
Probably not.....4
Definitely not.....5
Don't Know.....8

ASK EVERYONE:

32. It has been suggested that households might benefit from an inexpensive emergency warning device attached to a radio or television set. In other words, it would turn the set on to warn you against major natural disasters or in the event of a nuclear war. How do you feel about this? That is, are you strongly in favor, in favor, undecided, opposed, or strongly opposed to this suggestion?

Strongly in favor (ASK A)...1
Favor (ASK A).....2
Undecided (ASK A).....3
Opposed.....4
Strongly opposed.....5
Don't know.....8

- A. (IF "STRONGLY FAVOR," "FAVOR" OR "UNDECIDED" TO Q. 32): If you thought it was a good idea to purchase such a device, what is the most you would be willing to spend for it? RECORD VERBATIM THE AMOUNT IN DOLLARS AND CENTS.

\$ _____

Don't know.....8888

-
33. If a call went out for volunteers to participate in a community Civil Defense Program, would you definitely volunteer, probably volunteer, probably not, or definitely not volunteer?

Definitely yes.....1
Probably yes.....2
Undecided (ASK A).....3
Probably not (ASK A).....4
Definitely not (ASK A).....5
Don't know.....8

- A. (IF "PROBABLY NOT," "DEFINITELY NOT" OR "UNDECIDED" TO Q. 33): There are lots of reasons why a person might find it difficult to volunteer, or might not want to. What are some of the main reasons in your case? RECORD VERBATIM.

ASK EVERYONE:

34. In the past 12 months, have you been involved in any voluntary work, that is, activities for which you do not get paid and that are done for people outside of your immediate family or circle of close relatives?

Yes (ASK A & B).....1
No.....2

- A. (IF "YES" TO Q. 34): Approximately how many hours overall would you say you spent doing voluntary work during the past 12 months? RECORD VERBATIM.

- B. (IF "YES" TO Q. 34): What kinds of voluntary activities were you involved in? RECORD VERBATIM.

35. Have you or any member of your household received training or education in activities related to emergencies or natural disasters? I will ask a few questions about such activities. Please indicate whether you personally or another member of the household have undergone such training.

	<u>Respondent</u>	<u>Other Household Members</u>
A. First Aid	Yes (ASK A).....1 No.....2 Don't Know.....8	Yes (ASK A).....1 No.....2 Don't know.....8
	A. (IF "YES" TO FIRST AID): Who or what organization provided this training or education? RECORD VERBATIM.	A. (IF "YES" TO FIRST AID): Who or what organization provided this training or education? RECORD VERBATIM.
	_____ _____ _____	_____ _____ _____

	<u>Respondent</u>	<u>Other Household Members</u>
B. Radiological Monitoring	Yes (ASK A).....1 No.....2 Don't know.....8 A. (IF "YES" TO <u>RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING</u>): Who or what organization provided this training or education? RECORD VERBATIM. _____ _____ _____ _____	Yes (ASK A).....1 No.....2 Don't know.....8 A. (IF "YES" TO <u>RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING</u>): Who or what organization provided this training or education? RECORD VERBATIM. _____ _____ _____ _____
C. Shelter Management	Yes (ASK A).....1 No.....2 Don't know.....8 A. (IF "YES" TO <u>SHELTER MANAGEMENT</u>): Who or what organiza- tion provided this training or education? RECORD VERBATIM. _____ _____ _____ _____	Yes (ASK A).....1 No.....2 Don't know.....8 A. (IF "YES" TO <u>SHELTER MANAGEMENT</u>): Who or what organiza- tion provided this training or education? RECORD VERBATIM. _____ _____ _____ _____
D. What to do in the event of nuclear attack	Yes (ASK A).....1 No.....2 Don't Know.....8 A. (IF "YES" TO WHAT <u>TO DO IN THE EVENT OF NUCLEAR ATTACK</u>): Who or what organiza- tion provided this training or education? RECORD VERBATIM. _____ _____ _____ _____	Yes (ASK A).....1 No.....2 Don't know.....8 A. (IF "YES" TO WHAT <u>TO DO IN THE EVENT OF NUCLEAR ATTACK</u>): Who or what organiza- tion provided this training or education? RECORD VERBATIM. _____ _____ _____ _____

	<u>Respondent</u>	<u>Other Household Members</u>
E. Any other emergency or disaster-related training or education?	Yes (ASK A & B).....1 No.....2 Don't know.....8	Yes (ASK A & B).....1 No.....2 Don't know.....8
	A. (IF "YES" TO OTHER EMERGENCY OR DISASTER-RELATED TRAINING OR EDUCATION): Who or what organization provided this training or education? RECORD VERBATIM.	A. (IF "YES" TO OTHER EMERGENCY OR DISASTER-RELATED TRAINING OR EDUCATION): Who or what organization provided this training or education? RECORD VERBATIM.
	_____	_____
	_____	_____
	_____	_____
	_____	_____
	B. (IF "YES" TO OTHER EMERGENCY OR DISASTER-RELATED TRAINING OR EDUCATION): What kind of training was it? RECORD VERBATIM.	B. (IF "YES" TO OTHER EMERGENCY OR DISASTER-RELATED TRAINING OR EDUCATION): What kind of training was it? RECORD VERBATIM.
	_____	_____
	_____	_____
	_____	_____
	_____	_____

36. If there were an opportunity to be trained or educated regarding problems of emergencies or natural disaster, how likely is it that you or another member of your household would get such training or education? Please tell me whether you or another member of the household would be definitely willing, probably willing, probably not willing, or definitely not willing to get such training or whether the chances are about 50-50 that you or a household member would do so?

	<u>A. Respondent</u>	<u>Other household member</u>
Definitely willing	1	1
Probably willing	2	2
50-50	3	3
Probably not willing	4	4
Definitely not willing	5	5
Don't know	8	8

37. How do you feel about a program in our schools to educate children and young people about various emergencies and what to do in the event of a disaster or nuclear war? Would you be strongly in favor, in favor, opposed or strongly opposed to providing the nation's young people with such education as part of their school program?

Strongly favor.....1
Favor.....2
Oppose (ASK A).....3
Strongly oppose (ASK A).....4
Depends (Please explain).....5

Don't know.....8

- A. (IF "OPPOSE" OR "STRONGLY OPPOSE" TO Q. 37): What are some of the main reasons why you would not be in favor of such educational efforts in our schools? RECORD VERBATIM.

Now using this card (HAND RESPONDENT CARD 6), please tell me which of these statements best represents your opinion on these issues:

38. Right now, how would you compare the Soviet Union and the United States regarding strategic offensive weapons designed for attack purposes. Would you say the Soviet Union is much stronger, stronger, weaker, or much weaker than the United States? Or are they about equal in strength?

Much stronger.....1
Stronger.....2
Both about equal.....3
Weaker.....4
Much weaker.....5
Don't know.....8

39. How about defensive weapons--those designed only for defending against an attack? Again, at the present time, do you feel the Soviet Union is much stronger, stronger, weaker, or much weaker than the United States in overall defensive strength? Or are they about equal?

Much stronger.....1
Stronger.....2
Both about equal.....3
Weaker.....4
Much weaker.....5
Don't know.....8

40. Similarly, both countries have civil defense programs that are designed to protect people in the event of an attack. From what you know, do you feel the Soviet Union's civil defense efforts today are much stronger, stronger, about equal, weaker, or much weaker than the efforts of the United States?

Much stronger.....1
Stronger.....2
Both about equal.....3
Weaker.....4
Much weaker.....5
Don't know.....8

TAKE BACK CARD 6

41. Here is another simple card. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD 7). I would like to ask you a few questions about how much money you think we, as a country, are spending on a few programs. The card shows the amount in dollars and cents to indicate what you think we are spending per each man, woman and child for one year. It also shows the approximate total amount for one year to give you an idea of how much the dollars and cents come to when you add them up for our whole population. NOTE TO INTERVIEWER: READ Q'S 41 A-C FIRST, THEN GO TO Q's 41 D-F. PLEASE HAVE THE RESPONDENT INDICATE WHICH LETTER ON THE CARD BEST REPRESENTS HIS OR HER OPINION. IF THE RESPONDENT STATES AN AMOUNT, FOR EXAMPLE, BETWEEN TWO LETTERS, CIRCLE THE APPROPRIATE CODE (AS IN "BETWEEN A AND B").

A. Using this card, how much do you believe we spent last year on civil defense programs? Which letter on the card best represents the approximate amount you think we spent?

A.....00
a-b.....01
B.....02
b-c.....03
C.....04
c-d.....05
D.....06
d-e.....07
E.....08
e-f.....09
F.....10
f-g.....11
G.....12
g-h.....13
H.....14
h-i.....15
I.....16
i-j.....17
J.....18
j-k.....19
K.....20
Don't know.....88

B. How about foreign aid? How much do you think we spend last year on foreign aid programs, not including programs that are entirely military in character.

A.....00
a-b.....01
B.....02
b-c.....03
C.....04
c-d.....05
D.....06
d-e.....07
E.....08
e-f.....09
F.....10
f-g.....11
G.....12
g-h.....13
H.....14
h-i.....15
I.....16
i-j.....17
J.....18
j-k.....19
K.....20
Don't know.....88

C. And about how much did we spend on anti-poverty programs last year?

A.....00
a-b.....01
B.....02
b-c.....03
C.....04
c-d.....05
D.....06
d-e.....07
E.....08
e-f.....09
F.....10
f-g.....11
G.....12
g-h.....13
H.....14
h-i.....15
I.....16
i-j.....17
J.....18
j-k.....19
K.....20
Don't know.....88

CARD #7	
<u>For each man, woman, and child per year</u>	<u>Approximate total per year</u>
A. \$ 0	A. \$ 0 dollars
B. \$.05	B. \$ 10 million
C. \$.10	C. \$ 20 million
D. \$.25	D. \$ 50 million
E. \$.50	E. \$100 million
F. \$ 1.00	F. \$200 million
G. \$ 2.00	G. \$400 million
H. \$ 5.00	H. \$ 1 billion
I. \$10.00	I. \$ 2 billion
J. \$25.00	J. \$ 5 billion
K. \$50.00	K. \$ 10 billion

D. Now, using the same card how much do you think we ought to spend every year on civil defense programs?

A.....00
a-b.....01
B.....02
b-c.....03
C.....04
c-d.....05
D.....06
d-e.....07
E.....08
e-f.....09
F.....10
f-g.....11
G.....12
g-h.....13
H.....14
h-i.....15
I.....16
i-j.....17
J.....18
j-k.....19
K.....20
Don't know.....88

E. Again, how much do you think we ought to spend on foreign aid programs, not including military programs?

A.....00
a-b.....01
B.....02
b-c.....03
C.....04
c-d.....05
D.....06
d-e.....07
E.....08
e-f.....09
F.....10
f-g.....11
G.....12
g-h.....13
H.....14
h-i.....15
I.....16
i-j.....17
J.....18
j-k.....19
K.....20
Don't know.....88

F. Finally, how much do you think we should spend on anti-poverty programs?

A.....00
a-b.....01
B.....02
b-c.....03
C.....04
c-d.....05
D.....06
d-e.....07
E.....08
e-f.....09
F.....10
f-g.....11
G.....12
g-h.....13
H.....14
h-i.....15
I.....16
i-j.....17
J.....18
j-k.....19
K.....20
Don't know.....88

TAKE BACK CARD 7

42. Next I'm going to read you some statements about situations which may exist in our nation's civil defense. Not all of them are likely to come about. Regardless of their likelihood, please tell me how much you personally would like to see each one happen or not happen. We will use a simple scale (HAND RESPONDENT CARD 8), where minus three indicates you would find the situation highly undesirable, zero indicates you neither favor nor oppose it, and plus three indicates you would find the situation highly desirable. (READ STATEMENTS A THROUGH F AND CIRCLE THE APPROPRIATE CODE NEXT TO EACH STATEMENT).

A. Let's assume that all available spaces in public buildings which provide good protection against fallout will be marked as shelters and stocked with everything necessary for survival. How desirable would that be?

-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	DK
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	DK
B. Suppose all <u>private homes</u> would be surveyed as possible fallout shelters and the owners informed if their home qualifies as a shelter or provided with the necessary information to bring it up to standards for protection. How desirable do you feel that would be?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
C. Let's assume there would be a program for the Federal government to pay the additional cost of putting fallout shelters in buildings constructed by non-profit organizations such as hospitals and schools. How desirable would that be?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
D. Suppose, in tense situations which might precede a war, it were the government's policy to evacuate the populations of large cities and communities near military installations. How desirable do you feel that would be?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
E. How desirable would it be for the Government to have a program to build blast shelters, that is, shelters that could protect people against the primary, or direct, effects of nuclear weapons as well as against fallout?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
F. Suppose the Federal Government decided to end the civil defense program entirely. How desirable would that be?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

43. Now using the same desirability card as we did just now (KEEP USING CARD 8), I would like to ask you a few questions on disarmament. If our government decided to sign a general disarmament treaty, there are probably some conditions that you would want our country to insist upon. Taking one condition at a time how desirable is it that it be met before our country actually signs a treaty. READ STATEMENT A THROUGH K AND CIRCLE APPROPRIATE CODE NEXT TO EACH STATEMENT.

	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	DK
A. A safe and secure inspection system operated by the United Nations or by inspection teams from opposing nations (for example, the U.S. would inspect Russia and they would inspect us).	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B. Each nation having an army that is only large enough to maintain internal order.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
C. A U.N. Police Force controlling enough nuclear weapons to be the strongest army in the world.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Now I'm going to ask some questions about possible <u>partial</u> disarmament agreements that the United States could make with other nations. Please tell me how desirable you think each one would be.								
D. Eliminate all nuclear tests, including underground tests.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
E. Prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to those countries that do not have them now.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
F. Agree with the Soviets to decrease the number of nuclear weapons they, and ourselves, already have?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	DK
G. All of the nuclear powers agree to maintain not more than the number of nuclear bombs and missiles that they have now.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
H. Agree with all nations to stop all shipments of conventional arms to all other nations.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
I. Agree with Russia to have no antimissile missiles (ABM's) at all.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
J. Agree with Russia not to have any programs of Civil Defense; that is, programs to protect civilian populations against nuclear attack.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
K. Agree with all nuclear powers to destroy all of their bombs and missiles; that is, to do away with all bombs and missiles already in existence.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

TAKE BACK CARD 8

44. Here is another card (HAND RESPONDENT CARD 2). How likely do you consider it to be that major progress in arms control between ourselves and the Soviets will be made in the next couple of years—by about 1980?

Very likely.....1
Likely.....2
50-50 Chance.....3
Unlikely.....4
Very Unlikely.....5
Don't know.....8

45. And how likely is major progress in arms control by 1985? (USE CARD 2)

Very likely.....1
Likely.....2
50-50 Chance.....3
Unlikely.....4
Very unlikely.....5
Don't know.....8

TAKE BACK CARD 2

Now I'd like to spend a few moments talking about still another matter.

46. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD 9) Suppose there were a major international crisis and it seemed very likely that it might lead directly into a nuclear war. Would you (and your family) be inclined to evacuate your place of residence and go somewhere else under these circumstances?

Definitely yes (ASK A, B & C).....1
Probably yes (ASK A, B & C).....2
Undecided, depends (ASK A, B & C)..3
Probably no.....4
Definitely no.....5
Other (RECORD VERBATIM).....6

Don't know.....8

- A. (IF "DEFINITELY YES", "PROBABLY YES" OR "UNDECIDED" TO Q.46):
Where would you go to should you decide to leave your place of residence during a crisis of this kind?

- B. (IF "DEFINITELY YES", "PROBABLY YES" OR "UNDECIDED" TO Q.46):
About how far is that from here?

- C. (IF "DEFINITELY YES", "PROBABLY YES" OR "UNDECIDED" TO Q.46): Why
would you go to that place (area) rather than somewhere else?

TAKE BACK CARD 9

47. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD 10) Now when you think about your friends
here and people in this community (area) in general, how many of
them do you believe would evacuate their residence and go some-
where else should there be a major crisis and a big war seemed very
likely? What percentage would represent your best guess?

TAKE BACK CARD 10

48. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD 9) Suppose now you were to hear or read that
the Russians began evacuating their cities and other unsafe areas.
How would this affect your own thinking? Would you be likely to
leave your place of residence and go somewhere else until the
situation would change?

Definitely yes.....1
Probably yes.....2
Depends, undecided.....3
Probably no.....4
Definitely no.....5
Don't know.....8

TAKE BACK CARD 9

49. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD 10) And what percentage of other people in
this community (area) do you think would evacuate if it were known
that the Russians asked their own people to leave the cities?

TAKE BACK CARD 10

50. As best you can tell, do the Soviets have actual plans to evacuate their cities or other risk areas in the event of a crisis and a war threat?

Yes.....1
Unsure.....2
No.....3
Don't know.....8

51. Can you imagine any situation in which the President of the United States would ask people to evacuate the cities and perhaps some other areas of the country?

Yes1
Unsure.....2
No.....3
Don't know.....8

52. As best you know, do we in America have actual plans to evacuate cities and other risk areas in the event of a crisis in which war seems very likely?

Yes1
Unsure.....2
No.....3
Don't know.....8

53. Should we have such plans? (HAND RESPONDENT CARD 9)

Definitely yes.....1
Probably yes.....2
Undecided, depends....3
Probably no.....4
Definitely no.....5
Don't know.....8

54. (USE CARD 9): If all the people in this area were to evacuate and go somewhere else because of the chance of nuclear war, would there be enough time for all of them to do so; that is, from the time a nuclear war is viewed as pretty certain to the beginning of the war itself?

Definitely yes.....1
Probably yes.....2
Undecided, depends....3
Probably no.....4
Definitely no.....5
Don't know.....8

55. Suppose now that the President would urge evacuation or relocation of our people. Would you and your family leave your place of residence and evacuate under these circumstances, that is, after the President had announced such action?

Definitely yes.....1
Probably yes.....2
Undecided, depends.....3
Probably no.....4
Definitely no.....5
Don't know.....8

TAKE BACK CARD 9

56. If you chose to leave, would you follow instructions as to where to go or would you want to evacuate to a place of your own choice?

Instructions.....1
Choice.....2
Don't know.....8

N. A. ...

-
57. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD 10) Now what approximate percentage of the people in this community (area) would evacuate if the President strongly recommended that people do so?

TAKE BACK CARD 10

58. Now some people might not evacuate no matter what, that is, either on their own or even should the President urge people to relocate. What do you suppose would be the main reasons why people might not leave?
RECORD VERBATIM.

59. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD 5) In general, how good would the chances be that people in this area would survive if they were evacuated to another location some distance away?

Very Good1
Fairly Good.....2
Fifty-Fifty.....3
Fairly Bad.....4
Very Bad.....5
Don't know.....8

TAKE BACK CARD 5

60. Here is another card (HAND RESPONDENT CARD 11). Suppose evacuation, or crisis relocation, were necessary and people would have to go to assigned places. One way to assign people would be to ask them to evacuate on a neighborhood basis. Another way to assign people would be to have them evacuate from their work place or some other organization to which they may belong. If you had a choice, would it be better for you and your family to be assigned to a place with your neighbors or to be assigned with people from your work place or some other organization?

Neighborhood1
Work.....2
Other Organization (ASK A)..3
Makes no difference.....4
Don't Know.....8

- A. (IF "OTHER ORGANIZATION" TO Q.60) Which organization(s) might that be? RECORD VERBATIM.

61. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD 12) Now if people from our cities and other risk areas were actually relocated, they would find themselves in various other communities for the duration of the evacuation. How do you suppose people in these communities to which evacuees would come to, that is, in these host communities, would react?

Very helpful.....1
Somewhat helpful.....2
Neither.....3
Somewhat unhelpful.....4
Very unhelpful.....5
Don't know.....8

62. Suppose you and your family were in an area which did not have to be evacuated and which, in fact, became a host area for evacuees from elsewhere. How helpful or unhelpful would people be in this community to the evacuees?

Very helpful.....1
Somewhat helpful.....2
Neither.....3
Somewhat unhelpful.....4
Very unhelpful.....5
Don't know.....8

TAKE BACK CARD 12

63. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD 9) In the host areas in general, would people be willing to have the evacuees stay in their homes even if it meant that they might have to stay there for a couple of weeks?

Definitely yes.....1
Probably yes.....2
Undecided.....3
Probably no.....4
Definitely no.....5
Don't know.....8

64. If this community and this area were to receive evacuees, rather than being itself relocated, how about the people around here? Would most be willing to have evacuees stay in their homes for two weeks?

Definitely yes.....1
Probably yes.....2
Undecided.....3
Probably no.....4
Definitely no.....5
Don't know.....8

65. Would you (and your family) be willing to have evacuees stay at your place of residence?

Definitely yes (ASK A).....1
Probably yes (ASK A).....2
Depends (ASK A).....3
Probably no (ASK B).....4
Definitely no (ASK B).....5
Don't Know.....8

- A. (IF "DEFINITELY YES," "PROBABLY YES," "DEPENDS" TO Q.65): About how many people would you consider accommodating? Would it be one, two or even more families? RECORD VERBATIM.
-

- B. (IF "PROBABLY NO" OR "DEFINITELY NO" TO Q.65): There are many reason why people may be unable to help in this manner. And they have, of course, every right to make that choice. Why might you be disinclined to have evacuees stay with you at your place of residence? RECORD VERBATIM
-
-
-

TAKE BACK CARD 9

66. Under some circumstances, it might be best to evacuate people into the countryside where there are only a few others living. Many people in those relatively uninhabited areas of the country would be, of course, farmers. How do you feel about the way farmers and other people in the most rural areas would react to people who would be relocated there? Would they definitely help, probably help, probably not help or definitely not help?

Definitely help.....1
Probably help.....2
Undecided.....3
Probably not help.....4
Definitely not help.....5
Don't know.....8

-
67. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD 9) If you and your family were to evacuate into the countryside and not be able to stay at someone's house or farm, how able do you feel you would be to manage? Would you be able to deal with the situation, that is, live with your family in the countryside and off the land, even for a couple of weeks?

Definitely yes.....1
Probably yes.....2
Undecided.....3
Probably no.....4
Definitely no.....5
Don't know.....8

TAKE BACK CARD 9

-
68. In the evacuated areas, some essential services may have to continue. For example, policing or firefighting, some of the main utilities, some of the major industrial activities and the like. Some people then would have to be designated as critical workers because their occupations would be essential even if there were large scale relocation of our people. On this card (HAND RESPONDENT CARD 13) are listed some of the main options. First of all please look them over.

- A. Which one do you think would be the best one?
B. And which one would be the second best one?
C. How about the option that you consider to be the worst?
D. And the next worst one?

	A Best	B Second Best	C Worst	D Second Worst
1. Evacuate critical workers and their families and have critical workers commute back and forth to maintain essential services.....1		1	1	1
2. Evacuate only families of critical workers, urge the critical workers to stay and maintain essential services and provide full protection for them against blast as well as fallout.....2		2	2	2
3. Evacuate only families of critical workers, urge the critical workers in the areas to stay and maintain essential services and evacuate them at the last moment, that is, if the danger of nuclear attack becomes imminent.....3		3	3	3
4. Urge critical workers and their families in the evacuated areas to stay and maintain essential services and provide full protection for them against blast and fallout.....4		4	4	4
5. Urge critical workers and their families in the evacuated areas to stay and maintain essential services and make plans to evacuate them at the last possible moment.....5		5	5	5

69. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD 10) Suppose critical workers as well as their families were asked to evacuate. Approximately what percentage of people designated as critical workers would be willing to commute between the host area and the area they evacuated in order to maintain essential services and activities?

TAKE BACK CARD 10

70. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD 14) Now some of the things on this card may apply to you and others may not. Please tell me all that apply to you.

Do you have:	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>
A. A cottage or summer home within about 100 miles from here?	1	2	8
B. A cottage or summer home within about 200 miles from here?	1	2	8
C. A camping site or similar place within about 100 miles?	1	2	8
D. A camping site or similar place within about 200 miles?	1	2	8
E. Relatives or friends with whom you could stay who live within about 100 miles but not in a city area?	1	2	8
F. Relatives or friends with whom you could stay who live within about 200 miles but not in a city?	1	2	8
G. A family car, or cars, in which you could evacuate if you should do so?	1	2	8
H. A camper or similar equipment which you could take along if you were to evacuate?	1	2	8
I. Camping equipment (tents and the like)?	1	2	8
J. A boat which could be taken some miles away from land?	1	2	8

TAKE BACK CARD 14

71. If you and your family had to leave your home today, for how long, approximately, could you manage on the food items that you would take along, without having to buy anything?

72. Are there, however, food items you would definitely want to buy before you would leave?

Yes (ASK A).....1
No.....2
Don't know.....8

A. (IF "YES" TO Q. 72): What are some of the main items you would want to buy? (RECORD VERBATIM)

73. Is anyone in this family in need of regular medications or drugs of any kind?

Yes (ASK A).....1
No.....2
Don't know.....8

A. (IF "YES" TO Q. 73) : How long would your current supply of these needed medicines last without having to buy new ones?
INTERVIEWER: IF SEVERAL MEDICATIONS ARE MENTIONED, PROBE FOR THE ONE IN SHORTEST SUPPLY.

74. Right now, would you have money readily available that would be enough for you and your family to stay somewhere for two weeks, if you did not have to pay for accommodations? That is, would you have enough cash that you could get today to manage for about two weeks?

Yes.....1
No.....2
Depends (Explain, Please).....3

Don't Know.....8.

75. If you were to evacuate your place of residence today, what items other than food or medicine would you take along? RECORD VERBATIM.

Don't know (SKIP TO Q. 77)....88

76. Would you have to go and buy some of these items first?

Yes (ASK A).....1
No.....2
Don't know.....8

- A. (IF "YES" TO Q. 76): Which ones would you have to go out and buy? RECORD VERBATIM

- 77.. Do you have a car or cars?

Yes (ASK A, B & C).....1
No (GO TO Q. 78).....2

- A. (IF "YES" TO Q. 77): How many?

- B. (IF "YES" TO Q. 77): How much gasoline is there in the car you consider to be your main family car right now? What is your best estimate? Is the tank full? Three-quarters full? About half-full? Only about a quarter full? Or almost empty?

- C. (IF "YES" TO Q. 77): About how many miles would you be able to travel without having to refill your car?

(GO TO Q. 79)

78. IF RESPONDENT (FAMILY) DOES NOT HAVE A CAR ("NO" TO Q. 77)

If you were to leave your place of residence to relocate, would you rely on friends, relatives, or neighbors to take you and your family along in their car or would you use public transportation that would be made available for that purpose?

Friend's, relative's, neighbor's car.....1
Public transportation.....2

ASK EVERYONE:

79. Do you have any pets in the house, that is, cats or dogs and the like?

Yes (ASK A & B).....1
No.....2

A. (IF "YES" TO Q. 79): What pet(s) do you have:

B. (IF "YES" TO Q. 79): Would you take your (Dog(s), Cat(s), etc.) with you if you were evacuating?

Yes.....1
Depends.....2
No.....3
Don't Know.....8

Now I'd like to turn to a very few more questions of a different kind.

80. Have you ever had a direct experience with a tornado?

Yes (ASK A, B, & C).....1
No.....2

A. (IF "YES" TO Q. 80): When did that happen? RECORD YEAR

B. (IF "YES" TO Q. 80): Where was it? RECORD PLACE AND STATE

C. (IF "YES" TO Q. 80): What happened? Would you, please, briefly describe this experience including any damage that you or your family may have suffered.

81. Have you ever had a direct experience with a flood?

Yes (ASK A, B, C).....1

No.....2

A. (IF "YES" TO Q. 81): When did this happen? RECORD YEAR.

B. (IF "YES" TO Q. 81): Where was it? RECORD PLACE AND STATE

C. (IF "YES" TO Q. 81): What happened? Would you, please, briefly describe this experience?

82. Have you ever had a direct experience with a hurricane?

Yes (ASK A, B, C).....1

No.....2

A. (IF "YES" TO Q. 82): When did this happen? RECORD YEAR

B. (IF "YES" TO Q. 82): Where was that? RECORD PLACE AND STATE

C. (IF "YES" TO Q. 82): What happened? Would you, please, briefly describe this experience?

83. Have you ever had a direct experience with an earthquake?

Yes (ASK A, B, C).....1

No.....2

A. (IF "YES" TO Q. 83): When did this happen? RECORD YEAR

B. (IF "YES" TO Q. 83): Where was that? RECORD PLACE AND STATE

C. (IF "YES" TO Q. 83): What happened? Would you, please, briefly describe this experience?

84. Have you ever had a direct experience with any other major disaster, whether natural or manmade? That is, disasters other than earthquakes, hurricanes, tornados or floods?

Yes (ASK A, B, C, D).....1

No.....2

A. (IF "YES" TO Q. 84): What was (were) the disaster(s) you are referring to?

B. (IF "YES" TO Q. 84): When did it happen? RECORD YEAR(S)

C. (IF "YES" TO Q. 84): Where was that? RECORD PLACE(S) AND STATE(S)

- D. (IF "YES" TO Q. 84): Would you, please, give me a brief description of this (these) experience(s).

85. Did you or your family ever have to evacuate your home?

Yes (ASK A, B, C).....1

No.....2

- A. (IF "YES" TO Q. 85): How did this come about?

- B. (IF "YES" TO Q. 85): Where did you go? INTERVIEWER: PROBE FOR
DISTANCE FROM HOME.

- C. (IF "YES" TO Q. 85): How long a time was it before you were able to return to your residence?

86. Have you ever been in a situation in which you provided temporary housing for other people, whether individuals or families, who had to evacuate their home(s)?

Yes (ASK A, B, C, D)...1

No.....2

A. (IF "YES" TO Q. 86): How did this happen?

B. (IF "YES" TO Q. 86): When was that? RECORD YEAR.

C. (IF "YES" TO Q. 86): Where did this take place? RECORD PLACE AND STATE

D. (IF "YES" TO Q. 86): On the whole, what was your experience in this situation?

87. I have only a very few more questions. People have different amounts of information about various things. On this card (HAND RESPONDENT CARD 15) is a scale from zero to 10. Ten stands for a great deal of information. Zero, of course, stands for no information at all.

- A. Using any appropriate number on this scale, how would you characterize the amount of information you have about the overall world situation?

(ENTER NUMBER HERE OR
CODE 88 FOR "DON'T KNOW")

- B. About the economy in America?

(ENTER NUMBER HERE OR
CODE 88 FOR "DON'T KNOW")

- C. About national defense in general:

(ENTER NUMBER HERE OR
CODE 88 FOR "DON'T KNOW")

- D. About the Soviet Union?

(ENTER NUMBER HERE OR
CODE 88 FOR "DON'T KNOW")

- E. About civil defense in America?

(ENTER NUMBER HERE OR
CODE 88 FOR "DON'T KNOW")

- F. About the energy situation?

(ENTER NUMBER HERE OR
CODE 88 FOR "DON'T KNOW")

TAKE BACK CARD 15

88. Have you seen, heard or read anything in the mass media concerning Civil Defense in the past few months? INTERVIEWER: RECORD AS MANY ANSWERS AS RESPONDENT VOLUNTEERS. DO NOT PROBE. IF RESPONDENT ANSWERS "NO" OR "DON'T KNOW", GO TO Q. 89.

Yes (Unspecified) (ASK A).....1
Yes, TV (ASK A).....1
Yes, Radio (ASK A).....1
Yes, Printed Media (ASK A).....1
No.....2
Don't Know.....8

A. (IF ANY "YES" RESPONSE TO Q. 88):

If you recall, would you please tell me where it was from and what it was about? INTERVIEWER: "WHERE" REFERS TO GENERAL SOURCE, SUCH AS "LOCAL NEWSPAPER," "MAGAZINE," "TV SHOW," ETC.

89. In the past few months, have you had any discussions about problems of Civil Defense with family members, relatives, friends, neighbors or co-workers? INTERVIEWER: RECORD AS MANY ANSWERS AS RESPONDENT VOLUNTEERS. DO NOT PROBE. IF RESPONDENT ANSWERS "NO" OR "DON'T KNOW," GO TO Q. 90.

Yes (unspecified) 1
Yes, Family..... 1
Yes, Relatives..... 1
Yes, Friends.....1
Yes, Neighbors.....1
Yes, Co-workers.....1
No.....2
Don't know.....8

90. Now just before we finish I have a few background questions about you yourself.

What is your marital status?

Single, never married.....1
 Married.....2
 Divorced.....3
 Widowed.....4
 Separated.....5

91. What is the last grade or year in school ...

	A. You completed?	B. (IF "NEVER MARRIED", CODE 7 WITHOUT ASKING) Your (spouse) completed?
No schooling.....	0	0
Grammar school (1-8 years).....	1	1
Some high school (9-11 years).....	2	2
Completed high school (12 years).....	3	3
College, incomplete.....	4	4
College, graduated.....	5	5
Higher than college.....	6	6
Don't know.....	8	8
Never married.....	-	7

92. What sort of work (does/did) (main earner) usually do?

OCCUPATION: _____

INDUSTRY: _____

93. Is the main wage earner currently employed full-time, part-time, unemployed or retired?

Full-time 1
 Part-time..... 2
 Unemployed..... 3
 Retired..... 4
 Don't know..... 8

94. Are there other persons in the household currently employed either full-time or part-time?

Yes 1
No..... 2
Don't know..... 8

-
95. Counting rents, interest, and things like that, in which one of the groups on this card (HAND RESPONDENT CARD (6)) did your total family income fall, before taxes, last year?

A. Under \$3,000..... 1
B. \$3,000-\$4,999..... 2
C. \$5,000-\$7,499..... 3
D. \$7,500-\$9,999..... 4
E. \$10,000-\$14,999..... 5
F. \$15,000-\$24,999..... 6
G. \$25,000 and over..... 7
Don't know..... 8

TAKE BACK CARD (6)

-
96. Do you own your own home here, or do you rent?

Own 1
Rent..... 2
Other..... 3

-
97. Including yourself, how many people live in this household?

IF RESPONDENT LIVES ALONE, SKIP TO NEXT QUESTION (98)

- A. How many children under 5 years of age live here?

- B. How many children 5 to 13 years of age live here?

- C. How many young people that are 13 to 18 years of age live here?

- D. And finally, how many of the members of this household are 65 years of age or older?

98. Does anyone in this household belong to a labor union?

Yes.....1
No.....2

99. Which social class do you believe yourself to be in--the lower class, working class, middle class, or upper class?

Upper.....1
Middle.....2
Working.....3
Lower.....4
There are no classes.....5
Don't know.....8

100. How old were you on your last birthday? _____

101. (Have you) (Has your husband) ever served in the armed forces?

Yes (ASK A).....1
No.....2
Don't know.....8

A. (IF "YES" TO Q. 101): (Were you) (Was he) ever in combat?

Yes.....1
No.....2
Don't know.....8

102. One final question. In all, how many separate residences have you lived in since age 18?

RECORD NUMBER _____

INTERVIEWER: IF RESPONDENT ANSWERS TWO OR MORE, ASK ONE OF THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS, DEPENDING UPON CURRENT RESIDENCE.

- 102A. IF RESPONDENT CURRENTLY LIVES IN A CITY OR TOWN:

Did you ever live on a farm or in a rural community of 2500 or less population?

Yes.....1
No.....2

- 102C. IF RESPONDENT CURRENTLY LIVES ON A FARM OR IN A RURAL COMMUNITY OF 2500 OR LESS:

Did you ever live in a city?

Yes.....1
No.....2

- 102B. Did you ever live in a town of about 2500 to 10,000 population?

Yes.....1
No.....2

Finally, may I have your name and telephone number in case my office wants to verify that this interview took place? [RECORD ON SELECTION SHEET]

Thank you very much for your time and cooperation. (You have been very helpful.)

IMMEDIATELY AFTER LEAVING RESPONDENT, FILL OUT ITEMS A-L

RESPONDENT'S ADDRESS:

Street or Rural Route

City or Town and State

<p>A. TIME INTERVIEW ENDED: _____ AM _____ PM</p>		<p>H. TOTAL LENGTH OF INTERVIEW: _____ Minutes</p>	
<p>B. DATE OF INTERVIEW: Month (ENTER NO.) _____ Day..... _____ Year..... _____</p>		<p>I. TYPE OF STRUCTURE: Single-family house (detached) 1 Single-family house (attached) 2 Two-dwelling unit house (detached)..... 3 Two-dwelling unit house (attached)..... 4 Multiple-dwelling unit building with approximately _____ DU's..... 5 Rooming house..... 6 Other (SPECIFY) _____ 7 Don't know..... 8</p>	
<p>C. RESPONDENT'S SEX AND QUOTA QUALIFICATION: Male (18-29)..... 1 Male (30 or over)..... 1 Female (employed)..... 2 Female (unemployed)...2</p>		<p>J. COOPERATIVENESS OF RESPONDENT: Very cooperative.....1 Somewhat cooperative.....2 Not cooperative.....3</p>	
<p>D. RESPONDENT'S RACE: White.....1 Black.....2 Oriental.....3 Other (SPECIFY) _____ 4</p>		<p>K. INTEREST OF RESPONDENT: Very interested.....1 Somewhat interested.....2 Uninterested.....3</p>	
<p>E. PRIMARY SAMPLING UNIT (PSU): _____</p>		<p>L. INTERVIEWER'S SIGNATURE: _____</p>	
<p>F. P. S. U. NO: _____</p>			
<p>G. SAMPLING UNIT (S.U.) NO: _____</p>			

CARD #1

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

↓
No World
Tensions

↓
Extreme
World
Tensions

CARD #2

1. Very Likely
2. Likely
3. 50-50 Chance
4. Unlikely
5. Very Unlikely

CARD #3

1. No Time
2. Minutes (15-30)
3. Hours
4. About One Day
5. Two-Three Days
6. A Week or More

CARD #4

1. Certain Danger
2. Great Danger
3. Some Danger
4. Little Danger
5. No Danger at All

CARD #5

1. Very Good
2. Fairly Good
3. 50-50 Chance
4. Fairly Bad
5. Very Bad

AD-A068 729

PITTSBURGH UNIV PA UNIV CENTER FOR SOCIAL AND URBAN--ETC F/G 15/3
ISSUES OF CIVIL DEFENSE: VINTAGE 1978 -- SUMMARY RESULTS OF THE--ETC(U)
FEB 79 J NEHNEVAJSA, G ROGERS, S MANNERS DCPA01-77-C-0218

UNCLASSIFIED


UCSUR-79-CD2

NL

5 of 5

AD
A068 729





MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

CARD #6

- 1. Much Stronger**
- 2. Stronger**
- 3. Both About Equal**
- 4. Weaker**
- 5. Much Weaker**

CARD #7


For each man, woman
and child per year

A. \$ 0
B. \$.05
C. \$.10
D. \$.25
E. \$.50
F. \$1.00
G. \$2.00
H. \$5.00
I. \$10.00
J. \$25.00
K. \$50.00

Approximate
total per year

A. \$ 0 dollars
B. \$10 million
C. \$20 million
D. \$50 million
E. \$100 million
F. \$200 million
G. \$400 million
H. \$ 1 billion
I. \$ 2 billion
J. \$ 5 billion
K. \$ 10 billion

CARD #8




↓
Highly
Undesirable

↓
Highly
Desirable

CARD #9

1. Definitely yes
2. Probably yes
3. Undecided, depends
4. Probably no
5. Definitely no

CARD #10



CARD #11

1. Neighborhood
2. Work
3. Other organization

CARD #12

1. Very helpful
2. Somewhat helpful
3. Neither
4. Somewhat unhelpful
5. Very unhelpful

CARD #13

- 1. Evacuate critical workers and their families and have critical workers commute back and forth to maintain essential services.**
- 2. Evacuate only families of critical workers, urge the critical workers in the relocated areas to stay and maintain essential services and provide full protection for them against blast as well as fallout.**
- 3. Evacuate only families of critical workers, urge the critical workers in the areas to stay and maintain essential services and evacuate them at the last moment, that is, if the danger of nuclear attack becomes imminent.**
- 4. Urge critical workers and their families in the otherwise evacuated areas to stay and maintain essential services and provide full protection for them against both blast and fallout.**
- 5. Urge critical workers and their families in the otherwise evacuated areas to stay and maintain essential services and make plans to evacuate them at the last possible moment.**

CARD #14

- A. Cottage or summer home within about 100 miles from here.
- B. Cottage or summer home within about 200 miles from here.
- C. Camping site or similar place within about 100 miles.
- D. Camping site or similar place within about 200 miles.
- E. Relatives or friends with whom you could stay who live within about 100 miles but not in a city area.
- F. Relatives or friends with whom you could stay who live within about 200 miles but not in a city area.
- G. A family car or cars in which you could evacuate if you should do so.
- H. A camper or similar equipment which you could take along if you were to evacuate.
- I. Camping equipment (tents and the like).
- J. A boat which could be taken some miles away from land.

CARD 15

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

↓
No
Information

↓
A Great
Deal of
Information

CARD # 16

- A. Under \$3,000
- B. \$3,000-\$4,999
- C. \$5,000-\$7,499
- D. \$7,500-\$9,999
- E. \$10,000-\$14,999
- F. \$15,000-\$24,999
- G. \$25,000 and over

INSTRUCTIONS

CIVIL DEFENSE STUDY

SEPTEMBER-NOVEMBER, 1978



**Marketing Information Service
P. O. Box 4402
Atlanta, Georgia 30302**

CORRECTIONS

Interviewer: If necessary, make the following changes to your questionnaires:

1. On page 8, Q25 should read:

A. (If YES to Q25): Have you ever thought about using the basement as a fallout shelter in case of nuclear attack?

Yes.....1
No2

B. (If YES to Q25): Have you ever obtained information about the possibility of using the basement as a fallout shelter?

Yes.....1
No2

NOTE THE ORDER OF THESE QUESTIONS. "A" MUST BE ASKED BEFORE "B". Correct your questionnaires if necessary.

2. Page 37, Q87, CARD 15 should be shown.

3. Page 40, Q95, CARD 16 should be shown.

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GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

1. All: Wear a WATCH. You'll need to record start/stop times of interviews.
2. Familiarize yourself with your MAP and CALL RECORD SHEET. Know the area you will be surveying. Review the sample CALL RECORD SHEET on page 8.
3. Know how to use the SELECTION SHEET. Review the sample SELECTION SHEETS on pages 11-12.
4. Carefully read the ENTIRE QUESTIONNAIRE.
5. Conduct several MOCK INTERVIEWS. You may interview adults in your family, friends and neighbors. THIS IS A CRITICAL STEP to insure that you are as comfortable with the questionnaire as possible.
6. Begin interviewing at addresses on your CALL RECORD SHEET on _____.
7. All interviewing must be completed by _____.
8. Supervisors: MAIL all completed work as instructed on page 13.
9. TELEPHONE your progress reports as instructed on page 14.
10. VALIDATION. Each interviewer's work will be validated by supervisors and MIS project personnel. Both personal visit and telephone procedures will be used.

INTRODUCTION

1. The printed introduction should be used as a guide. Basically, the information we must convey to the respondent is:
 - a. Your name and the fact that you work for Marketing Information Service, a national market research company.
 - b. We are conducting a national study for the University of Pittsburgh to learn people's opinions about foreign affairs and Civil Defense.
 - c. The household address you are presently at was scientifically chosen to represent a large segment of the population. It is very important that we obtain information from this household.
 - d. All information will be kept confidential and will be used only in collective or average form.
 - e. Since this is a national study, we must make sure both males and females of different ages are properly represented. So, before beginning the survey, you must decide which adult in the household should answer the questions.
 - f. If asked, you may tell respondent that the U. S. Office of Civil Preparedness is sponsoring the study.
2. Use the selection procedure described on the page and discussed in this introduction package on page ____.

You must interview the person determined by using the selection sheet procedures.

You may not substitute.

Any problems should immediately be directed to your supervisor.

Once you are speaking with the correct respondent, repeat the introduction if necessary.
3. If you make a mistake and need to replace the selection sheet, make sure you replace it with the same number sheet. For example, if you are using selection sheet 2, replace it with another selection sheet 2. Staple the replacement on top of the first sheet.

SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS

This questionnaire has all specific instructions written in by each question. so this section will review only some procedures.

1. CARD BOOKLET. You will have a booklet containing 16 cards that you will show to the respondent at certain times throughout the interview. When instructed to do so (for example, "HAND RESPONDENT CARD 1"), you should open the booklet to CARD 1 and hand to the respondent. She/he will use the card to give you answers to the next few questions. When instructed to "TAKE BACK CARD 1", obtain the entire booklet from the respondent until you need to use another card. DO NOT MARK ON THE CARD BOOKLET OR LET RESPONDENT DO SO.
2. Most questions require you to a) RECORD a number or letter, b) CIRCLE a number corresponding to a response or c) WRITE a word-for-word (verbatim) response. Review the following examples.

3. And which number represents best your opinion as to world tensions just about two years ago in late 1976?

7

(ENTER NUMBER HERE OR
CODE 88 FOR "DON'T KNOW")

8. Between now and 1955, how likely do you consider it to be that some group of terrorists will claim that they have constructed a nuclear weapon and that they will use it against a city or another community unless their demands are met? In other words, how likely is it that we might experience an American city to be hostage to terrorists armed with a nuclear device?

Very likely.....1
Likely.....2
50-50 Chance.....3
Unlikely.....4
Very unlikely.....5
Don't know.....8

10. What kinds of things would have to happen for you to reach the conclusion that a nuclear war is almost sure to come? (PROBE.)

The president would have to make an announce-
ment to the nation. (P) All communications
would break down between the U.S. and
Russia (X)

3. SKIP PATTERNS. There are quite a few skip patterns in this questionnaire. Make sure you thoroughly understand them before conducting any interviews.

4. Note particularly these questions:

Q41 - If a respondent states an amount between two letters, for example, \$15 million approximate total per year, circle the code corresponding to b-c because \$15 million is BETWEEN B (\$10 million) and C (\$20 million).

A. Using this card, how much do you believe we spent last year on civil defense programs? Which letter on the card best represents the approximate amount you think we spent?

B. How about foreign aid? How much do you think we spend last year on foreign aid programs, not including programs that are entirely military in character.

C. And about how much did we spend on anti-poverty programs last year?

A.....00
a-b.....01
B.....02
b-c.....03
C.....04

A.....00
a-b.....01
B.....02
b-c.....03
C.....04

A.....00
a-b.....01
B.....02
b-c.....03
C.....04

Q68 - Be sure to record the answers to question A in Column A - "Best" (page 28), question B in Column B - "Second Best", question C in Column C - "Worst" and question D in Column D - "Second Worst".

A	B	C	D
Best	Second Best	Worst	Second Worst

1. Evacuate critical workers and their families and have critical workers commute back and forth to maintain essential services.....1

1 1 1

5. IMMEDIATELY following completion of the interview, record answers to items A-L on page 43. Obtain answers to items E, F and G from your CALL RECORD SHEET.

Respondent Questions

1. If you are asked to explain anything, TELL THE RESPONDENT THAT HE/SHE SHOULD GIVE THE BEST ANSWER THAT HE/SHE CAN AND INTERPRET ANY WORD OR PHRASE AS BEST HE/SHE CAN. We are asking their opinions; there are no right or wrong answers. You must not define words or lead the respondent in any way.

2. If the respondent becomes reluctant to complete the entire interview, STRESS how important his/her opinion is, how much we really need to find out how he/she feels about these issues.

CALL RECORD SHEET AND CALLBACK INSTRUCTIONS

1. Your call record sheet will list EITHER:

- a. a specific street address - for example, 22 River Street, or
- b. a specific number of units - for example, 4th unit on River Street, 8th unit on River Street, etc.

In case "a", you must make three (3) attempts to reach a respondent at 22 River Street. You may not substitute another residence.

In case "b", first carefully look at your entire page of listings and street names as well as your map. Determine where the most logical starting point is for the first listing. Then, going down ONE SIDE OF THE STREET, choose the 4th residential unit, record its exact address on your call record sheet and make three (3) attempts to complete an interview with the proper respondent. Continue to go down four more units until you reach the 8th residential unit on River Street. Again, record the exact address and make three (3) attempts to complete an interview with the proper person. A UNIT is considered one residence, that is, a house, each side of a duplex and each apartment in a complex.

2. You must make three attempts to complete an interview at each address WITH THE PERSON DETERMINED BY USING THE SELECTION SHEET.

3. Of these three attempts:

- a. EACH attempt must be made on a DIFFERENT DAY and at a DIFFERENT TIME
- b. ONE must be made on a weekend (Saturday or Sunday)
- c. ONE must be made during the evening (6:00p.m.-9:00p.m.)
- d. The other attempt may be made during weekday hours (3:00p.m.-9:00p.m.)

Do NOT begin interviewing on WEEKDAYS before 3:00 p.m. and on WEEKENDS before 10:00 a.m. The ONLY EXCEPTION to these rules is if you make a specific APPOINTMENT with the respondent to complete the interview.

4. After you visit each address, record the DATE, TIME and RESULT of the visit. REVIEW the sample call record sheet to make sure you know where to write this information. Use the RESULT CODES listed on your selection sheet.

- 1. Vacant
- 2. No answer/not at home (you will visit again)
- 3. Respondent not at home (make appointment for callback)
- 4. Household refusal (someone other than the intended respondent refuses to be interviewed)
- 5. Respondent refusal
- 6. Incomplete interview
- 7. Complete interview

5. Record YOUR NAME at the top of each sheet.

6. ALL CALL RECORD SHEETS must be returned to MIS at the conclusion of the study.

REMEMBER...

YOU MAY NOT SUBSTITUTE ADDRESSES.

YOU MUST MAKE THREE ATTEMPTS TO REACH A RESPONDENT.

STUDY THE EXAMPLES.

PROJECT # C103-8

PSUN 636

PSU Name

XYZ Co., N.Y.

SHEET

OF

SHEETS

INTERVIEWED

Mary Smith

SSU #	MAP #	Map Name	ADDRESS LOCATION OF DWELLING UNIT	INTERVIEW ATTEMPTS (Date, Time, Code of Each Attempt)			
				1st	2nd	3rd	4th
1			2132 River Street	9/11 3:30	2 9/12 7:00	7	
2			2146 River Street	9/11 3:40	3 9/12 4:00	7	
3			2168 River Street	9/11 3:45	1		
4			2207 River Street	9/11 5:00	2 9/12 6:05	7	
5			3104 Lake Ave. Apt. 4A	9/11 5:40	7		
6			3104 Lake Ave. Apt. 8C	9/11 5:45	2 9/12 8:30	2 9/16 11:30	7
7			3104 Lake Ave. Apt. 10A	9/11 5:50	3 9/12 5:10	7	
8			3104 Lake Ave. Apt. 13B	9/11 5:55	5		
9			3104 Lake Ave. Apt. 21C	9/11 7:15	7		
10			3110 Lake Ave. Apt. 2A	9/11 7:30	2 9/12 3:00	3 9/16 12:00	7
11			3110 Lake Ave. Apt. 7D	9/11 7:40	7		
12							
13							
14							
15							
16							
17							

SELECTION SHEET INSTRUCTIONS

THERE ARE TWO SAMPLE selection sheets following this page. Study them carefully.

Starting at the top of the page...

PSU# and SSU#: Obtain these numbers from your call record sheet.

INTERVIEW#: Leave this space BLANK.

Section 1: Record the address at the beginning of your visit and the remaining information at the end of the interview.

Record your name in space marked INTERVIEWER NAME.

Section 2: Record the date, EXACT START TIME and result of the call. The start time is very important because, after completing the interview, you must record the TOTAL LENGTH OF TIME of the interview.

Section 3: If there is MORE THAN one household at this housing unit, go through a second selection procedure using another selection sheet and complete an interview with the proper respondent in the second household.

A HOUSEHOLD is defined as a NUCLEAR FAMILY. For example, if your mother and father came to live with you, they would be considered a SEPARATE HOUSEHOLD from you. If two unrelated adults are sharing a home, EACH IS CONSIDERED A SEPARATE HOUSEHOLD. You will attempt to complete an interview with each of them.

Section 4: SELECTING THE RESPONDENT. Follow the instructions exactly.

- a. Obtain names or titles of all adults (18 years or older) living in the household (COLUMN A).
- b. List the HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD first.
- c. Record the SEX of each adult (COLUMN B).
- d. Record the AGE of each respondent (COLUMN C).
- e. Indicate if each is a U. S. citizen (COLUMN D).
- f. Assign a number to each CITIZEN. Start with the MALES (oldest to youngest) and continue with FEMALES (oldest to youngest) (COLUMN E).
- g. Use the SELECTION TABLE (in lower righthand corner) to determine whom to interview.
- h. Check the person who will be the RESPONDENT (COLUMN F).

THERE ARE TWELVE (12) DIFFERENT SELECTION TABLES. YOU MUST USE THE ONE ATTACHED TO YOUR QUESTIONNAIRE. IF YOU MAKE A MISTAKE, GET A LOOSE COPY OF THAT PARTICULAR TABLE AND STAPLE IT OVER THE FIRST ONE.

If you run out of loose copies of any particular table, another can be made by using any of the 12 extra tables. In such a case, change the selection table number and the numbers in the "Interview the person numbered" column to match

those of the desired selection sheet. You should then staple this selection sheet over the original and select the person to be interviewed.

REMEMBER...

YOU MAY NOT SUBSTITUTE.

YOU MUST MAKE THREE (3) ATTEMPTS TO COMPLETE AN INTERVIEW WITH THE PRE-DETERMINED RESPONDENT.

STUDY THE EXAMPLES.

PSU 101-1 SSU 3 } OBTAIN FROM CALL
RECORD SHEET

ONE - 120-575000
Expires December, 1975

1. NAME Jane Doe TELEPHONE (201) 763-5420 INTERVIEW # 1-4 All Decks

ADDRESS (OR DESCRIPTION) 1112 River Street

CITY New York COUNTY Bergen STATE New York

INTERVIEWER NAME Ron Smith

2. CALL RECORD: RECORD RESULTS OF EACH ATTEMPT USING CODE AT LEFT.

CALL NUMBER	ONE	TWO	THREE
DATE OF CALL	9/25	9/26	9/30
HOOR OF CALL	3:10p	7:15p	2:00p
RESULTS	3	3	7

1. VACANT
2. NO ANSWER/NOT AT HOME
3. RESPONDENT NOT AT HOME (MAKE APPOINTMENT FOR CALL BACK)
4. HOUSEHOLD REFUSAL
5. RESPONDENT REFUSAL
6. INCOMPLETE INTERVIEW
7. COMPLETE INTERVIEW

3. DETERMINE IF THERE IS MORE THAN ONE HOUSEHOLD AT THIS HOUSING UNIT AND CHECK ONE:

☒ ONE HOUSEHOLD

☐ THERE ARE HOUSEHOLDS

MAKE OUT COVER SHEETS FOR EACH HOUSEHOLD. ADD TO ITEM #1 A SPECIFIC DESIGNATION (HOUSEHOLD #1, HOUSEHOLD #2) FOR EACH HOUSEHOLD AS WELL AS IDENTIFYING THE DWELLING ON EACH COVER SHEET. CONTINUE HANDLING FOR EACH HOUSEHOLD.

4. LIST BELOW ALL PERSONS LIVING IN THE HOUSEHOLD WHO ARE 18 YEARS OR OLDER:

(A) RELATIONS-IP TO, OR CONNECTION WITH HEAD	(B) SEX	(C) AGE	(D) CITIZEN (YES OR NO)	(E) NUMBER	(F) CHECK RESPONDENT
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD Husband	M	56	Yes	1	
Wife	F	50	Yes	3	
Daughter	F	25	Yes	4	✓
Son	M	19	Yes	2	
Mother	F	70	No		

A - C. FILL IN ABOVE COLUMNS

D. ASK: "ARE THERE ANY OF THESE PERSONS WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS?" WRITE "NO" FOR ONES WHO ARE NOT AND "YES" FOR ALL CITIZENS.

E. ASSIGN A NUMBER TO EACH CITIZEN IN THE FOLLOWING ORDER: MALES FROM OLDEST TO YOUNGEST; THEN FEMALES FROM OLDEST TO YOUNGEST. USE THE SELECTION TABLE AT THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE WHO TO INTERVIEW. IN THE FIRST COLUMN CIRCLE THE NUMBER OF ELIGIBLE RESPONDENTS. THE NUMBER ACROSS FROM IT IDENTIFIES THE PERSON TO BE INTERVIEWED. (CHECK THIS PERSON AS YOUR RESPONDENT IN COLUMN F.)

SELECTION TABLE ONE

IF THE NUMBER OF ELIGIBLE PERSONS IS:	INTERVIEW THE PERSON NUMBERED:
ONE	1
TWO	2
THREE	3
FOUR	4
FIVE	5
SIX	6

PSU 305 SSU 1

OME - 120- S78002
Expires December, 1978

1. NAME Jim Brown TELEPHONE 404 636-7011 INTERVIEW # 1-4 ATT Decks

ADDRESS (OF DESCRIPTION) 23 Asby St. Apt. 7A

CITY Atlanta COUNTY DeKalb STATE Georgia

INTERVIEWER NAME Mary Smith

2. CALL RECORD: RECORD RESULTS OF EACH ATTEMPT USING CODE AT LEFT.

CALL NUMBER	ONE	TWO	THREE
DATE OF CALL	9/27	9/28	
HOUR OF CALL	4:30p	8:10p	
RESULTS	2	7	

1. VACANT
2. NO ANSWER/NOT AT HOME
3. RESPONDENT NOT AT HOME (MAKE APPOINTMENT FOR CALL BACK)
4. HOUSEHOLD REFUSAL
5. RESPONDENT REFUSAL
6. INCOMPLETE INTERVIEW
7. COMPLETE INTERVIEW

3. DETERMINE IF THERE IS MORE THAN ONE HOUSEHOLD AT THIS HOUSING UNIT AND CHECK ONE:

☒ ONE HOUSEHOLD

☐ THERE ARE HOUSEHOLDS

MAKE OUT COVER SHEETS FOR EACH HOUSEHOLD. ADD TO ITEM #1 A SPECIFIC DESIGNATION (HOUSEHOLD #1, HOUSEHOLD #2) FOR EACH HOUSEHOLD AS WELL AS IDENTIFYING THE DWELLING ON EACH COVER SHEET. CONTINUE HANDLING FOR EACH HOUSEHOLD.

4. LIST BELOW ALL PERSONS LIVING IN THE HOUSEHOLD WHO ARE 18 YEARS OR OLDER:

(A) RELATIONSHIP TO, OR CONNECTION WITH HEAD	(B) SEX	(C) AGE	(D) CITIZEN (YES OR NO)	(E) NUMBER	(F) CHECK RESPONDENT
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD <u>Husband</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
<u>Wife</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>2</u>	

A - C. FILL IN ABOVE COLUMNS

D. ASK: "ARE THERE ANY OF THESE PERSONS WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS?" WRITE "NO" FOR ONES WHO ARE NOT AND "YES" FOR ALL CITIZENS.

E. ASSIGN A NUMBER TO EACH CITIZEN IN THE FOLLOWING ORDER: MALES FROM OLDEST TO YOUNGEST; THEN FEMALES FROM OLDEST TO YOUNGEST.

F. USE THE SELECTION TABLE AT THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE WHOM TO INTERVIEW. IN THE FIRST COLUMN CIRCLE THE NUMBER OF ELIGIBLE RESPONDENTS. THE NUMBER ACROSS FROM IT IDENTIFIES THE PERSON TO BE INTERVIEWED. (CHECK THIS PERSON AS YOUR RESPONDENT IN COLUMN F.)

SELECTION TABLE TEN

IF THE NUMBER OF ELIGIBLE PERSONS IS:

INTERVIEW THE PERSON NUMBERED:

→ ONE 1
TWO 1
THREE 2
FOUR 2
FIVE 1
SIX 2

REPORTING PROCEDURES

Mail Procedures

1. Your first day of completed work is to be mailed to MIS the following day.
2. From then on, every TWO days, mail all completions to MIS.
3. Use the labels and envelopes provided by MIS.
- *4. All packages must be mailed using a CERTIFICATE OF MAILING. (See example below.)
 - a. BEFORE mailing, obtain a certificate from the Post Office (15¢ each).
 - b. COMPLETE the label (YOUR address and MIS address).
 - c. BRING the certificate to the Post Office with the package. The Post Office personnel will stamp the certificate and return it to you.
 - d. RETURN the certificate to MIS with your time and expense reports.

You must use one certificate for EACH package.

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE CERTIFICATE OF MAILING	
Received From:	APR 54 - Postage and Postmark.
<u>Mary Smith</u>	
<u>XY Street</u>	
<u>Z City, State 0000</u>	
One piece of ordinary mail addressed to	
<u>Marketing Information Service</u>	
<u>P.O. Box 4402</u>	
<u>Atlanta, Georgia 30302</u>	
MAY BE USED FOR DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL MAIL. DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR INSURANCE - POSTMASTER	
PS FORM MAY 1971 3817	© GPO:1975-O-578-590

Telephone Procedures

Interviewers: Report DAILY to your supervisor. Report NUMBER OF COMPLETIONS, LOCATION OF COMPLETIONS, ANY PROBLEMS.

Supervisors: After you receive and review your initial package of materials from MIS, report immediately to MIS at (404) 325-3221. Identify yourself as a supervisor for the University of Pittsburgh project. Your telephone reporting procedures will be set up at that time.

December 1978

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(ALL PROJECTS)

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ABSTRACT

This report deals with the aggregate results of a late 1978 survey of a probability sample of 1620 Americans (18 years of age and older in the 48 contiguous states) on issues central to the problems of civil defense. Many questions from previous national studies (1972, 1968, 1966, 1964, 1963) were repeated in the inquiry. The 1978 data show essentially the same results as did the previous inquiries: strong support for measures of civil defense that would stand a chance to enhance the survivability of our people in face of a nuclear attack (as well as selected other nuclear hazards). There exists strong support for appropriate in-place shelter systems (both public fallout shelters and home basement sharing). The nation reflects a high level of support for programs to develop protection against primary effects of nuclear weapons as well (blast sheltering).

The 1978 survey included a major focus on issues having to do with crisis relocation. Since this has been a relatively new emphasis in DCPA, the questions raised in the inquiry are "new." But some of the items were used on a study of the 4th Congressional District of Missouri (Congressman Ike Skelton).

The national results, whenever comparable, parallel the 4th Congressional Missouri District's findings. The data show that considerable spontaneous evacuation might take place in face of an acute international crisis, though an important portion of such population flow might be maladaptive (movement from safe to safe areas, safe to high risk areas, high risk to other high risk areas - using TR-82 as the referent for defining "higher" risk and "safer" areas). Compliance with a Presidential directive to relocate can be expected to be high and by far most Americans also believe

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This report deals with the aggregate results of a late 1978 survey of a probability sample of 1620 Americans (18 years of age and older in the 48 contiguous states) on issues central to the problems of civil defense. Many questions from previous national studies (1972, 1968, 1966, 1964, 1963) were repeated in the inquiry. The 1978 data show essentially the same results as did the previous inquiries: strong support for measures of civil defense that would stand a chance to enhance the survivability of our people in face of a nuclear attack (as well as selected other nuclear hazards). There exists strong support for appropriate in-place shelter systems (both public fallout shelters and home basement sharing). The nation reflects a high level of support for programs to develop protection against primary effects of nuclear weapons as well (blast sheltering).

The 1978 survey included a major focus on issues having to do with crisis relocation. Since this has been a relatively new emphasis in DCPA, the questions raised in the inquiry are "new." But some of the items were used on a study of the 4th Congressional District of Missouri (Congressman Ike Skelton).

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that there may well exist circumstances under which the President might actually opt for population relocation. Helpfulness of host communities is expected, and willingness to accommodate relocatees in private homes is high (higher, indeed, for the respondents themselves than in terms of their attribution of such willingness to others).

There exists low information level about civil defense, but high interest in emergency-related training and education, and high willingness to serve as a civil defense volunteer should the need arise.

Along with supportive assessments of civil defense in general and both in-place and relocation options more specifically, our people also support most key measures of arms control and disarmament thus seeing no contradiction at all between prudent measures of civil defense and advances in arms control agreements with the Soviets. The favorable climate of opinion makes it possible for the (Federal) Government to make almost whatever decisions might promote the enhancement of survival on the part of our people should the nation encounter an acute threat of nuclear confrontation.

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